Die ESZB-Statuten verpflichten das ESZB zur Sicherung der Preisstabilität, schließen jedoch eine konjunkturstabilisierende
Funktion der Geldpolitik nicht aus. Der EZB-Rat entschied sich im Oktober 1998 für eine flexible geldpolitische Strategie
und legte sich somit weder auf eine Inflationsziel- noch auf eine Geldmengenzielstrategie fest. Die Strategie des ESZB kann
effizient sein, d. h. die Ziele der Geldpolitik optimal erfüllen, wenn das ESZB in der Praxis Elemente einer Inflationszielstrategie
stärker in den Vordergrund rückt. Wichtige Voraussetzung der Rechenschaftspflicht ("accountability") und des raschen Aufbaus
von Reputation und Glaubwürdigkeit ist Transparenz; sie erfordert eine geldpolitische Strategie, die es erlaubt, die Einhaltung
der Ziele der Geldpolitik zu überwachen. Durch die Publikation einer Inflationsprognose kann die Transparenz erhöht werden.
Eine Inflationszielstrategie hat den Vorteil, sowohl effizient als auch transparent zu sein.
Keywords:Effizienz und Transparenz der geldpolitischen Strategie des ESZB; Schwerpunkt "Geldpolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion";
Efficiency and Transparency of the Monetary Policy Strategy of the ESCB
Forschungsbereich:Makroökonomie und öffentliche Finanzen
Sprache:Deutsch
Efficiency and Transparency of the Monetary Policy Strategy of the ESCB
The Treaty of Maastricht specified the goals for monetary policy: According to Art. 105(1), the primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) is to maintain price stability. However, the Treaty also stipulates that, without prejudice
to the objective of price stability, the ESCB is to support, above all, a high level of employment. This can be interpreted
to mean that policy makers assigned the ESCB the tasks to maintain price stability and to stabilise output across business
cycles. In October 1998, the ESCB announced its monetary policy strategy, i.e., a framework for policy decisions that is deemed
appropriate to achieve these goals. Within this strategy, money is given a prominent role: the ESCB published a reference
value for the broad monetary aggregate M3 that is designed to be consistent with, and serve the achievement of price stability.
Furthermore, a broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments and the risks to price stability in the
euro area will play a major role in the ESCB's strategy This strategy is neither a money supply targeting, nor an inflation
targeting strategy. Contrary to the strategy of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the ESCB clearly states that it will not respond
automatically to deviations of current money growth from the announced reference value. Unlike in the case of inflation targeting,
it will publish neither its inflation forecast nor an explicit inflation target. The present article discusses whether the
monetary strategy of the ESCB is optimal, i.e., whether it is efficient and transparent. It is argued that the strategy has
the potential of efficiency, of fulfilling the goals of monetary policy in an optimal way, if the ESCB follows flexible inflation
targeting in practice. Money supply targeting is considered inappropriate, since there is insecurity about whether important
preconditions for the appropriateness of money supply targeting, such as stability and controllability of money demand, are
fulfilled in the Monetary Union. An increasingly important prerequisite for the optimality of a strategy is transparency.
Increased transparency makes the central bank's reputation more sensitive to its actions and induces the central bank to gear
its policy to come closer to that with the greatest social benefit. Transparency is crucial for accountability. The strategy
of the ESCB lacks full transparency. Publishing conditional inflation forecasts would give the public the option to monitor
and evaluate the central bank's policy and to assess its coincidence with the monetary policy goals assigned to the ESCB.