Der Finanzausgleich regelt die Verteilung der Steuereinnahmen sowie von Transfers des Bundes an Länder und Gemeinden und bildet
damit die zentrale Finanzierungsquelle für die Haushalte der Länder und Gemeinden. Er wird durch den österreichischen Stabilitätspakt
künftig in seiner Bedeutung noch gestärkt. Das neue Finanzausgleichsgesetz hat das Gefüge der finanziellen Beziehungen zwischen
den Gebietskörperschaften zwar unverändert gelassen, bringt aber doch dem Bund zusätzliche Steuereinnahmen und stärkt die
finanzielle Position der kleineren Gemeinden. Die Lockerung von Zweckbindungen erweitert den engen Gestaltungsspielraum der
Einnahmen der Länder und Gemeinden. Eine verstärkte Orientierung an den Aufgaben der Gebietskörperschaften und ihrer Entwicklung
fehlt jedoch auch in diesem Finanzausgleich weitgehend.
Keywords:Finanzausgleich als Instrument der Budgetpolitik; The Public Revenue Sharing Scheme as a Budget Policy Tool
Forschungsbereich:Makroökonomie und öffentliche Finanzen
Sprache:Deutsch
The Public Revenue Sharing Scheme as a Budget Policy Tool
The new revenue sharing law has hardly changed the distribution of public funds among the federal government, Länder, and
communities as compared to previous laws, except that the distribution key for joint federal taxes (for income-based and inheritance
taxes) has clearly shifted in favour of the federal government, which, with the exception of ATS 1 billion, claims all additional
revenues flowing from the tax measures provided for in the laws accompanying the budgets for 2000 and 2001. As a result, the
federal share of the joint federal taxes rises, and will again grow in 2002 by which time the federal government will receive
70.2 percent of the joint federal tax revenues available for distribution. Since the provinces have undertaken, within the
scope of the growth and stability pact, to achieve a surplus of 0.75 percent of GDP, and local governments are set to achieve
a balanced budget, tensions are expected to rise in view of the narrowing leeway open to the provinces and communities. Nevertheless
the new revenue sharing scheme and the law covering earmarked contributions show a trend towards lesser use of earmarked funds,
which in turn widens the margin given to the provinces. The legal frame for transfer payments has remained widely unchanged.
The smaller communities were able to negotiate for a greater portion of the horizontal distribution of revenue shares: they
will now get a higher base amount which will rise annually for the duration of the current scheme. Consequently, the share
obtained by the smaller communities will increase at the expense of larger municipalities – first indications of growing solidarity
between communities. In the longer term it will be necessary to refocus the revenue sharing scheme on responsibilities. The
object should be to reduce the enormous transfers between territorial authorities (almost ATS 200 billion in 1999) and replace
them by a distribution of revenue shares on the basis of financing responsibilities, so that performance and its financing
are more closely linked. This implies not just changing the financing system, but also further departing from the earmarking
practice which aggravates efforts by the provinces and communities to achieve the goals of the stability pact. Greater emphasis
on responsibility-focused distribution of revenue shares would also meet the demand for more competition between regions without
the need to change fiscal sovereignty. In Austria, greater consideration of the source principle would be problematic for
revenue distribution as it would compound regional problems. Altogether, the new revenue sharing scheme needs to be viewed
as being only an intermediate step towards comprehensive change and restructuring of future financial relations between territorial
authorities.