Bidders' and Sellers' Strategies in Sequential Auctions. New Evidence about the Afternoon Effect
Lucio Picci
Antonello E. Scorcu
Typ
Artikel in referierter Fachpublikation
Fachpublikation
Empirica
Jahrgang
30
Ausgabenummer
2
Seiten
163-178
Online seit
Juli 2003
Keywords
Panel data; dynamic specification; heterogeneity; sequential auctions; price decline puzzle; Bidders' and Sellers' Strategies in Sequential Auctions. New Evidence about the Afternoon Effect
Forschungsgruppe
Industrie-, Innovations- und internationale Ökonomie
Panel data; dynamic specification; heterogeneity; sequential auctions; price decline puzzle; Bidders' and Sellers' Strategies in Sequential Auctions. New Evidence about the Afternoon Effect
Forschungsgruppe
Industrie-, Innovations- und internationale Ökonomie
