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WIFO-Publikationen und Projektberichte(296 Treffer)

Fritz Breuss, The United States-Euro Area Growth Gap Puzzle

WIFO Working Papers, 2017, (541), 39 Seiten
Ten years ago, the global financial crisis started to unwind in the USA and triggered the greatest recession since World War II. Although the crisis of 2007-08 was caused in the USA, their economy was not hit so hard in the Great Recession of 2009 as in Europe, and in particular in the Euro area. The USA also recovered more rapidly and sustained from the crisis than the Euro area. Additionally, the specific Euro (debt) crisis of 2010 led to a double-dip recession in the Euro area, not joined by the USA. This divergent post-crisis development since then accumulated to a considerable growth gap between the USA and the Euro area. What are the factors behind this different performance? Would a more aggressive fiscal and/or monetary policy in the Euro area have closed the growth gap? As our simulation exercises show: the answer is no. However, the unconventional monetary policy by the ECB since 2014-15 contributed to the most recent recovery in the Euro area. We identify the pivotal reason of Euro areas growth lagging behind the USA in the different experiences in the crises management. The USA has a long-lasting experience in handling financial crises. In historical comparison, the Euro area – the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the EU – is still a "teenager". The crises revealed, that the legal basis of the institutional set-up of EMU and hence of the Euro area was not enough crises-proven. Rescue instruments had newly to be implemented. The global financial crisis was the first great shock which was badly absorbed by the still quite heterogeneous Euro countries. The Euro area, shattered by a succession of external (global financial crisis, Great Recession) and internal (Euro crisis) shocks, could therefore not unfold its growth potential in the last decade. If – hypothetically – the Euro area would have profited from the faster-growing production inputs (capital and labour) as in the USA, the growth gap could have been closed.
Online seit: 01.09.2017 0:00

Fritz Breuss, A Macroeconomic Model of CETA's Impact on Austria

WIFO Working Papers, 2017, (532), 33 Seiten
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada is the most ambitious (new generation) free trade agreement the EU has ever negotiated. It is a "mixed" agreement with EU and member countries competences. Most elements of the agreement for which the EU has "exclusive competence", including the chapter on tariffs and non-tariff barriers (the dismantling of all barriers to trade in goods and services and market access to foreign direct investment) can – after the European Parliament gave its consent on 15 February 2017 – be applied provisionally in spring 2017. With a specifically constructed macroeconomic trade and growth model for Austria, we simulate the impact of CETA on Austria. CETA will add 0.3 percent to Austria's real GDP in the medium run and will stimulate bilateral trade and FDI. Our model is a small prototype model and can easily be applied to other foreign trade agreements the EU is planning. A comparison shows that TTIP – which is "politically" dead now – would have the biggest impact (real GDP +1.7 percent).The almost finished negotiated EU-Japan foreign trade agreement would result in an increase of Austria's real GDP by 0.4 percent in the medium run.
Online seit: 31.03.2017 0:00

Fritz Breuss, Would DSGE Models have Predicted the Great Recession in Austria?

WIFO Working Papers, 2016, (530), 24 Seiten
DSGE (Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models are the common workhorse of modern macroeconomic theory. Whereas story-telling and policy analysis were in the forefront of applications since its inception, the forecasting perspective of DSGE models is only recently topical. In this study, we perform a post-mortem analysis of the predictive power of DSGE models in the case of Austria's recession in 2009. For this purpose, 8 DSGE models with different characteristics (small and large models, closed and open economy models, one and two-country models) were used. The initial hypothesis was that DSGE models are inferior in ex-ante forecasting a crisis. Surprisingly however, it turned out that not all but those models which implemented features of the causes of the global financial crisis (like financial frictions or interbank credit flows) could not only detect the turning point of the Austrian business cycle early in 2008 but they also succeeded in forecasting the following severe recession in 2009. In comparison, non-DSGE methods like the ex-ante forecast with the Global Economic (Macro) Model of Oxford Economics and WIFO's expert forecasts performed not better than DSGE models in the crisis.
Online seit: 08.11.2016 0:00

Fritz Breuss, The Crisis Management of the ECB

WIFO Working Papers, 2016, (507), 45 Seiten
A sequence of crises – the global financial crisis in 2008, the "Great Recession" in 2009 and the subsequent Euro crisis – constituted a major challenge for policy makers. After the fiscal policy had used up its powder in fighting the 2009 recession, monetary policy remained the only expansionary player in the policy arena. The ECB reacted to the crises with applying conventional (interest rate) and unconventional (qualitative easing) measures, however, with a considerable delay to the US Fed. The interest (main refinancing operation) rate was set to zero in September 2014 (the Fed already in December 2008) and the proper QE programme started not until March 2015 (the Fed shortly after the Lehman brothers crash). In evaluating the crisis management of the ECB one must state a clear failure in reaching its own medium term inflation target of 2 percent. However, it was successful in bringing down interest rates for government bonds after Draghi's famous "whatever it takes" speech in July 2012 and the following announcement of the outright monetary transactions programme. Whether ECB's QE programme 2015-2017 will be successful in reaching its primary goal, namely regaining the inflation target of 2 percent is an open question. Simulations with the Global Economic Model of Oxford Economics indicate that it will be able to reach the inflation goal but only with a considerable lag. The impact on the real economy will not be as large as QE experiments in the USA. Other unintended effects – e.g., the creation of bubbles on the stock markets – are larger than the intended effects. In contrast to the usual dynamic stochastic general equilibrium exercises our simulations of ECB's QE with the global economic model can not only quantify the effects for the Euro area as a whole but also for its member countries and it can identify the possible spillovers to countries outside the Euro area.
Online seit: 08.01.2016 0:00

Fritz Breuss, In Search of Growth in a Future with Diminished Expectations. The Case of Austria

WIFO Working Papers, 2015, (493), 48 Seiten
The euro area has – in contrast to the USA – still not recovered from the "Great Recession" 2009 and the following euro crisis. Some fear that Europe could embark into a decade of "secular stagnation" like Japan in the recent past. The US success can be attributed to the application of the strategy of the "three arrows": a co-ordinated expansionary fiscal and monetary policy cum permanent structural reforms. In contrast, the euro area has its hands tied by a self-imposed restriction in fiscal policy (new fiscal rules). Thus, the euro area remains as a growth-stimulating strategy only an expansionary monetary policy by the ECB plus "structural reforms" at the member country level. Austria – after the expiring of the hitherto "EU growth bonus" – has also to look for new strategies to stimulate growth by its own. In simulations with a macro-growth model for Austria alternative growth scenarios are analysed: structural reforms to improve efficiency in product und labour markets, investment in knowledge and innovation (R&D), more globalisation, and traditional demand policies (monetary and fiscal). The most promising strategies are more globalisation and structural reforms plus R&D investments. Most of these strategies would stimulate growth without impairing fiscal sustainability.
Online seit: 07.01.2015 0:00

Fritz Breuss, TTIP und ihre Auswirkungen auf Österreich. Ein kritischer Literaturüberblick

WIFO Working Papers, 2014, (468), 36 Seiten
Mit einem umfassenden Handels- und Investitionsabkommen (TTIP) wollen die EU und die USA die größte Freihandelszone der Welt errichten und damit Wachstum und Beschäftigung stimulieren. Zwar prognostizieren alle bisherigen TTIP-Studien positive Handels-, Wohlfahrts- und Beschäftigungseffekte für beide Vertragsparteien (allerdings in ungleichem Ausmaß), doch treten diese nicht sofort ein, sondern erst sehr langfristig. Die TTIP ist daher zur Überwindung der gegenwärtigen Krise nicht geeignet. Die geschätzten Liberalisierungseffekte divergieren erheblich je nach Methode: Während allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle (CGE-Modelle) sehr geringe Wohlfahrtseffekte ermitteln (½% bis 1% des BIP), versprechen Schätzungen mit Gravitationsmodellen außerordentlich hohe Gewinne (Steigerung der Realeinkommen in der EU um 5% und in den USA um 13,4%). Für Österreich wird eine langfristig realisierbare BIP-Zunahme um 1,7% (CGE-Modell) bis 2,7% (Gravitationsmodell) geschätzt. Politisch heikel sind die Aussagen bezüglich der Auswirkungen auf Drittländer. Hier orten Schätzungen mit Gravitationsmodellen höchste Verluste für Handel (Handelsumlenkung) und Wohlfahrt. Das könnte die Genehmigung einer TTIP durch die WTO problematisch machen. NGOs und die interessierte Öffentlichkeit sind – angesichts der scheinbaren Intransparenz der Verhandlungen – darüber hinaus zunehmend skeptisch geworden. Die Europäische Kommission hat daher im Frühjahr 2014 die Verhandlungen im Bereich Investitionsschutz vorübergehend ausgesetzt, um die Öffentlichkeit besser zu informieren.
Online seit: 12.05.2014 0:00

Fritz Breuss, A Prototype Model of European Integration. The Case of Austria

WIFO Working Papers, 2014, (465), 32 Seiten
Post-war European integration is a succession of regime changes: customs union in the 1960s, Single Market and EMU in the 1990s and EU enlargement in the 2000s. Since 1995 Austria as an EU member takes part in the deepening of EU integration (Single Market, EMU and Monetary Union) and participates in the enlargement process of the EU. Around the years 2014-15 Austria celebrates several anniversaries: 25 years of the fall of the Iron Curtain and hence expansion of new market opportunities through the opening-up of Eastern Europe, 20 years of EU and 15 years of EMU, 10 years since the start of the EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe. With the Croatian accession in 2013, the EU now counts 28 member countries. In order to capture the effects of the last 25 years of Austria's integration into Europe, an integration model for Austria is estimated. It is able to reproduce the main integration effects theoretically expected from the regime changes since 1989. In this respect, the Austrian integration model could also serve as a prototype for other EU countries. Overall, the participation in all integration steps since 1989 has added about 1 percent to Austria's real GDP per year.

Fritz Breuss, Europa als Global Player

WIFO Working Papers, 2013, (455), 81 Seiten
Europa (besonders die EU) ist als regionaler Wirtschaftsraum in die Globalisierung eingebettet. Die EU hat sich seit dem Inkrafttreten des Lissabon-Vertrages am 1. Dezember 2009 zunehmend auch von einem "politischen Zwerg" zu einem geachteten politischen "Global Player" entwickelt. Europas verliert zwar allmählich seine Vormachtstellung im Welthandel, dennoch ist die EU nach wie vor eine "Welthandels-Supermacht". Der Euro ist seit seiner Einführung 2002 zur zweitwichtigsten Weltreservewährung geworden. Die EU unterhält – da die Doha-Runde im Rahmen der WTO bisher noch nicht erfolgreich war – ein umfangreiches Netzwerk bilateraler Freihandelsabkommen ("Spaghetti-Schüssel"). Zur Abschirmung vor den Gefahren der Globalisierung verfolgt die EU mehrere Strategien: Zum einen wird durch die ständige EU-Erweiterung der Binnenmarkt immer größer, was einer impliziten Abschottung gegenüber Drittländern gleichkommt. Verstärkt wird dieser Immunisierungseffekt durch die Ausdehnung der Euro-Zone. Zum anderen ist die Wettbewerbs- und Anti-Dumping-Politik der EU sehr effizient in der Sicherstellung eines fairen Wettbewerbes im EU-Binnenmarkt. Den Globalisierungsverlierern hilft die EU mit dem Globalisierungsfonds.
Online seit: 18.11.2013 0:00

Fritz Breuss, European Banking Union

WIFO Working Papers, 2013, (454), 38 Seiten
The ongoing Euro crisis and the worse economic development in Europe than in the USA are grounded, not the least in the delayed implementation of reforms of the banking sector. Whereas the leaks in economic governance of EMU have been fixed the banking sector is still not stabilised, even five years after Lehman Brothers. From the grand solution of a "European Banking Union" (EBU) only the first pillar, the European Bank Supervision with the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) will come into effect in 2014. The other necessary steps – the single resolution mechanism (SRM) and the single deposit guarantee mechanism (SDM) – will follow later. Until the "Europeanisation" will take place the bank recovery and resolution will be managed nationally based on EU law. A first evaluation indicates that the potential benefits of solving bank problems via the resolution mechanism of a new EBU would be distributed unequally between the member countries of the EU/Euro area. Germany would be the biggest loser, Spain and the Netherlands the biggest winners. Of the non-euro countries, the UK and Sweden have the most to gain, but Poland would lose. The country-specific gains of EBU depend on the number and size of banks which are located in a country. It is, however, not yet clear whether the goal of macroeconomic stabilising of bank resolutions would be better achieved when executed via the SRM or with the ESM, both for the countries affected and for the Euro area as a whole.
Online seit: 20.09.2013 0:00

Fritz Breuss, Die Größe der Kleinen in der EU

WIFO Working Papers, 2013, (452), 51 Seiten
In den frühen 1970er-Jahren kritisierte E.F. Schumacher die westlichen Industrieländer angesichts der aufkommenden Globalisierungstendenzen mit dem von Leopold Kohr geprägten Slogan "Small is beautiful". Im Zusammenhang mit der voranschreitenden EU-Erweiterung stellt sich die Frage, wieweit Klein immer noch schön ist. Der Binnenmarkt verspricht die größten Integrationsgewinne durch die Nutzung von Economies-of-Scale. Gemäß der Integrationstheorie würden große Volkswirtschaften (mit ihren größeren Unternehmen) mehr von der Vertiefung der europäischen Integration profitieren als kleine. Ist die Größe der Volkswirtschaften aber innerhalb der EU wirklich von Bedeutung? Bestand die ursprüngliche EU 6 aus Ländern gleicher Größe, so ist die EU 28 heute sehr ungleichgewichtig: 7 großen und mittelgroßen Ländern stehen 21 kleine gegenüber. Während in der Politik nach wie vor die großen Länder (auch im Rat) das Sagen haben, inbesondere aufgrund der historischen Achse Berlin–Paris, ist das Bild vom wirtschaftlichen Standpunkt gemischt and entspricht weitgehend der Einschätzung von Rose (2006) auf der Suche nach einem "national scale effect". Auch für die EU-Länder gilt, dass es auf die Größe nicht ankommt. Kleine Volkswirtschaften sind offener gegenüber dem Außenhandel als große (und sollten daher vom freien Zugang zum Binnenmarkt mehr profitieren), aber unterscheiden sich darüber hinaus nicht systematisch. Größe macht nicht reicht. Die Wachstumsperformance hängt nicht von der Landesgröße ab, sondern vom Untersuchungszeitraum und der Integrationsphase.
Online seit: 08.08.2013 0:00

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