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The paper analyses the potential of a surcharge on national fuel taxes as sustainability-oriented own resource to finance the EU budget. Our estimations show that such a surcharge could yield substantial revenues, ranging between 12.93 billion € (for a surcharge of 0.03 €) and 86.2 billion € (for a surcharge of 0.2 €) per year. Besides the contribution an EU fuel tax would make to various sustainability-related EU goals and strategies, it would help to address two specific problems inherent in the current EU system of fuel taxation. An EU fuel tax designed as a surcharge on national fuel taxes would decrease the existing tax bias in favour of diesel, as the surcharge would be levied uniformly on gasoline and diesel, which in most EU countries is taxed at lower rates, alike. Moreover, by increasing national fuel tax rates, the surcharge would – depending on its level – mitigate or even remove the "under-taxation" of fuel in relation to the minimum fuel tax rates stipulated in the EU Energy Tax Directive in a number of EU member countries, which is caused by the absence of regular inflation adjustment of nominal fuel tax rates.

The empirical literature on mergers, market power and cooperation in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we propose an approach to analyse cooperative behaviour among a group of firms only by making use of information on the spatial structure of a horizontally differentiated market. Using spatial econometrics techniques we focus on differences in the pricing behaviour between different groups of firms, i.e., alliance and stand-alone firms. We apply this method to the market for ski lift tickets using a unique data set on ticket prices and detailed resort-specific characteristics covering all ski resorts in Austria. We show that prices of ski resorts forming alliances are higher and increase with the size and towards the spatial center of an alliance. Interaction in pricing is higher within than outside alliances. All results are in line with the findings of theoretical models on non-competitive pricing behaviour in horizontally differentiated markets.

Macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU are at the heart of the current crisis. One explanation for the high current account deficits in the Southern European countries is that they lack a large, competitive and export-oriented industrial sector. The paper tests the hypothesis that parts of the structural change which happened in the EU before 2008 were supported by the divergent unit labour cost developments in the EMU. We look into patterns of structural change and sectoral competitiveness in all EU member countries and assess their linkages by means of a descriptive analysis as well as through econometric estimations. Our results broadly support the hypothesis. Industrial policy, which aims at fostering new competitive export-oriented industries in Southern Europe in order to reduce macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU, should thus be combined with adjustments in relative labour costs.

Recent projections of long-term care costs across Western societies show a significant rise in the upcoming decades. This is mainly due to demographic developments, but also due to a reduction of families' capacities to deliver informal care. Thus, an expansion of both mobile and in-patient care is inevitable. As the increasing demand alters both public and private expenditures, it is worth taking a look beyond the conventional cost-based evaluation of long-term care developments and to evaluate the economic effects induced by this growing sector. In that demand for care services increases, this poses chances for, but also puts demands on other sectors of the economy, which go beyond the immediate effects and costs of the care institutions. Against this background this paper presents a first analysis of the macroeconomic linkages of the long-term care sector for the case of Austria.

CO2-Importzölle als Begleitmaßnahme für das EU-Emissionshandelssystem galten aufgrund der möglichen internationalen Vergeltungsmaßnahmen und Klagen vor der WTO bisher als No-Go. Die durch US-Präsident Trump und den Brexit entstandene Bewegung in Sachen Zölle wie auch die laufende Diskussion um alternative Finanzierungsquellen für das EU-Budget könnten es allerdings erlauben, CO2-Zölle auf die EU-Agenda zu setzen, wie dieser Beitrag zeigt.