This paper reviews the literature on (potential) green recovery measures in the context of the global financial crisis and
the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on their macroeconomic effects. We find that spending for renewables and energy efficiency
is particularly promising with regard to macroeconomic impacts. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that green recovery
measures are associated with larger macroeconomic effects compared to conventional non-green recovery spending. We also derive
lessons learned with regard to open questions and issues as well as accompanying framework conditions which could enhance
a macroeconomically successful implementation of green recovery measures.
Additional green public investment at the Member-State level will be needed to address the climate emergency as a central
priority in the EU. This chapter discusses two paths to enable increased green public investments in the EU: through possible
amendments to the current EU fiscal framework or through funding from the EU budget. The Commission's proposal from November
2022 regarding orientations for a reform of the EU-governance framework widens the leeway for debt-financed public investment.
However, existing green public investment needs are not considered sufficiently. Therefore, we discuss several options to
enable the flexibility of national budgets to ensure a level of green public investment which – together with private resources
– is sufficient to close the existing green investment gaps. In addition, the use of the lever the EU budget theoretically
offers to contribute to green public investment in the EU needs to be intensified. At about 1 percent of EU GNI (1.7 percent
of EU GNI including NGEU) the overall volume of the EU budget is limited. The more important are steps to strengthen spending
in policies that create EU value added, inter alia green public investment.
Auftraggeber: Better Finance – The European Federation of Investors and Financial Services Users
With around 90 percent of the average retirement income received from public pension entitlements, the Austrian pension system
is very reliant on the first pillar. Occupational pensions are primarily offered through pension funds and insurance companies.
Direct commitments are an alternative vehicle, but their usage stagnates. The option for defined contribution (DC) plans with
favourable tax treatment offered either by pension funds or insurance companies boosted the prevalence of occupational pensions
in Austria. While occupational pensions have become more popular over time, low interest rates and a high liquidity preference
dampened demand for individual life insurance contracts. Over the years 2002 through 2022, the performance of pension funds
in real net terms has been positive, with an annualised average return of 0.3 percent before tax. The life insurance industry
followed a distinctly more conservative investment policy and achieved an average annual net real return before tax of 1.4
Timo Wollmershäuser, Stefan Ederer, Friederike Fourné, Max Lay, Robert Lehmann, Sebastian Link, Sascha Möhrle, Ann-Christin Rathje, Moritz Schasching, Stefan Schiman-Vukan, Gerome Wolf, Lara Zarges
Auftraggeber: ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e.V.
Die Weichen für die deutsche Wirtschaft sind auf Erholung gestellt. Die Inflation ist weiter auf dem Rückzug, die Lohneinkommen
steigen mit kräftigen Raten, und die Beschäftigung ist so hoch wie nie zuvor im wiedervereinigten Deutschland. Damit kehrt
Kaufkraft zurück, und die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage sollte wieder zulegen. Zudem dürfte wegen der sinkenden Inflation
auch der Zinshöhepunkt überschritten sein, und im Frühsommer des kommenden Jahres dürfte die Europäische Zentralbank eine
erste Leitzinssenkung beschließen. Das dürfte auch die deutschen Absatzmärkte stützen, zumal auch dort mit einem Kaufkraftplus
zu rechnen ist. Daher sollten der globale Warenhandel und der Warenkonsum wieder zulegen und im kommenden Jahr zu den Konjunkturtreibern
werden. Die Baukonjunktur wird weiter abkühlen. Vor allem im Wohnungsbau dürfte die Auftragslage angespannt bleiben, da die
Baupreise nach wie vor hoch sind und die Kreditzinsen nur sehr langsam sinken. Alles in allem wird das Bruttoinlandsprodukt
in diesem Jahr um 0,3% zurückgehen und im kommenden Jahr um 0,9% zunehmen. Im Jahr 2025 dürfte sich die Konjunktur dann normalisieren
und das Bruttoinlandsprodukt um 1,3% zulegen. Unsicherheit geht von der Finanzpolitik aus. Die vorliegende Prognose geht von
der Annahme aus, dass ungeachtet der Haushaltslücke alle bisher geplanten finanzpolitischen Maßnahmen umgesetzt werden. Sollten
zusätzliche Konsolidierungsmaßnahmen beschlossen werden, um einen verfassungskonformen Haushalt aufzustellen, ist es sehr
wahrscheinlich, dass die vorliegende Prognose zu optimistisch ist.
This article reports on the latest update of Austria's effective exchange rate indices, which aggregate bilateral exchange
rates and relative prices or costs into indicators of Austria's short- to medium-term international competitive position.
The weighting scheme on which the indicators are based uses bilateral trade data for Austria's 55 most important trading partners.
With the latest update, the three-year averaging period was moved forward to 2016-2018. The main results are as follows: Based
on the recalculated country weights, we confirm the preliminary finding of a medium-term worsening of Austria's competitive
position, although alternative price indices would appear to provide conflicting signals. In particular, measures based on
producer prices and unit labour costs indicate competitiveness gains, while the HICP/CPI-based index shows marked losses.
These diverging signals, however, merely reflect data availability at the current edge. With regard to the geographical focus
of Austria's international trade relations, we observe a further shift toward overseas markets in the US dollar area and China,
away from Western Europe and Russia. The real effective exchange rate for the tourism industry, which we developed during
the previous update and enhanced during this update, reflects a more pronounced appreciation in the tourism sector than in
the service sector as a whole. However, according to the latest figures on overnight stays this loss in price competitiveness
has had no significant dampening effect on tourism demand in recent months. Finally, we address the economic costs of Austria's
current inflation differential to the euro area, which has induced a real appreciation. In two simulations, we quantify realized
effects and calculate expected future losses driven by higher unit labour costs. In total, we find that the loss in price
competitiveness may cause the Austrian economy to shrink by around ¾ to 1 percentage point between 2022 and 2025.
We assess the role that nontradable goods play as a determinant of fiscal spending multipliers, making use of a two-sector
model. While fiscal multipliers increase with the share of nontradable goods, an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between
multiplier size and the import share. Employing an interacted panel VAR model for EU countries, we estimate the effect of
the share of nontradable goods on fiscal spending multipliers. Our empirical results provide strong evidence for the predictions
of the theoretical model. They imply that the drag of fiscal consolidations is on average smaller in countries with a low
share of nontradable goods.
We analyse the spatial relationships of economic output dynamics in European regions from 2000 to 2019 using dynamic spatial
autoregressive growth models. In contrast to previous studies that rely on exogenous spatial weight matrices based solely
on geographical proximity, we use a novel Bayesian approach to fully estimate the spatial weight matrix. Our results show
that economic and sectoral characteristics (e.g., sectoral production structure, education, etc.) significantly influence
the degree of regional interdependence. The approach thus allows to study the complex dynamics of regional economic development
beyond mere distance.
We analyse the emergence of the Vienna Initiative (VI) as a public-private partnership in the wake of the global financial
crisis and its short-term impact on risk metrics of Western European banks and individual countries. We find that adverse
herding behaviour toward banks provides an explanation for banks' (non-)participation in the initiative. The VI measures were
successful in mitigating adverse herding behaviour, underscoring their strong signalling effect on investor sentiment. Additionally,
they attenuated financial market stress in those Central, Eastern and South-eastern European economies that were addressed
by the VI, while having only minor adverse spillovers to those that were not.