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Weitere Publikationen: Philipp Schmidt-Dengler (5 Treffer)

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, 11, (1), S.157-184, https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v11y2019i1p157-84.html
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, (11), S.1-29
Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (J Political Econ 72:44–61, 1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.
European Economic Review, 2017, (100), S.193-214, https://daneshyari.com/article/preview/5066240.pdf
We estimate the causal impact of restructuring aid granted by the European Commission between 2003 and 2012 on the survival and financial viability of aided firms. Using a comprehensive data set we find that restructuring aid increases a firm's average survival time by 8 to 15 years and decreases the hazard rate by 58 to 68 percent, depending on the definition of firm survival. Further analysis finds strong support that, in the longer run, aid receiving firms have a significantly higher probability to improve their financial viability than the counterfactual group.