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WIFO publications and research project papers(442 hits)

Ewald Walterskirchen, Hans Seidels Sicht auf die Fiskalpolitik der Ära Kreisky

WIFO-Monatsberichte, 2017, 90(12), pp.913-917
   
Hans Seidel bezeichnet die wirtschaftlichen Erfolge der Regierung Kreisky, gemessen an den üblichen ökonomischen Kennzahlen, als beeindruckend. Er merkt allerdings an, dass die Regierung Budgetdefizite hinterließ, die von den nachfolgenden Regierungen beseitigt werden mussten.
 
Online since: 20.12.2017 0:00

Ewald Walterskirchen, Hans Seidel, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik in der Kreisky-Ära. Zur Entstehung des Buches

WIFO-Monatsberichte, 2017, 90(12), pp.909-911
   
Hans Seidel setzt sich in seinem letzten Buch mit der Kreisky-Periode auseinander. Er untersucht, wie die Herausforderungen zweier schwerer Erdölpreiskrisen besser gemeistert werden konnten als im Ausland. Neben der bewährten Sozialpartnerschaft trugen dazu vor allem die neuentwickelten Konzepte der Hartwährungspolitik und des Austro-Keynesianismus bei.
 

Ewald Walterskirchen, Working Hours in a Period of Low Economic Growth. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 110

WWWforEurope: Welfare, Wealth and Work for Europe, January 2016, 15 pages, http://www.foreurope.eu
Collectively agreed reductions of working hours phased out in Europe in the 1990ies. During the last two decades, working time became more flexible and heterogeneous. Working hours of full-time employees in the EU hardly changed. The strong increase in part-time work was the outstanding phenomenon. Today, one third of female employees and almost 10 percent of male employees work part-time. In a period of slow growth, productivity gains will be squeezed by subdued investment and low capacity utilisation. Thus, a smaller pie will be available either for real wage increases or for working time reductions. In this situation, it will be politically even more difficult to find an agreement on shorter working hours than in past decades. Since the productivity and employment effects of a working time reduction in a low-growth period are quite uncertain, social partners must be willing to negotiate again when the effects become apparent.
 
Commissioned by: European Commission
Supported by: Österreichische Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft mbH – Austrian Agency for International Cooperation in Education and Research – OeAD-GmbH
Study by: Project team WWWforEurope

Anna Dimitrova, Katarina Hollan, Daphne Channa Laster, Andreas Reinstaller, Margit Schratzenstaller, Ewald Walterskirchen, Teresa Weiss (WIFO), Literature Review on Fundamental Concepts and Definitions, Objectives and Policy Goals as well as Instruments Relevant for Socio-ecological Transition. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 40

WWWforEurope: Welfare, Wealth and Work for Europe, September 2013, 77 pages, http://www.foreurope.eu
The WWWforEurope project's central goals are to identify the forces and challenges necessitating deliberations on a new growth path, to define socio-ecological transition, key actors and main obstacles, and to find out how the process of a socio-ecological transition can be initiated, monitored, and accelerated on an institutional level (EU, national and regional level). The paper focuses on the concepts of sustainability, growth, innovation, welfare and well-being, wealth and work. We also look at the various dimensions and definitions of transition and transformation which can be found in the literature, trying to concretise the concept of a socio-ecological transition forming the context and starting point of the WWWforEurope project.
 
Study by: Project team WWWforEurope
Commissioned by: European Commission

Karl Aiginger, Fritz Breuss, Obituary: Kurt Wilhelm Rothschild (1914–2010). Emeritus Professor Kurt Wilhelm Rothschild, Austrian Economist, Passed Away on November 15th, 2010, aged 97, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.153-154, http://www.springer.com/10663
 

Fritz Breuss, Global Financial Crisis as a Phenomenon of Stock Market Overshooting, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.131-152, http://www.springer.com/10663
Inspired by Dornbusch's model of exchange rate overshooting we develop a theory of stock market behaviour and its impact on the real economy. The idea is that stock market prices overshoot and undershoot their long-run equilibrium values which are determined by the development in the real economy. The overshooting is triggered primarily by a loose monetary policy. With our model we explain the genesis of the global financial crisis 2008–2009 primarily as the result of a loose monetary policy in the USA. Following the overshooting and crash in the stock market the real economy dropped into a recession. After modelling the interaction of three markets with different speed of adjustment – money, stocks and goods – for a closed economy we expand it to an open economy and lastly study the spillovers of a financial market crisis between countries (from a large to a small country) by introducing the transmission channels of external trade or cross-border financial transactions. A long-lasting monetary easing as exhibiting by the Fed and the ECB since 2007 and 2008, respectively, could – according to our model – generate another boom-bust cycle.
 

Gunther Tichy, Why Did Policy Ignore the Harbingers of the Crisis?, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.107-130, http://www.springer.com/10663
An analysis of the monetary authorities' reports for 2005 to 2007 reveals that they were well aware of the risks of the financial crisis. They, however, tended to overemphasise the risks outside their control and to neglect those, at least partially under their control. Central banks should and could have acted already in 2005. Academic studies and their own assessments clearly indicated an accumulation of risks. Monetary authorities didn't react as 1. they believe in self-regulating markets, and 2. in monetary instruments' ineffectiveness to prevent bubbles, as well as 3. their tendency to assigning an extremely low probability to potential risks. This is not untypical for expert assessments: Risk assessment for complex systems is extremely complicated. If feasible at all, it would require extraordinarily complex techniques to take into account the tight coupling of system components and their complex interaction. This will not be possible in the foreseeable future. As a result reducing the system's complexity appears to be the only way to reduce the probability and the severity of future financial crises.
 

Franz R. Hahn, David Mayes: The Future of Financial Markets – How to Avoid a Financial Crisis in the Future? Comment, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.103-105, http://www.springer.com/10663
 

David G. Mayes, The Future of Financial Markets: Financial Crisis Avoidance, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.77-101, http://www.springer.com/10663
This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of such future crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive-based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.
 

Helene Schuberth, Lessons from the Crisis in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s by Jaakko Kiander, Pentti Vartia: Comment, in: Gerhard Rünstler, Ewald Walterskirchen, Special Issue: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Conference in Honour of Kurt W. Rothschild

Empirica, 2011, 38(1), pp.71-76, http://www.springer.com/10663
 
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