Bis Ende der siebziger Jahre lag der Zinssatz in allen Industrieländern mittelfristig unter der Wachstumsrate, überdies schwankte
er viel weniger als danach. Diese stabilen Finanzierungsbedingungen trugen wesentlich zur hohen Investitions- und Verschuldungsbereitschaft
der Unternehmen bei: Der Unternehmenssektor "übernahm" die Finanzierungsüberschüsse der privaten Haushalte in Form von Investitionskrediten,
der Staatshaushalt war mittelfristig ausgeglichen. Unter diesen Bedingungen ging die Staatsschuldenquote langfristig zurück,
in Westdeutschland und Japan war sie bis Mitte der siebziger Jahre sogar negativ. Dieses Entwicklungsmuster setzte sich Ende
der siebziger Jahre nicht mehr fort, da seither der Zinssatz permanent über der Wachstumsrate liegt. Die Unternehmen können
– wie der Staat – die Relation zwischen ihren Schulden und dem BIP nur dann stabilisieren, wenn sie Überschüsse in ihrer Primärbilanz
erzielen. Tatsächlich "drehten" die Unternehmen ihre Primärbilanz von einem Defizit in einen anhaltenden Überschuß, indem
sie ihre Investitionen von realer zu finanzieller Veranlagung verschoben: Sachkapital und Schulden des Unternehmenssektors
wuchsen langsamer als das BIP, wodurch auch der Beschäftigungsanstieg gedämpft wurde. Bei anhaltend hohen Überschüssen der
privaten Haushalte konnte es dem Staat nicht gelingen, selbst Primärüberschüsse zu erzielen, seine Verschuldung wuchs daher
seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre in nahezu allen Industrieländern rascher als das BIP.
Keywords:Zinssatz, Wachstumsrate und Staatsverschuldung; Interest Rates, Growth, and Public Debt
Forschungsbereich:Industrie-, Innovations- und internationale Ökonomie
Sprache:Deutsch
Interest Rates, Growth, and Public Debt
Variations in nominal interest rates have a larger impact on the distribution of income in the corporate sector than changes
in wages. If the interest rate rises from, say, 5 percent to 8 percent, then interest payments on loans (taken up at variable
interest rates) will go up by 60 percent (other things being equal), thereby weakening the corporate revenue position. If
capacity utilization is high and business expectations optimistic, firms will still stick to their investment plans and offset
the interest-rate-induced fall in savings by higher borrowing. Yet, if the interest rate hike lasts for two or even three
years (as has repeatedly been the case in industrialized countries except Japan) the debt-to-earnings ratio will jump and
force enterprises to consolidate their financial position: by sharply cutting investment and borrowing they will exacerbate
the cyclical downturn caused inter alia by the rise in interest rates. In a recession, rising public transfers and shrinking
tax revenues blow up the deficit; from an aggregate financial balances perspective, the cut in the corporate debt burden entails
a rise in government debt. The recession may be overcome by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, with lower interest
rates contributing towards an improvement in the corporate debt/revenue position. As profit expectations turn more optimistic
and capacity utilization improves, firms resume capital spending and borrowing such that their financial position starts weakening
again while that of the government improves. This cyclical pattern, typical for the industrialized countries, has not been
observed since the early 1980s as, since that time, the rate of interest has come to lie permanently above the rate of growth.
Under such conditions, net debtors like the corporate or the public sector may stabilize their debt-to-GDP ratio only if they
achieve a surplus in their primary balances, i.e., if revenues exceed expenditure net of interest payments. Over the last
fifteen years, enterprises have indeed turned their aggregate primary deficit to a permanent surplus, by shifting investment
from real towards financial assets. Thus, physical capital and corporate debt have both expanded less than GDP, leading also
to a slower rise in employment. With net financial assets of the household sector staying high, it was impossible for the
government sector to accumulate primary surpluses; as a result, its debt rose relative to GDP in almost all industrialized
countries since the early 1980s. The "switch" from a negative to a positive interest rate/growth differential therefore caused
private savings to be channeled less into productive capacity (and employment) and more into government bonds. The hypothesis
whereby government deficits push up interest rates ("crowding out") is not confirmed by the data: government deficits tend
to fall in cyclical boom and early downturn periods while at the same time interest rates rise, and vice versa. The major
determinant of interest rate developments, whose role is often underestimated, appears to be policy action by central banks.