Die monetären Rahmenbedingungen für Außenhandel und Investitionen haben sich seit dem Zusammenbruch des Europäischen Währungssystems
1992/93 nachhaltig verändert. Nach sechs Jahren stabiler Wechselkurse wurde die EU in einen Hartwährungsblock unter der "leadership"
der Deutschen Bundesbank und in die Weichwährungsländer gespalten. Zwischen 1992 und 1995 stieg der real-effektive Wechselkurs
von Deutschland, Frankreich, den Niederlanden, Belgien, Dänemark und Österreich um durchschnittlich 3% pro Jahr, jener der
übrigen EU-Länder sank hingegen um 6% pro Jahr; gleichzeitig expandierten die Exporte der Abwertungsländer real um 9% pro
Jahr, während jene des Hartwährungsblocks um nur 3% zunahmen. Da die Lohnstückkosten in den Weichwährungsländern nicht rascher
steigen als im Hartwährungsblock, dürften die Wechselkursverschiebungen seit 1992 die realwirtschaftliche Entwicklung Europas
auch noch in der nächsten Zukunft beeinflussen.
Keywords:Wechselkursregime und Wirtschaftsdynamik in der EU; Exchange Rate Regime and Economic Activity in the European Union
Forschungsbereich:Industrie-, Innovations- und internationale Ökonomie
Sprache:Deutsch
Exchange Rate Regime and Economic Activity in the European Union
Between 1982 and 1986, the weaker European currencies were devalued substantially in a number of realignments. At the same
time, consumer prices and unit labor costs in the countries concerned rose above average, making for a decline in the real
effective exchange rate by only 1½ percent p.a., while the latter increased by the same amount in the hard-currency countries.
Although exports and investment in the countries of weaker currency were stimulated by these devaluations, GDP of the EU as
a whole expanded by hardly 2 percent p.a. over the period 1981-1987. From 1987 to 1992 when exchange rates remained stable
inflation differentials between soft- and hard-currency countries abated gradually, while trend GDP growth in the EU accelerated
to almost 3 percent p.a. Stable framework conditions for intra-EU trade have been largely responsible for this outcome. Between
September 1992 and August 1993 the EMS de facto collapsed, mainly due to the fact that the policy of high interest rates pursued
by the Bundesbank was oriented towards developments in Germany, while disregarding the need for lower interest rates in EMS
partner countries, particularly in the U.K. Unlike in earlier phases of exchange rate instability unit labor costs since 1992
have not advanced by more than in the hard-currency block, resulting in a large shift in price competitiveness: between 1992
and 1995, the real effective exchange rate of the hard-currency area rose by an average 3 percent p.a. while that of the other
EU countries fell by 6 percent p.a. Over the same period, total exports of the soft-currency area increased by an annual 9
percent, those of the hard-currency block by only 3 percent. Growth of real economic activity in the EU as a whole has been
dampened by exchange rate instability: between 1992 and 1995, real GDP advanced 1½ percent p.a., only half the amount of the
1987-1992 period. Expansion of intra-EU trade, too, has been slower in the latter period – despite the establishment of the
single market – than during the period of stable exchange rates.
