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Further publications: Stefan Ederer (24 hits)

If Piketty's main theoretical prediction (r > g leads to rising wealth inequality) is taken to its radical conclusion, then a small elite will own all wealth if capitalism is left to its own devices. We formulate and calibrate a Post-Keynesian model with an endogenous distribution of wealth between workers and capitalists which permits such a corner solution of all wealth held by capitalists. However, it also shows interior solutions with a stable, non-zero wealth share of workers, a stable wealth-to-income ratio, and a stable and positive gap between the profit and the growth rate determined by the Cambridge equation. More importantly, simulations show that the model conforms to Piketty's empirical findings during a transitional phase of increasing wealth inequality, which characterizes the current state of high-income countries: the wealth share of capitalists rises to over 60 percent, the wealth-to-income ratio increases, and income inequality rises. Finally, we show that the introduction of a wealth tax as suggested by Piketty could neutralize this rise in wealth concentration predicted by our model.
We develop and calibrate an analytical growth model in the Post-Keynesian tradition with an endogenous wealth distribution and differential returns to wealth between workers and capitalists. We show that a long-run equilibrium allows for non-zero wealth owned by workers, even as the model contains the "triumph of the rentier" predicted by Piketty as a special case. The model's calibration to ten European countries shows that the distribution of wealth is likely to become more unequal in all cases, barring political countermeasures.
The paper investigates how including the distribution of wealth changes the demand effects of redistributing functional income. It develops a model with an endogenous wealth distribution and shows that the endogenous rise in wealth inequality resulting from a redistribution towards profits weakens the growth effects of this redistribution. Consequently, a wage-led regime becomes more strongly wage-led. A profit-led regime on the other hand becomes less profit-led and there may even be a regime switch – in this case the short-run profit-led economy becomes wage-led in the long run due to the endogenous effects of wealth inequality. The paper thereby provides a possible explanation for the instability of demand regimes over time.
This paper estimates rates of return across the gross wealth distribution in eight European countries. Like differential saving rates, differential rates of return matter for Post Keynesian theory, because they impact the income and wealth distribution and add an explosive element to growth models. We show that differential rates of return matter empirically by merging data on household balance sheets with long-run returns for individual asset categories. We find that (1) the composition of wealth differentiates between three socioeconomic groups: 30 percent are asset-poor, 65 percent are middle-class home owners, and the top 5 percent are business-owning capitalists; (2) rates of return rise across all groups; and (3) rates of return broadly follow a log-shaped function across the distribution, where inequality in the lower half of the distribution is higher than in the upper half. If socioeconomic groups are collapsed into the bottom 95 percent workers and top 5 percent capitalists, then rates of return are 5.6 percent for the former and 7.2 percent for the latter.
Macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU are at the heart of the current crisis. One explanation for the high current account deficits in the Southern European countries is that they lack a large, competitive and export-oriented industrial sector. The paper tests the hypothesis that parts of the structural change which happened in the EU before 2008 were supported by the divergent unit labour cost developments in the EMU. We look into patterns of structural change and sectoral competitiveness in all EU member countries and assess their linkages by means of a descriptive analysis as well as through econometric estimations. Our results broadly support the hypothesis. Industrial policy, which aims at fostering new competitive export-oriented industries in Southern Europe in order to reduce macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU, should thus be combined with adjustments in relative labour costs.
Der Artikel untersucht Verdoorn-Effekte in Österreich und der EU empirisch mittels ökonometrischer Methoden. Wir finden sowohl für die Sachgütererzeugung als auch für die Gesamtwirtschaft signifikante Effekte. Demnach zieht ein Anstieg der Produktion um 1% eine Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität um bis zu ½ Prozentpunkt nach sich. Mit Hilfe von Impuls-Antwort-Funktionen werden zusätzlich endogene Verstärkungsmechanismen über eine stärkere Kapitalakkumulation und den dadurch induzierten technischen Fortschritt abgebildet. Eine Phase schwachen Wirtschaftswachstums hat demnach einen direkten negativen Einfluss auf das Produktivitätswachstum und daher den langfristigen Wohlstand und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Angebotsseitige Politikmaßnahmen zur Steigerung der Produktivität sollten daher durch Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage ergänzt werden.
Piketty's main theoretical prediction is that a small elite will own all wealth if capitalism is left to its own devices. We formulate and calibrate a Post-Keynesian model with an endogenous distribution of wealth between workers and capitalists. The model permits Piketty's corner solution of all wealth held by capitalists; however, it also shows that interior solutions with a stable, non-zero wealth share of workers, a stable wealth-to-income ratio, and a stable and positive gap between the profit and the growth rate are determined by the Cambridge equation. Furthermore, simulations show that the model conforms to Piketty's empirical findings in a transitional phase, in which the wealth share of capitalists rises to over 60 percent, the wealth-to-income ratio increases, and income inequality rises. Finally, we show that the introduction of a wealth tax as suggested by Piketty could neutralise the rise in wealth concentration.
We develop and calibrate an analytical growth model in the neo-Kaleckian tradition with an endogenous wealth distribution and differential returns to wealth between workers and capitalists. We show that a long-run equilibrium allows for non-zero wealth owned by workers, even as the model contains the "triumph of the rentier" predicted by Piketty's r > g as a special case. The model's calibration to ten European countries shows that the distribution of wealth is likely to become more unequal in all cases, barring political countermeasures.
We develop and calibrate an analytical growth model in the neo-Kaleckian tradition with an endogenous wealth distribution and differential returns to wealth between workers and capitalists. We show that a long-run equilibrium allows for non-zero wealth owned by workers, even as the model contains the "triumph of the rentier" predicted by Piketty's r > g as a special case. The model's calibration to ten European countries shows that the distribution of wealth is likely to become more unequal in all cases, barring political countermeasures.
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