ASCII schlägt eine Überarbeitung der EU-Richtlinie zur Lieferkettensorgfaltspflicht vor, der EU Corporate Sustainable Due
Diligence Directive. Die Richtlinie basiert auf europäischen Werten und ist zu begrüßen. Um eine kosteneffiziente Umsetzung
zu ermöglichen, sollte sie sich auf die Überwachung von Zulieferern konzentrieren, anstatt auf bilaterale Beziehungen zwischen
Käufern und Verkäufern. Negativ- und Positivlisten von Ländern und Zulieferern sollten eingeführt werden. Solche Listen enthalten
ausländische Zulieferer, denen die Teilnahme an EU-Lieferketten verboten (Negativlisten) oder erlaubt (Positivlisten) ist.
Mit Unternehmen auf Negativlisten dürfen keine Geschäfte getätigt werden. Bei Verträgen mit Unternehmen, die auf Positivlisten
stehen, müssen EU-Importeure keine Sorgfaltsprüfung der Unternehmen durchführen. Dies senkt die Gesamtkosten der Verordnung
für EU-Importeure, verringert die Wahrscheinlichkeit unerwünschter Nebenwirkungen und macht das Instrument wirksamer. Die
Nichteinhaltung durch einen ausländischen Zulieferer kann zur Streichung von der Liste führen, was einem EU-weiten Exportverbot
gleichkommt und somit die Marktmacht des EU-Binnenmarktes nutzt. Die Wirksamkeit würde auch dadurch erhöht, dass die Rechtsunsicherheit
für Unternehmen verringert und der Geltungsbereich der Verordnung über in der EU ansässige Produktionsnetzwerke hinaus ausgedehnt
ASCII proposes a revision of the EU directive on supply chain due diligence, the EU Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive.
The directive is based on European values and is to be welcomed. ASCII suggests that the Directive should focus, where possible,
on direct monitoring of suppliers rather than on bilateral relationships between buyers and sellers. The directive should
be amended to allow the use of negative and positive lists of countries and suppliers. Such lists contain foreign suppliers
that are prohibited (negative lists) or authorised (positive lists) to participate in EU supply chains. When contracting with
companies on positive lists, EU importers do not have to carry out due diligence on the companies. They are prohibited from
doing business with companies on negative lists. The Directive will continue to apply to non-listed companies. This reduces
the overall cost of the regulation for EU importers, reduces the likelihood of unwanted side-effects and makes the instrument
more effective, as non-compliance by a foreign supplier leads to delisting throughout the EU, not just with a single buyer.
It would also increase effectiveness by reducing legal uncertainty and extending the scope of the regulation beyond EU-based
Globalisation has had undesirable effects on the labour standards embedded in the products we consume. This paper proposes
an ex-ante evaluation of supply chain due diligence regulations, such as the EU Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive
(CSDDD). We construct a full-scale network model derived from structural business statistics of 30 million EU firms to quantify
the likelihood of links to firms potentially involved in human rights abuses in the European supply chain. The 900 million
supply links of these firms are modelled in a way that is consistent with multiregional input-output data, EU import data,
and stylized facts of firm-level production networks. We find that this network exhibits a small world effect with three degrees
of separation, meaning that most firms are no more than three steps away from each other in the network. Consequently, we
find that about 8.5 percent of EU companies are at risk of having child or forced labour in the first tier of their supply
chains, about 82.4 percent are likely to have such offenders at the second tier and more than 99.1 percent have such offenders
at the third tier. We also profile companies by country, sector, and size for the likelihood of having human rights violations
or child and forced labour violations at a given tier in their supply chain, revealing considerable heterogeneity across EU
companies. Our results show that supply chain due diligence regulations that focus on monitoring individual buyer-supplier
links, as currently proposed in the CSDDD, are likely to be ineffective due to a high degree of redundancy and the fact that
individual company value chains cannot be properly isolated from the global supply network. Rather, to maximise cost-effectiveness
without compromising due diligence coverage, we suggest that regulations should focus on monitoring individual suppliers.
Why does the world seem to suddenly be fighting over antibiotics? For one thing, production is increasingly concentrated in
two countries China and India. For another, an entire industry seems surprised by the rapid increase in demand for drugs
after the decline during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results suggest three broad policy recommendations. First, health policies
should invest into improvements of the demand tracking, planning, and forecasting infrastructure. Health policies should focus
on shortages of drugs for which substitutes are also unavailable. Second, the health system seeks to guarantee the sufficient
provision of drugs at low prices. The international division of labour that has emerged seems to provide price efficiency,
but supply security risks have become increasingly evident. This implies a refocusing of policies towards greater supply resilience.
Third, the market structure should not only mitigate supply risks, but the market design should ideally internalise supply
security risks, thereby rendering ad-hoc policy interventions obsolete.
Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 2023, 50, (1), pp.25-47
This paper studies the interplay of integration into EU value chains and industrial development measured by labour productivity.
We focus on the mediating role of domestic institutions compared to technological determinants for the distribution of the
economic value generated along the European and global value chains. Our integration indicator measures value chain trade
within the Single Market relative to global value chain networks. Using a simultaneous equation model, we find an overall
positive effect of integration on labour productivity, which is driven by upstream integration. While the effect of productivity
on integration is positive, it decreases with increasing productivity levels. Highly productive industries rather seek global
value chain trade than regional integration. Better domestic institutions facilitate EU integration, although they favour
industries with less complex product portfolios and lower levels of knowledge cumulativeness. This creates politically unwanted
specialisation effects leading to an unequal distribution of the economic value generated.
The paper introduces a novel indicator of technological relatedness across firms. It considers both imported inputs and exported
products to assess the similarity of firms in terms of their technological capabilities in Austria. The indicator captures
technological similarity more closely than measures relying solely on exported products or overlapping industry classes. Descriptive
results indicate that companies that are more closely related in the import-export product space also export and import more
complex products. More complex products in turn are related to higher labor productivity levels. The impact of the proposed
measure for bilateral corporate coherence on the production costs of firms is assessed by firm-level quadratic cost functions.
The results indicate that bilateral coherence and related spillovers have a significant negative impact on the total cost
of production of firms on average. The associated cost reduction effect follows a mildly U-shaped pattern. The paper also
assesses the impact of bilateral coherence on the margins of trade at the firm level. The results indicate that firms with
a higher bilateral coherence, and associated spillovers, have a positive impact on the diversification of both the export
portfolio and imported inputs. The impacts on intensive margins and both import and export concentration are more ambiguous.