# ÖSTERREICHISCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG 

## Technical Trading and Trends in the Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate

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#### Abstract

The study explores the pattern of exchange rate dynamics based on the dollar-euro rate. It documents the performance of technical trading systems in this market, and it analyses the impact of technical trading on exchange rate dynamics. The main results are as follows: First, exchange rates fluctuate around "underlying" short-term trends. Over a extended period of time, short-term trends last longer in one direction than in the other. The accumulation of these runs result in long-term appreciation or depreciation trends. Second, the 2,265 technical models based on daily data would have produced an average gross rate of return of 4.2 percent per year when trading the dollar-euro rate between 1999 and 2006. The 2,466 models based on 30-minutes data perfom worse than the daily models. However, those 25 models, which performed best over the most recent sub-period, would have produced over the subsequent period a gross return of 8.2 percent per year. Third, the aggregate transactions as well as open positions of technical models exert an excessive demand (supply) pressure on currency markets. When the models produce trading signals, they are either buying or selling, when they maintain open positions, almost all of them are on the same side of the market, either long or short.


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## 0. Executive Summary

The purpose of the study is threefold. First, the study investigates the pattern of exchange rate dynamics in an exploratory (inductive) manner. It measures the path of exchange rate movements and elaborates those elements of non-randomness in exchange rate dynamics which account for the accumulation of (very) short-term runs to medium-term and long-term trends. Second, the study documents the performance of a wide range of technical trading rules and examines the components of their profitability. Third, the study explores the relationship between the use of technical trading systems in the foreign exchange market and exchange rate dynamics.

The main results of the investigation into the pattern of exchange rate movements (chapter
3) can be summarized as follows:

- Exchange rates fluctuate most of the time around "underlying" short-term trends. This phenomenon is more pronounced on the basis of daily and 30-minutes data than on the basis of 1 -minute data.
- Over a extended period of time (i. e., up to several years) these short-term trends (monotonic movements or runs on the basis of smoothed data) last longer in one direction than in the other.
- The accumulation of upward runs lasting longer than downward runs brings about a "bull market" in a stepwise process.
- In the same manner, the sequence of downward runs lasting longer than upward runs causes the exchange rate to depreciate during a "bearish" period.
- The difference in the slope of upward and downward runs contributes to the development of "bull markets" and "bear markets". Upward (downward) runs being steeper over an extended period of time than "counter-runs" runs cause short-term trends (runs on the basis of smoothed data) to become more persistent.
- Short lasting ups and downs of exchange rates occur more frequently than expected if the exchange rate followed a random walk, i.e., the observed short-term volatility is even higher than expected under the "random walk hypothesis( (RWH). However, as the
exchange rate fluctuates around "underlying" trends most of the time, there occur less short runs and more persistent runs than under the RWH when the exchange rate series is smoothed by moving averages.
- The average slopes of exchange rate runs tend to be smaller than expected if the exchange rate followed a random walk. This tendency is particularly pronounced on the basis of intraday data.
These observations conflict with the basic assumptions of the "efficient market hypothesis". According to this concept any asset price reflects the fundamental equilibrium value of the respective asset (rational market participants permanently keep the price at this level). If new information arrives, actors will drive the price instantaneously to its new equilibrium. This (rational) behaviour assures that asset prices follow a random walk which in turn implies that one cannot systematically make trading profits from exploiting just the information contained in past prices ("weak market efficiency").
In order to investigate this issue, the profitability of technical trading systems in the dollar/euro market (1999/2006) and in the dollar/deutschmark market (1987/1999) is analyzed in chapter 4. The analysis covers 2265 models based on daily exchange rates and 2466 models based on 30-minutes exchange rates. All these models derive buy and sell signals exclusively from the information contained in past prices. The main results of the analysis of the profitability of technical currency trading are as follows:
- The 2265 technical models based on daily data would have produced an average gross rate of return of $4.2 \%$ per year when trading the dollar/euro rate between 1999 and 2006. The net rate is only slightly smaller ( $3.9 \%$ per year). Only $2.6 \%$ of all models would have made losses.
- The daily models would have been profitable on average in each of four sub-periods lasting 2 years between 1999 and 2006. The annual gross return would have been highest over the sub-period 1999/2000 (8.7\%) and lowest over the sub-period 2005/2006 (0.6\%).
- The in-sample-profitability of the 25 best performing models would have been three times higher than the average return of all 2265 models. Such an ex-post performance might attract potential (amateur) traders. However, the out-of-sample-performance of the 25 (ex post) best perfoming models is rather poor.
- The 2466 models trading the dollar/euro exchange rate at 30 -minute intevals perfom worse than the daily models, they would have produced an annual gross rate of return of only $1.1 \%$ on average. Due to the high number of transactions the annual net rate of return would be strongly negative ( $-6.1 \%$ ).
- The 25 (ex post) best 30 -minutes models would have been profitable also out of sample. Over the entire out-of-sample period 2001/2006, those 25 models which performed best over the most recent sub-period would have produced ex-ante (i. e., over the subsequent period) a gross return of $8.2 \%$ per year and a net return $4.6 \%$ per year.
- The pattern of profitability is the same for all types of models and for all periods. The number of single losses exceeds the number of single profits, the average loss per day (per 30-minutes interval) during unprofitable positions is higher than the average profit per trading interval during profitable positions. Hence, the overall profitability is exclusively due to profitable positions lasting several times longer than unprofitable positions.
- This "universal" structure of the profitability of technical models is less pronounced when trading is done on the basis of 30 -minutes data as compared to daily data. The difference is particularly pronounced with respect to the sole profit source of technical trading, i. e., the duration of profitable positions. When trading is based on daily data, profitable positions last roughly four times longer than unprofitable positions but only twice as long when 30 -minutes data are used.
- The results for trading the dollar/deutschmark exchange rate between 1987 and 1998 are similar to those found for dollar/euro trading between 1999 and 2006.

One can conclude from these results that the profitability of technical currency trading in general, and of the best performing models in particular, is sufficiently high to have caused more and more market partcipants to use technical analysis as one basis of their trading decisions. The last chapter therefore explores the impact of aggregate trading signals on exchange rate movements. The main results can be summarized as follows:

- The aggregate transactions as well as open positions of technical models exert an excessive demand (supply) pressure on currency markets. When the models produce trading signals they are either buying or selling, when they maintain open positions almost all of them are on the same side of the market, either long or short.
- There prevails a strong simultaneous interaction between exchange rate movements and the transactions triggered off by technical models. When these models change their open positions at a certain speed then the exchange rate changes much stronger than on average in the direction congruent with the models' transaction.
- After a certain part of technical models has reversed open positions at a certain speed, the exchange rate continues to move in the same direction as implied by the models' transactions. A rising exchange rate, for example, causes increasingly more technical models to produce buy signals, which in turn strengthens and lengthens the appreciation trend.
- After $90 \%$ of the models have already changed their open positions from short to long (long to short) the exchange rate continues to rise (fall) over the subsequent days.
- The continuation of exchange rate trends after most technical models have opened positions congruent with the trend has to be attributed to the transactions of nontechnical traders, perhaps amateurs. At the same time, these "latecoming bandwagonists" are probably the most important losers in currency trading.


## 1. Introduction: Scope and Structure of the Study

Over the first ten years of its existence, the euro has fluctuated widely vis-à-vis the other most important currencies. This is particularly true for the US dollar/euro exchange rate (figure 1). In early 1999 one euro was worth $1.17 \$$, then the exchange rate fell until October 2000 to $0.83 \$$, it started to rise again in February 2002 and reached $1.36 \$$ by December 2004. After falling back to $1.17 \$$ during 2005, the euro appreciated strongly up to $1.60 \$$ in mid 2008. By the end of 2008 , the euro exchange rate fell again to roughly $1.30 \$$.

The exchange rate cycle between 1999 and 2005 developed in a sequence of upward and downward trends. For example, the euro depreciation between January 1999 and October 2000 was brought about in three downward trends, interrupted by only small countermovements (figure 1). In a similar manner, the euro appreciation between February 2002 and December 2004 developed in a sequence of several trends each lasting some months (figure 1). Between October 2000 and January 2002 the exchange rate level was roughly the same. The two upward and the two downward trends, which occurred over this period, compensated each other. Also these movements were persistent as the four trends lasted for several months (figure 1).

Around these medium-term trends the daily exchange rate fluctuates in a seemingly erratic manner. It is unclear, e. g., if an upward trend is brought about by upward movements being steeper or lasting longer than counter-movements (and vice versa in the case of mediumterm downward trends).
The pattern of exchange rate dynamics as a sequence of trends, sometimes interrupted by non-directional movements ("whipsaws") seems to repeat itself across different time scales. Figure 2 displays exchange rate movements based on 5 -minute data over six business days in June 2003 (this sample covers roughly the same amount of data points as the seven-year period displayed in figure 1). Inspection reveals that the exchange rate fluctuates also over the very short run in a sequence of trends, sometimes interrupted by "whipsaws" as during afternoon trading (GMT) on June, 6, and on June, 11.

The present study addresses three main questions:

- Which types of trading behaviour cause the exchange rate to move in a sequence of short-term upward and downward trends most of the time?
- Why does this pattern of exchange rate dynamics repeat itself across different time scales?
- What causes short-term trends to last longer or be steeper in one direction rather than in the other for several years, resulting in a medium-term to long-term trend of euro depreciation (1999/2000) or euro appreciation (2002/2004 and 2005/mid 2008)?

Figure 1: The cycle of the dollar/euro exchange rate 1999-2008
Daily data

s: Olsen Ltd.

Figure 2: Movements of intraday dollar/euro exchange rates, June, 6-13, 2003 5-minutes data


S: Olsen Ltd.

Empirically founded answers to these questions could contribute to a better understanding of the wide and persistent fluctuations of the exchange rate from its fundamental goods market equilibrium, e. g., purchasing power parity (PPP). Figure 3 demonstrates the extent of the overshooting of the dollar/euro exchange rate using PPP of internationally traded goods and services (tradables) as the fundamental benchmark (see Schulmeister, 2005, for a discussion of PPP concepts).

Figure 3: Dollar/euro exchange rate and purchasing power parity


S: OECD, WIFO, Schulmeister (2005).
Mainstream theory cannot explain the overshooting of the exchange rate (in particular its extent). Therefore this phenomenon is mostly attributed to "shocks". However, such an interpretation conflicts with three other empirical regularities. First, the deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental equilibrium are brought about in persistent trends, often lasting for several years (note that the famous Dornbusch model can only account for overshooting over the short run - Dornbusch, 1976). Second, also the reversion of the exchange rate towards PPP takes several years. Third, the reversion process does usually not lead to a convergence of the exchange rate towards PPP but rather to a "shooting through" of the PPP level followed by a new overshooting process in the opposite direction (figure 3 for a discussion of the "PPP puzzle" see Froot - Rogoff, 1995; Rogoff, 1996; Sarno - Taylor, 2002; Taylor - Taylor, 2004).

The present study attempts to shed light on the PPP puzzle by investigating the interaction between trading behaviour and price dynamics in the foreign exchange market over the (very) short run as well as over the medium and long run. Hence, the study is based on daily data as well as on intraday data.

Due to this "microstructure approach" the study also addresses a second puzzle as regards currency markets, namely, the huge and growing discrepancy between trading activities in theses markets and transaction volume in the "underlying" goods markets, e. g., in international trade. Between 1986 and 2006 overall world trade (goods and services) expanded by a factor of roughly 5 , spot transactions in the foreign exchange market rose by a factor of 9 and derivatives trading by a factor of almost 27 (figure 4).

Figure 4: World trade and foreign exchange transactions


S: BIS, WFE, OECD, Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF).
The level of overall foreign exchange trading was roughly 66 times higher than total world trade of goods and services. Due to the much higher expansion of transactions of currency derivatives, the volume of the latter is more than twice as large as the volume of spot transactions (figure 5).

The coincidence of the PPP puzzle and the "trading volume puzzle" represents an additional challenge for mainstream economics. This is so because high liquidity (e. g., trading volume) should facilitate the price discovery process and should therefore dampen deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental equilibrium. In fact, however, exchange rate overshooting coincides with a tremendous rise in trading activity, in particular in currency derivatives.

Figure 5: Volume of overall trade and foreign exchange transactions in 2006


S: BIS, WFE, OECD, Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF).
Since traditional equilibrium models cannot explain the exchange rate puzzles, the research project followed an inductive or exploratory approach. This approach included not only a careful data inspection but also investigations in the market place through visiting foreign exchange trading desks and interviewing professional traders. From this "field research" I derived a first hypothesis about exchange rate dynamics as the outcome of the interaction of different trading strategies. This "bull-bear-hypothesis" can be sketched as follows:

- Exchange rate runs are triggered by economic or political news if traders believe that the news will cause other traders to open a new position in the market.
- Once a run has gained momentum, technical trading systems open a position congruent with the direction of the ongoing price movement.
- Amateur speculators, who jump on the bandwagon later than professional traders, extend the exchange rate trend.
- The longer an upward (downward) trend lasts, the fewer buy (sell) orders are given by technical traders and by "latecoming bandwaggonists", so that, the trend looses momentum.
- In such a situation technical and non-technical "contrarians" jump in, hoping to profit from an imminent reversal of the trend.
- Contrarian trading together with cash-in-transactions bring any short-term exchange rate trend to an end, often initiating a new trend in the opposite direction.
- Technical currency trading (trend-following as well as contrarian) is practiced at different time scales, the data used range from tick and minute data up to daily data. This practice contributes to the self-similarity of exchange rate dynamics across time scales.
- Exchange rate trends in one direction last longer than counter-movements for several years because there prevails an expectational bias in favour or against a currency ("bullishness" or "bearishness"). If a current run is in line with the bias, traders put more money into an open position and/or hold such a position longer than in the case of a trend against the bias.

The research project focuses on those components of this hypothesis which concern the interaction between exchange rate dynamics and technical trading systems. The main reason for that lies in the importance of technical trading in currency markets as survey studies reveal.') First, roughly $90 \%$ of market participants base their trading at least in part on technical analysis. Second, between $30 \%$ and $40 \%$ of professionals use technical analysis as their most important trading technique. Third, the importance of technical analysis has increased more strongly over the 1990s than other trading practices like the orientation on fundamentals or on customer orders.
The purpose of the study is threefold. First, the study investigates the pattern of exchange rate dynamics in an exploratory (inductive) manner. It measures the path of exchange rate movements and elaborates those elements of non-randomness in exchange rate dynamics which account for the accumulation of (very) short-term runs to medium-term and long-term trends. Second, the study documents the performance of a wide range of technical trading rules and examines the components of their profitability. Third, the study explores the relationship between the use of technical trading systems in the foreign exchange market and exchange rate dynamics. More specifically, the objectives of the study are as follows:

- Summarize the key assumptions underlying the mainstream theory of asset price dynamics ("fundamentalist hypothesis") and compare them to the inductively derived assumptions of the "bull-bear-hypothesis" (section 2).
- Investigate the pattern of exchange rate movements based on different data frequencies, e. g., daily, 30 -minutes and 1 -minute data (section 3). In particular, elaborate how long-term appreciations (depreciations) of the euro exchange rate are brought about. Are these trends (mainly) due to upward (downward) movements lasting longer than counter-movements, or are they (mainly) caused by upward (downward) movements being steeper than counter-movements? How are monotonic exchange rate movements distributed by their duration?
- Analyze the ex-post-profitability (in sample) as well as the ex-ante-profitability (out of sample) of a great number of popular technical trading systems, e. g., roughly 2.500 moving average models, momentum models and relative strength models (section 4). Special attention shall be given to the components of the profitability of technical currency trading and how they are related to the pattern of exchange rate movements.

[^0]In addition, the following questions shall be addressed: If a technical trader selects from many different models those performing best over a certain "test period" in the past, and if he then follows these models over the subsequent period, would he make "abnormal" profits? Or would this optimization strategy produce losses due to "model mining"?

- Provide an analysis of the impact of technical trading systems on exchange rate dynamics (section 5). This concerns in particular the following questions. How are the trading signals produced by different models distributed (clustered) over time? How many technical models hold the same - long or short - position at any point in time? How do aggregate transactions and/or open positions of technical models and their change over time relate to subsequent exchange rate movements?
The study focuses on the most important euro exchange rate, i. e., vis-à-vis the US dollar. For a comparison between the euro-era and the pre-euro-era the study investigates the above sketched relationships also for the period 1987/1999 (in this case, only the single most active currency market is considered, i.e., the dollar/ deutschmark market).


## 2. The "fundamentalist hypothesis" and the "bull-bear-hypothesis" of asset price dynamics

According to mainstream economic theory, asset prices are determined by the respective equilibrium conditions, i. e., by the so-called market fundamentals. In the case of exchange rates, two conditions represent the basic fundamentals, interest parity as the money market equilibrium and purchasing power parity as the goods market equilibrium. Assuming rational expectations and instantaneous price adjustment, interest parity should always hold true (deviations from the monetary equilibrium could only be due to risk premia under imperfect foresight). Purchasing power parity, however, is assumed to only hold over the medium and long run. Over the short run, the exchange rate will deviate from PPP due to sticky price adjustment in the goods markets (Dornbusch, 1976; for surveys of exchange rate models see Rogoff, 1996; Sarno-Taylor, 2002; Taylor-Taylor, 2004).
Traditional models of exchange rate determination represent just special cases of the equilibrium theory of asset price determination in general. The basic proposition of this concept is as follows. Asset prices are determined by market fundamentals so that destabilizing speculation will influence prices at best over the very short run (if at all). In this chapter, I shall at first summarize the main assumptions of this theoretically (deductively) derived concept of asset price formation which I term "fundamentalist hypothesis". I will then discuss the key elements of the alternative "bull-bear-hypothesis" which is rather empirically oriented. ${ }^{2}$ )
The main assumptions and propositions underlying the "fundamentalist hypothesis" can be summarized as follows (see also figure 6 and table 1):

[^1]- The theoretical benchmark model of the "fundamentalist hypothesis" is an ideal, frictionless market where all participants are equipped with perfect knowledge and where no transaction costs exist. In this "world 0 " there is no need for trading and, hence, for liquidity because prices would instantaneously jump to their new equilibrium in reaction to new information.
- The model underlying the "fundamentalist hypothesis" relaxes the assumptions of perfect knowledge and of no transaction costs. Also in this "world" actors are fully rational and use the same information set and the same "true" model, but do not know the expectations of other actors. Hence, in "world I" prices cannot reach a new equilibrium instantaneously but only through a gradual price discovery process (Habermeier Kirilenko, 2003).
- The high transaction volumes in modern financial markets stem mainly from the activities of market makers. The latter provide just the liquidity necessary for facilitating and smoothing the movements of asset prices towards their fundamental equilibria.
- Speculation is an indispensable component of both, the price discovery process as well as the distribution of risks. As part of the former, speculation is essentially stabilizing, i.e., it moves asset prices smoothly and quickly to their equilibria (Friedman, 1953).
- An endogenous overshooting caused by excessive speculation does not exist. Any deviation of asset prices from their fundamental equilibrium is due to exogenous shocks and, hence, is only a temporary phenomenon.
- The emergence of news and shocks follows a random walk and so do asset prices. Therefore, speculation techniques based on past prices cannot be systematically profitable (otherwise a market cannot even be considered "weakly efficient" - Fama, 1970).

The "bull-bear-hypothesis" perceives trading behaviour and price dynamics in asset markets as follows ("World II"):

- Imperfect knowledge is a general condition of social interaction and, hence, is characteristic also for the market place. As a consequence, actors use different models and process different information sets when forming expectations and making decisions. ${ }^{3}$ )
- As human beings, actors' expectations and transactions are governed not only by rational calculations, but also by emotional und social factors (the latter two factors are particularly important in financial markets since these markets are often characterized by "manic" or "depressive" phases as the asset prices themselves).

[^2]- Not only are expectations heterogeneous but they are often formed only qualitatively, i. e., as regards the direction of a price movement. In financial markets, e. g., traders react to news by just forming qualitative expectations about the direction of the imminent price move (not only due to time pressure but also because one cannot know the expectations of other traders).
- Upward (downward) price movements - usually triggered by news - are lengthened by "cascades" of buy (sell) signals stemming from trend-following technical trading systems since "technical analysis" is the most widely used technique in short-term trading in financial markets.
- The "trending" behaviour of short-term asset price movements (based on daily or intraday data) is fostered by the dominance of either a "bullish" or a "bearish" bias in expectations. News which are in line with the prevailing "market mood" gets higher recognition and reaction than news which contradict the "market mood".
- In addition, traders put more money into an open position and hold it longer if the current run is in line with the "bullish" or "bearish" sentiment than in the case of a run against the "market mood".
- In the aggregate, this behaviour of market participants cause price runs in line with the "market mood" to last longer than counter-movements. In such a way short-term runs accumulate to long-term trends, i. e., "bull markets" and "bear markets". The sequence of these trends then constitutes the pattern in long-term asset price dynamics: Prices develop in irregular cycles around the fundamental equilibrium without any tendency to converge towards this level.
- Long-term price trends do not represent "bubbles", i. e., non-fundamental equilibrium paths, since market participants know in advance that any "bull market" and "bear market" will end, and that there occur also significant counter-movements during longterm trends.

In order to clarify the theoretical differences between the "fundamentalist hypothesis" and the "bull-bear-hypothesis", it is useful to distinguish between three (theoretical) paths of asset prices, depending on the assumptions made about market conditions. "World 0" represents the case of an ideal, frictionless market where all participants are equipped with perfect knowledge and where no transaction costs exist (as usually assumed in theoretical models of asset pricing under rational expectations). In this world, prices would instantaneously jump to their new equilibrium in reaction to new information (Habermeier - Kirilenko, 2003). In "world I" all actors are also fully rational, but do not know the expectations of other participants. For that reason and also because transactions are costly, prices cannot jump instantaneously to the new equilibrium due to fundamental news but follow a gradual price discovery process towards the equilibrium. In "world II" there operate also "bounded-rational" or even irrational traders who drive the price beyond its fundamental equilibrium.

Figure 6: Three stylized paths of asset prices


A simple chart stylizes the three paths of asset prices over the short run (figure 6):

- In "world 0" new information at the point in time $=1$ causes the asset price to jump instantaneously from the old equilibrium at $P=100$ (at point $A$ ) to the new equilibrium at $P=104(B)$. The price stays there until news in $t=3$ cause the price to jump to $P=102(E)$. Finally in $t=5$ new information once again causes an instantaneous price adjustment to $\mathrm{P}=106$ (I).
- In "world I" prices adjust only gradually, i.e., it takes a series of transactions to move the price from $P=100$ to $P=104$, i.e., from $A$ to $C$. However, since there are only rational traders in this world, the price movement will stop at the new fundamental equilibrium level and stay there until $t=3$ (then the price starts to move from $D$ to $F$, and later from $H$ to J).
- In "world II" there exist traders who form their price expectations according to the most recent movements, i.e., when prices move persistently up (down) they expect the respective run or short-term trend to continue. Hence, they buy (sell) when prices are rising (falling), which in turn strengthens the trend.
As a consequence of this "trending", rational investors (in the sense of profit-seeking) will try to systematically exploit this non-randomness in price dynamics. The conditions of "world II" will therefore almost inevitably emanate from those of "world I": If prices move smoothly from one fundamental equilibrium to the next, and if this price discovery process takes some time, then profit-seeking actors will develop trend-following trading strategies. The use of these strategies will in turn increase the momentum of price movements which will then hardly stop exactly at the new fundamental equilibrium (for models dealing with the interaction of heterogeneous
actors see DeLong et al., 1990A and 1990B; Frankel - Froot, 1990; De Grauwe - Grimaldi, 2006; Hommes, 2006; Frydman - Goldberg, 2007).

Over more than 100 years people have developed and used a great variety of "technical" trading systems. All models of "technical analysis" have in common that they attempt to exploit price trends and by doing so they reinforce the pattern of asset price dynamics as a sequence of upward and downward trends (for a comprehensive treatment of technical analysis see Kaufman, 1987; the interaction between technical trading and price dynamics is explored in Schulmeister, 2006, 2009B).

Table 1: Features of three hypothetical "worlds" of financial markets

|  | World 0 | World I | World II |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General characteristic | Perfect knowledge and foresight. <br> Rational expectations. <br> No transaction costs (frictionless markets). | As in world 0 with two exceptions: <br> - Transaction costs matter <br> - Expectations of other actors due to news have to be discovered in a gradual adjustment process. | Imperfect knowledge as general condition of social interaction: Actors process different information sets using different models. <br> Actors are human beings: Expectations and transactions are governed by rational, emotional und social factors. |
| Expectations | Homogeneous. | In general homogeneous, but heterogeneous during the price discovery/adjustment process. | Heterogeneous. |
| Expectations formation | Quantitative. | Quantitative. | Often only directional (qualitative). |
| Price adjustment to news | Instantaneous jumps to the new fundamental equilibrium. | Gradual price movement towards the new fundamental equilibrium. | Price movement overshoots the ("region" of) the new fundamental equilibrium. <br> Short-term trending of asset prices accumulates to mediumterm trends due to optimistic or pessimistic biases in expectations ("bullishness/bearishness"). |
| Transaction volume | Low (counterpart of the "underlying" transaction in goods markets). | "Basic" liquidity necessary for the price discovery process => <br> Trading volume higher than the "underlying" goods markets transactions, moving in tandem with the latter over time. | "Excessive" trading causes transaction volumes to grow significantly faster than the "underlying" transactions in goods markets. |
| Trading is based on | Fundamentals. | Fundamentals. | Fundamentals, technical models as well as on psychological factors on the individual level (e.g. emotions) as well as on the social level (e.g. market moods, herding). |

In our stylized example those transactions (in "world II") which cause the price to overshoot (driving it from C to K , from G to L and from M to O ) have to be considered "excessive" (as in "world I" price movements are triggered by news also in "world II"). These overshooting price changes amount to 12 between $\dagger=1$ and $\dagger=7$. The overall price changes over this period amount to $30(8+10+12)$, whereas only cumulative price changes of $10(4+2+4)$ would be fundamentally justified.
This stylized example shows that once prices start to overshoot, their overall price path becomes much longer and the related transaction volumes get much bigger than under purely rational expectations (as in "world I"). At the same time the trending of asset prices provides opportunities for technical (i. e., non-fundamental) speculation, and the use of these speculation systems in turn strengthens asset price trends.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the three different "worlds" of financial markets ("world 0 " is also covered since it serves as benchmark model in asset pricing theory - even though the assumptions made for this "world" are extremely unrealistic). Based on the "stylistic" differentiation between "world I" and "world II" one could derive some support for the "bull-bear-hypothesis" from the following empirical observations (and vice versa for the "fundamentalist hypothesis" if these observations cannot be made):

- First, the discrepancy between the level and growth of transaction in (financial) asset markets (including derivatives) and in the underlying (physical) spot markets is extremely high (i. e., hedging is of little importance, most transactions occur between speculators with different expectations).
- Second, asset prices overshoot their fundamental equilibrium values most of the time. The respective long-term over-appreciations (over-depreciations) are primarily brought about by monotonic upward (downward) movements (i. e., price runs) lasting longer than counter-movements, and less by upward (downward) runs being steeper than counter-movements (the latter case would point at quick reactions of "fundamentalists" to news, the former case would reflect the persistence of price movements).
- Third, technical trading systems are widely used in financial markets and produce "abnormally" high profits over extended periods of time (i. e., several years).
- Fourth, the use of technical trading systems feeds back upon asset price trends, e. g., the aggregate trading signals of a great variety of technical models strengthen and lengthen price trends.

The present study evaluates the empirical relevance of the "bull-bear-hypothesis" in comparison to the "fundamentalist hypothesis" with respect to the pattern of price dynamics and the role of technical trading systems in the dollar/euro market and in the dollar/DM market. Observations concerning the size of financial transactions relative to transactions in the underlying goods markets are documented and evaluated in Schulmeister Schratzenstaller - Picek, 2008, and in Schulmeister, 2009A.

## 3. Pattern of exchange rate fluctuations

This chapter explores the specific shape of exchange rate movements. In particular, I shall investigate how short-term runs bring about long-term overshooting. Hence, this chapter addresses the relationship between the following two phenomena:

- Exchange rates, but also stock prices and commodity prices, move in a sequence of upward trends ("bull markets") and downward trends ("bear markets") which last for several years. As a consequence, exchange rates - and asset prices in general - do not converge towards their fundamental equilibrium but overshoot it most of the time.
- Trading volume in financial markets has expanded enormously, at present it is almost 100 times higher than nominal GDP of industrial countries. The main driver of this expansion is the increase in the speed of trading: The time horizon of most transactions is shorter than a few hours.
The coincidence of both developments constitutes a puzzle. How can very short-term transactions generate asset price movements which accumulate to long-term "bull markets" and "bear markets"? To put it differently: Which properties of asset price dynamics cause asset prices to move in long-term irregular cycles, i. e., in a sequence of upward and downward trends?
In this chapter I shall try to find some answers to these questions by exploring the movements of the dollar/euro exchange rate across different time scales, e. g., based on data at 1 day, 30 -minutes as well as on 1 -minute intervals. As alternative to the standard assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis, I sketch the following hypothetical picture of exchange rate dynamics. This picture fits into the more general picture of the "bull-bear-hypothesis":
- Over the short run, asset prices fluctuate almost always around "underlying" trends (sideways movements occur comparatively seldom). If one smoothes the respective price series with simple moving averages, one can easily identify the "underlying" trends.
- The phenomenon of "trending" repeats itself across different time scales. E. g., there occur trends based on 1-minute-data as well as trends based on daily data. However, the volatility of fluctuations around the trend is higher the higher is the data frequency.
- Long-term upward or downward trends ("bulls and bears") are the result of the accumulation of price runs based on daily data which last for several years longer in one direction than the counter-movements.
In order to examine the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, I shall at first look at the "Gestalt" of exchange rate movements taking the dollar/euro rate as example. Then I present some general relations between short-term monotonic price movements ("runs") and longterm price trends. The chapter concludes with a quantification of these relationships based on the development of the dollar/euro exchange rate between 1999 and 2006 and of the dollar/deutschmark rate between 1987 and 1998.

Figure 7: Subperiods in the development of the US dollar/euro exchange rate 1999-2006


The (irregular) cycle of the dollar/euro exchange rate between 1999 and 2005 was shaped by two pronounced long-term trends, a downward trend lasting from January 1999 to October 2000, and an upward trend lasting from January 2002 to December 2004 (marked by $A$ and $C$ in figure 7).
Both long-term trends were realised in a sequence of shorter (medium-term) trends. For example, the euro depreciation over period A was brought about in three downward trends which were interrupted by only small counter-movements (figure 7). In a similar manner the euro appreciation during period $C$ was realised in a sequence of several trends, each lasting some months. Only between October 2000 and January 2002 did the trending behaviour of the dollar/euro exchange rate not result in a long-term appreciation or depreciation (the two upward and downward trends - each lasting several months - roughly "compensated" each other).

In order to analyze the interaction between short-term runs and long-term trends across different time scales (data frequencies), the study divides the overall sample period into 4 long-term sub-periods and 15 medium-term sub-periods (figure 7 and table 2).

Figure 8: Stylized relationship between runs and trends of asset prices


The basic relationsships between monotonic price movements (runs) upward (RU) and downward (RD), their slopes upward and downward (SRU, SRD) and their duration in time units (DRU, DRD) are as follows.
Slope of upward runi and of downward run $i_{i}$ :
$S R U_{i}=d P R U_{i} / D R U_{i}$
$S R D D_{j}=d P R D_{j} / D R D_{j}$
where $\mathrm{dPRU}_{\mathrm{i}}$ and dPRD indicate the absolute price change realized during upward run $i$ and downward run j, respectively.
The overall price rise (fall) realized during a medium-term or long-term upard (downward) trend as between 0 and k in figure 7 is the sum over all single price changes realized during all upard (downward) runs which can be conceived as the product of duration and slope:
$P_{k}-P_{0}=\Sigma d P R U_{i}-\Sigma \mathrm{dPRD}_{j}=\Sigma \mathrm{DRU}_{i} * \mathrm{SRU}_{\mathrm{i}}-\quad \Sigma \mathrm{DRD}_{\mathrm{j}} * \mathrm{SRD}_{\mathrm{j}}$
The average duration of upward and downward runs between 0 and $k$ (ADRU0,k ADRD $_{0 . k}$ ) is
$A D R U_{0, k}=\left(\Sigma D R U_{i}\right) / N R U_{0, k}$
ADRD $0, k=\left(\Sigma D^{2} D_{j}\right) / N_{R} D_{0, k}$
where NRU indicate the number of runs between 0 and $k$.
The average slope of upward and downward runs between 0 and $k$ (ASRU $0_{0, k}$ ASRD $0, k$ ) is:
$A S R U_{0, k}=\left(\Sigma \mathrm{dPRU} U_{\mathrm{i}} / / \Sigma \mathrm{DRU} \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$
ASRD $_{0, k}=\left(\Sigma \mathrm{dPRD} \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}} / /\left(\Sigma \mathrm{DRD}_{\mathrm{j}}\right)\right.$
Based on these relations the overall price rise (fall) realized during a medium-term or longterm upard (downward) trend between 0 and $k$ can be represented as result of six components, the number of upward and downward runs, the average duration of upward and downward runs and the average slope of upward and downward runs:
$P_{k}-P_{0}=N R U_{0, k} * A D R U_{0, k} * A S R U_{0, k}-N R D_{0, k} * A D R D_{0, k} * A S R D_{0, k}$
These relations shall now be quantified for the dollar /euro exchange rate, based on daily data, on 30-minutes data and on 1-minute data.

### 3.1 Exchange rate dynamics based on daily data

At first, I measure the path of the daily $\$ / €$ exchange rate movements as depicted in figure 7. The results are shown in table 2.
In period A the euro depreciated in 471 (trading) days by 34.4 (dollar) cents. This translates into a depreciation "speed" of 0.07 cents per day (column 4 in table 2). As there were many ups and downs, the path of the cumulated movements was several times longer than the change in level, namely, 226.0 cents (column 3 ) or 0.48 cents per day (column 6).
The ratio of column 2 and column 3 measures the degree of monotonicity (column 6). There are two extreme values. A value of one (in absolute terms) would indicate a pure monotonic path like a (deterministic) bubble. A value of zero would indicate "whipsaws", i.e., price oscillations around a constant level. Hence, this ratio indicates the importance of countermovements during a price trend.
During the euro "bear market" (period A) daily exchange rate movements were slightly "more monotonic" than during the "bull market" in period C (the respective values of column 6 are -0.15 and 0.12 , respectively). At the same time, the average change in price per day was the same in both periods ( 0.07 cents). This implies that the average slope of exchange rate runs was smaller in absolute terms during period $A$ as compared to period $C$ (figure 3 shows that this was true for upward runs as well as for downward runs).
The relations between duration, (average) change in price and length of price path differ significantly across the 15 sub-periods. However, exchange rate movements tend to be steeper and "more monotonic" during comparatively shorter periods (as sub-period 4 or subperiod 11 - table 2).

If one carries out the same measurement exercise based on daily exchange rates smoothed by a 5 -days moving average, then the length of the actual price path shrinks in all subperiods to less than half of the original price path. This holds true for the four main sub-periods A to D as well as for the 15 shorter sub-periods. There are two reasons for that result. First, most fluctuations of the daily dollar/euro exchange rate are small in size and last only one day. Second, and more important, the exchange rate fluctuates most of the time around an "underlying" trend as is shown in figure 7.
As next step, I explore how the accumulation of monotonic movements (runs) of the daily dollar/euro rate brings about exchange rate trends lasting several years (as during period A and C). Table 3 shows that the euro depreciation during the "bear market" in period A was primarily due to downward runs lasting longer by one third than upward runs ( 2.38 days versus 1.79 days). The average slope of upward and downward runs was approximately the same ( 0.47 and -0.48 , respectively). During the "bull market" in period C , upward runs lasted 1.95 days on average, roughly by $20 \%$ longer than downward runs ( 1.66 days). However, during this period also differences in the slope between upward and downward runs did contribute to the overall appreciation as upward runs were by roughly $10 \%$ steeper than downward runs ( 0.56 and -0.51 , respectively - table 3).

Table 2: Pattern of exchange rate movements: Daily dollar/euro rates 1999-2006
Based on original data

| Period | Duration | Change in <br> price | Length of <br> actual <br> price path | Change in <br> price per <br> day <br> (slope) | Length of <br> dictual <br> price path <br> per day | Change in <br> price per <br> length of <br> actual |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| path |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1) Cumulative absolute value of the daily changes in exchange rate levels.

Table 3: Exchange rate runs: Daily dollar/euro rate 1999-2006

|  |  |  |  |  | d on orig | nal data |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Period |  | Upward runs |  | Downward runs |  |  | Ratio between upward and |  |
|  |  | Number | Average <br> Duration Days | Average slope 1) | Number | Average <br> Duration Days | Average slope 1) | Duration | Slope 2) |
| 1999/01/01-1999/07/12 | 1 | 32 | 1.63 | 0.402 | 32 | 2.59 | - 0.439 | 0.63 | 0.92 |
| 1999/07/12-1999/10/15 | 2 | 17 | 2.06 | 0.570 | 16 | 2.06 | - 0.397 | 1.00 | 1.44 |
| 1999/10/15-2000/05/04 | 3 | 35 | 1.57 | 0.467 | 36 | 2.44 | -0.511 | 0.64 | 0.91 |
| 2000/05/04-2000/06/16 | 4 | 8 | 2.38 | 0.664 | 8 | 1.38 | -0.536 | 1.73 | 1.24 |
| 2000/06/16-2000/10/25 | 5 | 20 | 1.95 | 0.405 | 21 | 2.48 | -0.561 | 0.79 | 0.72 |
| 2000/10/25-2002/01/31 | 6 | 79 | 1.97 | 0.510 | 79 | 2.13 | - 0.457 | 0.93 | 1.12 |
| 2002/01/31-2002/07/19 | 7 | 35 | 1.91 | 0.463 | 34 | 1.56 | - 0.296 | 1.23 | 1.56 |
| 2002/07/19-2002/10/17 | 8 | 20 | 1.55 | 0.466 | 21 | 1.52 | - 0.570 | 1.02 | 0.82 |
| 2002/10/17-2003/05/29 | 9 | 38 | 2.37 | 0.520 | 37 | 1.78 | -0.381 | 1.33 | 1.37 |
| 2003/05/29-2003/09/03 | 10 | 20 | 1.45 | 0.515 | 21 | 1.86 | -0.619 | 0.78 | 0.83 |
| 2003/09/03-2004/01/09 | 11 | 24 | 2.42 | 0.617 | 23 | 1.39 | -0.511 | 1.74 | 1.21 |
| 2004/01/09-2004/05/13 | 12 | 23 | 1.78 | 0.737 | 24 | 1.96 | - 0.852 | 0.91 | 0.86 |
| 2004/05/13-2004/12/30 | 13 | 50 | 1.80 | 0.591 | 49 | 1.51 | - 0.483 | 1.19 | 1.22 |
| 2004/12/30-2005/11/14 | 14 | 57 | 1.74 | 0.527 | 58 | 2.16 | -0.567 | 0.81 | 0.93 |
| 2005/11/14-2006/12/30 | 15 | 81 | 1.85 | 0.492 | 81 | 1.77 | -0.412 | 1.05 | 1.20 |
| 1999/01/01-2000/10/25 | A | 113 | 1.79 | 0.474 | 113 | 2.38 | - 0.484 | 0.75 | 0.98 |
| 2000/10/25-2002/01/31 | B | 79 | 1.97 | 0.510 | 79 | 2.13 | - 0.457 | 0.93 | 1.12 |
| 2002/01/31-2004/12/30 | C | 210 | 1.95 | 0.557 | 209 | 1.66 | -0.513 | 1.18 | 1.08 |
| 2004/12/30-2006/12/30 | D | 139 | 1.80 | 0.505 | 139 | 1.93 | - 0.484 | 0.93 | 1.04 |
| 1999/01/01-2006/12/30 | T | 541 | 1.88 | 0.520 | 540 | 1.95 | - 0.490 | 0.97 | 1.06 |
|  | Based on 5-days moving averages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1999/01/01-1999/07/12 | 1 | 14 | 2.64 | 0.145 | 15 | 6.27 | - 0.219 | 0.42 | 0.66 |
| 1999/07/12-1999/10/15 | 2 | 7 | 5.57 | 0.286 | 6 | 4.17 | - 0.230 | 1.34 | 1.25 |
| 1999/10/15-2000/05/04 | 3 | 13 | 3.15 | 0.189 | 14 | 6.93 | -0.261 | 0.46 | 0.73 |
| 2000/05/04-2000/06/16 | 4 | 3 | 6.00 | 0.377 | 2 | 4.00 | -0.146 | 1.50 | 2.57 |
| 2000/06/16-2000/10/25 | 5 | 6 | 3.67 | 0.250 | 7 | 9.29 | -0.253 | 0.39 | 0.99 |
| 2000/10/25-2002/01/31 | 6 | 20 | 6.95 | 0.226 | 20 | 8.95 | -0.163 | 0.78 | 1.38 |
| 2002/01/31-2002/07/19 | 7 | 11 | 8.09 | 0.172 | 10 | 2.50 | - 0.075 | 3.24 | 2.28 |
| 2002/07/19-2002/10/17 | 8 | 5 | 5.40 | 0.088 | 6 | 4.67 | -0.109 | 1.16 | 0.81 |
| 2002/10/17-2003/05/29 | 9 | 8 | 14.38 | 0.222 | 7 | 4.71 | -0.182 | 3.05 | 1.22 |
| 2003/05/29-2003/09/03 | 10 | 4 | 3.25 | 0.106 | 4 | 11.25 | -0.217 | 0.29 | 0.49 |
| 2003/09/03-2004/01/09 | 11 | 7 | 9.29 | 0.251 | 6 | 2.50 | -0.128 | 3.71 | 1.96 |
| 2004/01/09-2004/05/13 | 12 | 5 | 5.60 | 0.096 | 6 | 8.00 | -0.193 | 0.70 | 0.50 |
| 2004/05/13-2004/12/30 | 13 | 7 | 16.14 | 0.169 | 6 | 6.50 | -0.136 | 2.48 | 1.24 |
| 2004/12/30-2005/11/14 | 14 | 9 | 8.44 | 0.116 | 10 | 13.40 | -0.159 | 0.63 | 0.73 |
| 2005/11/14-2006/12/30 | 15 | 18 | 9.83 | 0.131 | 18 | 5.67 | - 0.089 | 1.74 | 1.48 |
| 1999/01/01-2000/10/25 | A | 44 | 3.80 | 0.229 | 45 | 6.64 | - 0.240 | 0.57 | 0.95 |
| 2000/10/25-2002/01/31 | B | 37 | 3.97 | 0.246 | 36 | 4.75 | - 0.199 | 0.84 | 1.24 |
| 2002/01/31-2004/12/30 | C | 70 | 6.77 | 0.245 | 68 | 4.06 | -0.242 | 1.67 | 1.01 |
| 2004/12/30-2006/12/30 | D | 56 | 4.36 | 0.232 | 56 | 4.82 | -0.216 | 0.90 | 1.08 |
| 1999/01/01-2006/12/30 | T | 207 | 5.02 | 0.239 | 205 | 5.00 | -0.229 | 1.00 | 1.05 |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2 ) In absolute terms.

The relation between slope and duration of monotonic exchange rate movements is less clear over the 15 (shorter) subperiods marked in figure 7 . However, in 11 out of 15 cases did runs in line with the short-term trend last longer than counter-runs. Hence, the difference in the average duration between upward and downward runs did contribute to the overall appreciation or depreciation, respectively, realized during the trend (table 3). At the same time, also the differences in the average slope between upward and downward runs contributed to the overall short-term trends: During an appreciation (depreciation) period, upward (downward) runs were in most cases steeper than counter-runs (table 3).
This pattern is particularly pronounced on the basis of 5 days moving averages of the original price series (table 3): The long-term appreciation (depreciation) trend of the $\$ / €$ exchange rate in period $\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{C})$ is primarily brought about by upward (downward) runs lasting longer than "counter-runs". The differences in the slopes of upward and downward runs play only a minor role, mainly because steeper upward (downward) runs during an appreciation (depreciation) trend turn into more persistent price movements when the original data are smoothed by a moving average.

To sum up: A long-term appreciation (depreciation) is realized in two ways. First, during a "bullish" ("bearish") period upward (downward) runs are steeper than counter-runs. Second, during a "bullish" ("bearish") period upward (downward) runs last longer than counter-runs. The first phenomenon could be attributed to traders reacting stronger to news which are in line with the prevailing "market mood" than to "counter-news". The second phenomenon might reflect "bandwagon behavior", in particular based on technical trading systems. The use of the latter is fostered by the fact that the differences in slope as well as in duration of runs cause price movements which are in line with the long-term trend to become more persistent than conter-movements when moving averages are used (hence, moving average models are probably the most popular tools of technical traders). ${ }^{4}$ )
I will now document the distribution of upward and downward runs according to their length for two periods, first, for the period of a long-term depreciation trend of the euro (period A), and, second, for the period of an appreciating euro (period C).
Over the depreciation phase A, short upward runs occurred more frequently than short downward runs ( 93 runs compared to 69 runs; short runs are defined as lasting up to 2 days). By contrast, within the set of medium runs (between 3 and 6 days) and long runs (longer than 6 days), downward runs occurred more frequently than upward runs (table 4).

[^3]Table 4: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs Daily dollar/euro rates

| Run | Upward runs |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| length | Number |  | Slope 1) |  | Number |  | Slope 1) |  |
|  | observed | RW - | observed | RW - | observed | RW- | observed | RW - |

Period A: 1999/01/01-2000/10/25

|  | 1-2 | 93 | - | 88.7 | 0.491 | - | 0.501 | 69 | *** | 88.8 | -0.515 | - | $-0.501$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Original data | 3-6 | 20 | ** | 27.7 | 0.445 | * | 0.501 | 42 | *** | 27.5 | -0.478 | - | -0.502 |
|  | $\geq 7$ | 0 | * | 1.8 | - | - | 0.508 | 2 | - | 1.8 | -0.343 | * | -0.505 |
|  | All | 113 | - | 118.2 | 0.474 | - | 0.501 | 113 | - | 118.2 | -0.484 | - | -0.502 |
| 5-days moving averages 2) | 1-6 | 37 | - | 35.9 | 0.179 | - | 0.162 | 27 | * | 36.0 | -0.148 | - | -0.162 |
|  | 7-14 | 5 | ** | 10.4 | 0.250 | - | 0.261 | 11 | - | 10.4 | -0.267 | - | -0.262 |
|  | $\geq 15$ | 2 | - | 2.0 | 0.342 | - | 0.286 | 7 | *** | 2.0 | -0.265 | - | -0.286 |
|  | All | 44 | - | 48.4 | 0.229 | - | 0.224 | 45 | - | 48.4 | -0.240 | - | -0.224 |
| 20 days moving averages 2) | 1-14 | 16 | - | 18.0 | 0.032 | ** | 0.051 | 11 | * | 18.0 | -0.058 | - | -0.052 |
|  | 15-34 | 3 | - | 4.1 | 0.165 | ** | 0.124 | 5 | - | 4.1 | -0.101 | - | -0.123 |
|  | $\geq 35$ | 0 | * | 1.4 | - | - | 0.150 | 4 | *** | 1.4 | -0.147 | - | -0.151 |
|  | All | 19 | - | 23.5 | 0.117 | - | 0.110 | 20 | - | 23.5 | -0.122 | - | -0.110 |

Period C: 2002/01/31-2004/12/30

|  | 1-2 | 163 | ** | 141.9 | 0.585 | - | 0.558 | 177 | *** | 141.8 | -0.510 | * | -0.557 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Original data | 3-6 | 43 | - | 44.3 | 0.532 | - | 0.558 | 32 | *** | 44.3 | -0.519 | - | -0.559 |
|  | $\geq 7$ | 4 | - | 2.9 | 0.475 | - | 0.563 | 0 | ** | 2.9 | - | - | -0.562 |
|  | All | 210 | *** | 189.0 | 0.557 | - | 0.559 | 209 | *** | 189.1 | -0.513 | ** | -0.558 |
| 5-days moving averages 2) | 1-6 | 44 | ** | 57.2 | 0.176 | - | 0.181 | 53 | - | 57.1 | -0.180 | - | -0.180 |
|  | 7-14 | 18 | - | 16.6 | 0.279 | - | 0.292 | 15 | - | 16.8 | -0.305 | - | -0.291 |
|  | $\geq 15$ | 8 | *** | 3.3 | 0.262 | - | 0.319 | 0 | ** | 3.2 | - | - | -0.320 |
|  | All | 70 | - | 77.1 | 0.245 | - | 0.250 | 68 | * | 77.1 | -0.242 | - | -0.249 |
| 20 days moving averages 2) | 1-14 | 29 | - | 28.7 | 0.058 | - | 0.057 | 31 | - | 28.7 | -0.050 | - | -0.058 |
|  | 15-34 | 4 | - | 6.5 | 0.129 | - | 0.138 | 6 | - | 6.6 | -0.141 | - | -0.138 |
|  | $\geq 35$ | 5 | ** | 2.4 | 0.181 | - | 0.168 | 0 | ** | 2.3 | - | - | -0.169 |
|  | All | 38 | - | 37.5 | 0.144 | - | 0.125 | 37 | - | 37.5 | -0.096 | ** | -0.124 |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

Notes: The table compares the observed numbers and slopes of exchange rate runs by duration to their expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective period. * ${ }^{* *},{ }^{* * *}$ ) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

By the same token, short downward runs occurred more frequently than short upward runs over the appreciation phase $C$. At the same time, medium and long runs were more often upward directed than downward directed (table 4).
In order to test for the robustness of these results, I generate 1000 random series ("random walks without drift"). I then compare the observed distribution of monotonic price movements to the expected distribution under the random walk hypothesis (RWH). This comparison shall reveal in which class of runs (by length) and based on which smoothing parameters (length of moving average $=M A$ ) does the observed number of runs as well as their slope deviate (most) significantly from the respective values according to the RWH.
Based on the original data ( $M A=1$ ), there occurred significantly more short runs than under the RWH over the appreciation period C. This results holds to a larger extent true for short downward runs as compared to short upward runs. At the same time there occurred significantly less medium and long downward runs (table 4). Over the depreciation period A, by contrast, there occurred significantly less short downward runs, but significantly more medium downward runs, and less medium and long upward runs than under the RWH (table 4).

Based on smoothed series (both, the observed exchange rate series as well as the random series are smoothed by a 5 days and 20 days moving average), the most significant deviations of the observed number of runs from their expected values under the RWH concern the most persistent runs (lasting longer than 14 days in the case of a 5 days MA, and longer than 34 days in the case of a 20 days MA - table 4). Over the depreciation period A, e. g, there occurred many "abnormally" long lasting monotonic downward movements (many more than upward movements). In an analogous way, over the appreciation period C there occurred many "abnormally" long lasting upward movements (many more than downward movements).
In general, the observed slopes of exchange rate runs deviate from their expected values under the RWH to a lesser extent than the number of runs. E. g., during the appreciation period $C$ the average slope of downward runs (in absolute terms) is only in three cases significantly smaller than the values expected under the RWH. In three cases are upward runs on average (insignificantly) steeper than expected (table 4). The picture is even more unclear for the depreciation period A. In only three cases are upward runs significantly less steep than under a random walk, in one case, however, the opposite is true. In only four cases are downward runs (insignificantly) steeper than according to the RWH.
The tables $A / 1$ and $A / 2$ in the annex document the distribution of the upward and downward runs according to their length more in detail. Table A/1 reports the observed number and slope for each single run length up to 6 days as well as the respective values under the RWH. The table also documents the contribution of the single run classes to the overall change in the exchange rate. It turns out that the greatest part of any overall appreciation or depreciation is realized by relatively few persistent price movements. E. g., based on 5 days moving averages, the dollar/euro exchange rate fell by 33.5 cents over period A (table 2).

Table 5: Classification of all exchange rate runs by duration 1999-2006
Daily dollar/euro rates


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents in absolute terms. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by $5(10,20,40)$ days moving averages.

This "net" depreciation was the result of an cumulative rise by 38.3 cents and an cumulative fall by 71.1 cents (table A/1). $56.6 \%$ of the cumulative rise and $86.4 \%$ of the cumulative fall were brought about in only 7 upward runs and only 18 downward runs lasting 7 days or more. During the "bull market" of period C $80.4 \%$ of the "gross" appreciation by 93.4 cents was realized in only 15 persistent upward runs (out of a total of 68 upward runs - table A/1).

Table $\mathrm{A} / 2$ accomplishes the calculations already contained in table 4. E. g., the table also includes the expected values of the number and slopes of runs under a random walk with drift. In addition, also the results für the sub-periods $B$ and $C$ are reported in table $A / 2$. Furthermore, this table includes the results for 10 -days and 40 -days moving averages. The deviations of the observed number and slope of runs by duration from the expected values under a random walk with drift are smaller than from a random walk without drift. Of course, this result holds true in particular for the "bearish" period A and the "bullish" period C.

Table 5 displays the distribution of exchange rate runs by their length for the overall period 1999 to 2006. Since the dollar/euro rate followed roughly a cycle over this period, the observed duration and slope of runs deviate much less from the respective values according to the RWH than over the "bearish" period A and the "bullish" period C (table 4). Based on the original data, there occur significantly more runs than under te RWH, i. e., the empirical short-term volatility is even higher than expected if the exchange rate followed a random walk. At the same time, the average slopes of runs are less steep than in the case of a random walk. Smoothing the original series as well as the 1000 random series reduces the number of runs for the observed runs to a larger extent than for the random walk series. This result is due to the fact that the exchange rate fluctuates most of the time around "underlying" short-term trends.

Figure 9: Subperiods in the development of the US dollar/deutschmark rate 1987-1998


In the last part of this section I shall explore the pattern of exchange rate dynamics for the dollar/DM rate between 1987 and 1998. In order to facilitate the comparison of the results with the results for the dollar/euro rate between 1999 and 2006, the dollar/DM rate is chained with the dollar/euro rate on January 2, 1999. Hence, this "artificial" dollar/DM rate differs from the "true" rate by a constant factor (with respect to foreign exchange trading, the DM was the genuine forerunner of the euro).

Table 6: Pattern of exchange rate movements: Daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998

|  | Period | Based on original data |  |  |  |  | Change in price per length of actual path |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Duration | Change in price | Length of actual price path | Change in price per day (slope) | Length of actual price path per day |  |
|  |  | Days | Cents | Cents 1) | Cents | Cents |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 1987/01/01-1987/12/31 | 1 | 248 | 22.6 | 134.3 | 0.09 | 0.542 | 0.17 |
| 1987/12/31-1989/06/14 | 2 | 371 | -26.9 | 182.8 | -0.07 | 0.493 | -0.15 |
| 1989/06/14-1991/02/11 | 3 | 421 | 38.5 | 239.6 | 0.09 | 0.569 | 0.16 |
| 1991/02/11-1991/07/02 | 4 | 100 | -28.3 | 82.3 | -0.28 | 0.823 | -0.34 |
| 1991/07/02-1992/09/02 | 5 | 301 | 33.7 | 215.8 | 0.11 | 0.717 | 0.16 |
| 1992/09/02-1994/02/08 | 6 | 368 | -27.3 | 248.2 | -0.07 | 0.674 | -0.11 |
| 1994/02/08-1995/04/19 | 7 | 310 | 32.9 | 195.1 | 0.11 | 0.629 | 0.17 |
| 1995/04/19-1997/08/06 | 8 | 593 | -37.4 | 316.3 | -0.06 | 0.533 | -0.12 |
| 1997/08/06-1998/12/31 | 9 | 362 | 12.8 | 180.3 | 0.04 | 0.498 | 0.07 |
| 1987/01/01-1995/04/19 | A | 2125 | 42.3 | 1303.4 | 0.02 | 0.613 | 0.03 |
| 1995/04/19-1998/31/12 | B | 956 | -23.9 | 497.3 | -0.03 | 0.520 | -0.05 |
| 1987/01/01-1998/31/12 | T | 3082 | 15.4 | 1803.6 | 0.01 | 0.585 | 0.01 |
|  | Based on 5 days moving averages |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1987/01/01-1987/12/31 | 1 | 244 | 20.9 | 62.1 | 0.09 | 0.255 | 0.34 |
| 1987/12/31-1989/06/14 | 2 | 367 | -22.7 | 87.6 | -0.06 | 0.239 | -0.26 |
| 1989/06/14-1991/02/11 | 3 | 417 | 36.2 | 109.1 | 0.09 | 0.262 | 0.33 |
| 1991/02/11-1991/07/02 | 4 | 96 | -25.3 | 40.8 | -0.26 | 0.425 | -0.62 |
| 1991/07/02-1992/09/02 | 5 | 297 | 32.3 | 95.7 | 0.11 | 0.322 | 0.34 |
| 1992/09/02-1994/02/08 | 6 | 362 | -26.8 | 103.5 | -0.07 | 0.286 | -0.26 |
| 1994/02/08-1995/04/19 | 7 | 304 | 29.2 | 74.7 | 0.10 | 0.246 | 0.39 |
| 1995/04/19-1997/08/06 | 8 | 585 | -36.4 | 110.0 | -0.06 | 0.188 | -0.33 |
| 1997/08/06-1998/12/31 | 9 | 354 | 10.8 | 54.5 | 0.03 | 0.154 | 0.20 |
| 1987/01/01-1995/04/19 | A | 2121 | 40.8 | 613.0 | 0.02 | 0.289 | 0.07 |
| 1995/04/19-1998/31/12 | B | 952 | -25.4 | 222.7 | -0.03 | 0.234 | -0.11 |
| 1987/01/01-1998/31/12 | T | 3078 | 15.1 | 836.9 | 0.00 | 0.272 | 0.02 |

Table 7: Exchange rate runs: Daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998

|  | Based on original data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Period | Upward runs |  |  | Downward runs |  |  | Ratio between upward and |  |
|  |  | Number | Average duration | Average slope 1) | Number | Average duration | Average slope 1) | Duration | Slope 2) |
|  |  |  | Days |  |  | Days |  |  |  |
| 1987/01/01-1987/12/31 | 1 | 58 | 2.12 | 0.638 | 58 | 2.16 | -0.447 | 0.98 | 1.43 |
| 1988/01/01-1989/06/14 | 2 | 91 | 1.93 | 0.443 | 92 | 2.12 | -0.538 | 0.91 | 0.82 |
| 1989/06/15-1991/02/11 | 3 | 104 | 2.31 | 0.579 | 103 | 1.76 | -0.556 | 1.31 | 1.04 |
| 1991/02/12-1991/07/02 | 4 | 22 | 1.68 | 0.730 | 23 | 2.74 | -0.878 | 0.61 | 0.83 |
| 1991/07/03-1992/09/02 | 5 | 78 | 2.23 | 0.717 | 78 | 1.63 | -0.717 | 1.37 | 1.00 |
| 1992/09/03-1994/02/08 | 6 | 92 | 1.74 | 0.690 | 92 | 2.26 | -0.662 | 0.77 | 1.04 |
| 1994/02/09-1995/04/19 | 7 | 78 | 2.26 | 0.648 | 77 | 1.74 | -0.605 | 1.30 | 1.07 |
| 1995/04/20-1997/08/06 | 8 | 165 | 1.62 | 0.522 | 165 | 1.98 | -0.542 | 0.82 | 0.96 |
| 1997/08/07-1998/12/31 | 9 | 98 | 1.79 | 0.552 | 97 | 1.93 | -0.448 | 0.93 | 1.23 |
| 1987/01/01-1995/04/19 | A | 524 | 2.08 | 0.618 | 524 | 1.98 | - 0.609 | 1.05 | 1.02 |
| 1995/04/20-1998/31/12 | B | 263 | 1.68 | 0.534 | 262 | 1.96 | - 0.508 | 0.86 | 1.05 |
|  | Based on 5 days moving averages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1987/01/01-1987/12/31 | 1 | 24 | 5.83 | 0.297 | 23 | 4.43 | - 0.202 | 1.32 | 1.47 |
| 1988/01/01-1989/06/14 | 2 | 29 | 5.14 | 0.218 | 30 | 7.23 | - 0.254 | 0.71 | 0.86 |
| 1989/06/15-1991/02/11 | 3 | 42 | 6.07 | 0.285 | 42 | 3.83 | -0.227 | 1.58 | 1.26 |
| 1991/02/12-1991/07/02 | 4 | 8 | 3.50 | 0.276 | 9 | 7.56 | - 0.486 | 0.46 | 0.57 |
| 1991/07/03-1992/09/02 | 5 | 32 | 6.09 | 0.328 | 31 | 3.26 | -0.314 | 1.87 | 1.05 |
| 1992/09/03-1994/02/08 | 6 | 26 | 6.42 | 0.230 | 27 | 7.22 | -0.334 | 0.89 | 0.69 |
| 1994/02/09-1995/04/19 | 7 | 27 | 7.11 | 0.271 | 26 | 4.31 | -0.203 | 1.65 | 1.33 |
| 1995/04/20-1997/08/06 | 8 | 36 | 6.72 | 0.152 | 36 | 9.53 | -0.213 | 0.71 | 0.71 |
| 1997/08/07-1998/12/31 | 9 | 27 | 6.96 | 0.174 | 27 | 6.15 | -0.131 | 1.13 | 1.32 |
| 1987/01/01-1995/04/19 | A | 208 | 5.40 | 0.291 | 208 | 4.77 | -0.288 | 1.13 | 1.01 |
| 1995/04/20-1998/31/12 | B | 103 | 4.20 | 0.228 | 102 | 5.08 | -0.239 | 0.83 | 0.95 |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2 ) In absolute terms.

Figure 9 shows that the deutschmark appreciated between January 1987 and April 1995 by 42.3 cents. However, this period A cannot be considered one single "bull market" since it comprises several appreciation or depreciation trends each lasting between one year and two years. Figure 9 and table 6 specify - somewhat arbitrarily - five "bullish" and four "bearish" sub-periods between the beginning of 1987 and the end of 1998. The movements of the dollar/DM exchange rate over each of these subperiods (with the exception of the comparatively short subperiod 4) is similar to those of the dollar/euro "bear market" 1999/2000 and to the dollar/euro "bull market" 2002/2005, respectively. This similarity concerns the average slope of price movements, their length per day as well as the degree of monotonicity (compare the respective values in columns 4,5 and 6 of table 6 to those in table 2). As in the case of the dollar/euro exchange rate, smoothing the original data by means of a 5 days moving average reduces the length of the dollar/DM exchange rate path
by more than 50\%, mainly because the daily rates fluctuate around short-term trends most of the time (table 6, figure 9).

Table 8: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs Daily dollar/deutschmark

|  | Run length | Upward runs |  |  |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Number |  |  | Slope 1) |  |  | Number |  |  | Slope 1) |  |  |
|  |  | observ |  | RW Simulation | observ |  | RW - <br> Simulation | observ |  | RW - <br> Simulation | observed |  | RW - <br> Simulation |
|  |  | Period A: 1987/01/01-1995/04/19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1-2 | 378 | - | 397.9 | 0.612 | *** | 0.665 | 396 | - | 398.0 | -0.585 | *** | -0.665 |
| Original data | 3-6 | 135 | - | 124.3 | 0.633 | * | 0.665 | 123 | - | 124.1 | -0.636 | * | -0.666 |
|  | $\geq 7$ | 11 | - | 8.5 | 0.565 | * | 0.662 | 5 | - | 8.6 | -0.628 | - | -0.664 |
|  | All | 524 | - | 530.7 | 0.618 | *** | 0.665 | 524 | - | 530.7 | -0.609 | *** | -0.665 |
| 5-days moving averages 2) | 1-6 | 146 | - | 160.0 | 0.209 | - | 0.215 | 155 | - | 160.0 | -0.228 | - | -0.215 |
|  | 7-14 | 52 | - | 47.3 | 0.336 | - | 0.348 | 45 | - | 47.1 | -0.315 | ** | -0.347 |
|  | $\geq 15$ | 10 | - | 9.3 | 0.355 | - | 0.379 | 8 | - | 9.6 | -0.366 | - | -0.378 |
|  | All | 208 | - | 216.7 | 0.291 | - | 0.298 | 208 | - | 216.7 | -0.288 | - | -0.298 |
| 20 days moving averages 2) | 1-14 | 68 | - | 81.1 | 0.086 | *** | 0.067 | 67 | - | 81.0 | -0.062 | - | -0.067 |
|  | 15-34 | 12 | ** | 18.6 | 0.172 | - | 0.163 | 18 | - | 18.6 | -0.144 | * | -0.163 |
|  | $\geq 35$ | 12 | *** | 6.7 | 0.183 | - | 0.202 | 6 | - | 6.8 | -0.220 | - | -0.204 |
|  | All | 92 | * | 106.4 | 0.158 |  | 0.149 | 91 | * | 106.4 | -0.147 | - | -0.150 |
|  | Period C: 1995/04/19-1998/12/31 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Original data | 1-2 | 220 | *** | 179.4 | 0.512 | ** | 0.568 | 196 | * | 179.4 | -0.472 | *** | -0.569 |
|  | 3-6 | 41 | *** | 56.0 | 0.579 | - | 0.569 | 63 | - | 55.9 | -0.545 | - | -0.567 |
|  | $\geq 7$ | 2 | - | 3.7 | 0.527 | - | 0.568 | 3 | - | 3.7 | -0.549 | - | -0.569 |
|  | All | 263 | *** | 239.1 | 0.534 | ** | 0.569 | 262 | *** | 239.1 | -0.508 | *** | -0.568 |
| 5-days moving averages 2) | 1-6 | 82 | - | 72.8 | 0.174 | - | 0.184 | 73 | - | 72.6 | -0.162 | * | -0.183 |
|  | 7-14 | 19 | - | 21.1 | 0.296 | - | 0.297 | 22 | - | 21.1 | -0.271 | - | -0.295 |
|  | $\geq 15$ | 2 | - | 4.2 | 0.261 | * | 0.324 | 7 | * | 4.3 | -0.294 | - | -0.324 |
|  | All | 103 | - | 98.0 | 0.228 | ** | 0.254 | 102 | - | 98.0 | -0.239 | - | -0.253 |
| 20 days moving averages 2) | 1-14 | 34 | - | 36.2 | 0.066 | - | 0.058 | 31 | - | 36.2 | -0.061 | - | -0.058 |
|  | 15-34 | 9 | - | 8.3 | 0.112 | * | 0.139 | 10 | - | 8.3 | -0.136 | - | -0.139 |
|  | $\geq 35$ | 2 | - | 3.0 | 0.184 | - | 0.174 | 4 | - | 3.0 | -0.159 | - | -0.172 |
|  | All | 45 | - | 47.5 | 0.113 | - | 0.127 | 45 | - | 47.5 | -0.131 | - | -0.127 |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

Notes: See Table 4.

Table 7 shows how the accumulation of exchange rate runs brought about long-term appreciation and depreciation trends of the dollar/DM exchange rate. In almost all cases did upward (downward) runs last longer during "bull markets" ("bear markets") than "counterruns", in most cases did the difference in duration between upward and downward runs contribute more to the overall appreciation or depreciation than the difference in the slope between upward and downward runs. This pattern is particularly pronounced if the dollar/DM rates are smoothed by a 5 -days moving average.
The distribution of upward and downward runs of the dollar/DM exchange rate displays a similar pattern as in the case of the dollar/euro rate (table 8). Over the appreciation period between 1987 and 1995, there occurred less short upward runs than short downward runs, but more medium and long upward runs than downward runs. The opposite was the case over the depreciation period between 1995 and 1998. Hence, these two very long-term exchange rate changes were primarily brought about by persistent upward (downward) runs occurring comparatively more frequently during the appreciation (depreciation) phase.
The deviations of the duration and the slope of runs from the respective values expected under the RWH are less pronounced for the appreciation and depreciation period of the dollar/DM exchange rate than for the periods $C$ and $A$ of the dollar/euro exchange rate (tables 8 and 4). This different result is mainly due to the fact that the DM appreciation 1987/95 as well as the DM depreciation 1995/98 does not represent one single long-term upward trend and downward trend, respectively, whereas the periods $C$ and $A$ in the development of the euro can be considered one single "bull market" and "bear market", respectively (see figures 7 and 9). ${ }^{5}$ )

### 3.2 Exchange rate dynamics based on intraday data

This section reports at first the results of the same "measurement exercises" based on 30minutes data. The frequency of these data is higher by a factor of 48 than the frequency of daily data since the data base comprises 24 hours of trading per day (except for weekends). For this reason, moving averages with longer length than in the case of daily data are used for smoothing the 30 -minutes data.
Table 9 displays the non-random components in the duration of monotonic exchange rate movements during the depreciation period of the euro (period A) as well as during the appreciation period $C$. The most important results for the original (unsmoothed) 30 minutes exchange rates are as follows (table 9):

- Short lasting exchange rate runs occurred significantly more frequently than expected under the RWH. At the same time, persistent runs i. e., monotonic exchange rate

[^4]movements lasting longer than nine 30-minutes intervals, occurred less often than under the RWH. Both results hold true for the depreciation period $A$ as well as for the appreciation period $C$.

- The overall number of observed exchange rate runs is significantly higher than is to be expected if 30 minutes exchange rates followed a random walk.
- The average slopes of upward and downward runs are significantly smaller (In absolute terms) than under a random walk. This result holds true for all run classes over the "bear market" 1999/2000 as well as over the "bull market" 2002/2004.

When the 30 minutes data are smoothed by a 50 -period MA and by a 100 -period MA, respectively, a very different picture emerges (table 9):

- Over the depreciation period A there occurred (insignificantly) less short exchange rate runs than under the RWH. At the same time, there occurred significantly more long downward runs, but significantly less upward runs than under the RWH (long lasting runs are defined as those lasting more than 34 periods).
- Also over the appreciation period $C$ is the number of short lasting runs smaller than expected under the RWH (this result is significant for the 50-period MA but insignificant for the 100-period MA). In an analogous way to the depreciation period A, there occurred significantly more long lasting upward runs than under the RWH. At the same time there occurred less persistent downward runs (this result is significant for the 100-period MA but insignificant for the 50 -period $M A$ ).
- The overall number of upward and downward runs is in all but one case (period $A / 50-$ period $M A$ ) smaller than expected under the RWH (in the case of period C/50-period MA, this result is significant).
- Exchange rate runs based on smoothed data remain signfificantly less steep than expected under the RWH.
One can conclude from these results that the short-term volatility of exchange rates, i. e., the frequency of short lasting ups and downs, is much higher when measured on the basis of intraday data than on daily data. In both cases (i. e., data frequencies) is the observed shortterm volatility higher than expected under the RWH. However, in both cases does the exchange rate fluctuate around an "underlying" trends. As a consequence, there occur less short lasting runs and more long lasting (persistent) runs when the exchange rate series is smoothed by moving averages. Persistent upward (downward) runs last longer during an appreciation (depreciation) phase than the counter-movements. Hence, the sequence of these runs results in a stepwise appreciation (depreciation) process, i. e., in long-term exchange rate trends.

Table 9: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30 -minutes interval in cents. - 2 ) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See table 8.

Also the fact that exchange rate runs are significantly less steep than according to the RWH points to some persistence in price dynamics, probably in part due to comparatively slow reaction to news, in part due to the use of trend-following trading techniques.

Figure 10: "Bearish" and "bullish" sub-periods in the development of the dollar/euro exchange rate


Table 10: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals

|  | Run length | Upward runs |  |  |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Number |  |  | Slope 1) |  |  | Number |  |  | Slope 1) |  |  |
|  |  | observ |  | RWsimulation | observe |  | RW Simulation | observ |  | RWsimulation | observ |  | RW- <br> Simulation |
|  | Period 1: 1999/01/01-1999/07/12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $<3$ | 32705 | *** | 23763 | 0.027 | *** | 0.029 | 33028 | *** | 23767 | -0.027 | *** | -0.029 |
| Original data | 3-9 | 5842 | *** | 7869 | 0.021 | *** | 0.029 | 5529 | *** | 7865 | -0.022 | *** | -0.029 |
|  | >= 10 | 23 | *** | 66 | 0.012 | *** | 0.029 | 13 | *** | 65 | -0.022 | *** | -0.029 |
|  | Total | 38570 | *** | 31698 | 0.025 | *** | 0.029 | 38570 | *** | 31698 | -0.026 | *** | -0.029 |
| 50 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 6176 | *** | 3019 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 6182 | *** | 3026 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | 15-34 | 506 | *** | 406 | 0.002 | *** | 0.003 | 444 | ** | 408 | -0.002 | *** | -0.003 |
|  | >= 35 | 511 | *** | 616 | 0.003 | *** | 0.005 | 567 | *** | 607 | -0.003 | *** | -0.005 |
|  | Total | 7193 | *** | 4041 | 0.002 | *** | 0.004 | 7193 | *** | 4041 | -0.002 | *** | -0.004 |
| 100 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 4433 | *** | 2129 | 0.000 | *** | 0.001 | 4484 | *** | 2141 | 0.000 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | 15-49 | 482 | *** | 366 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 394 | * | 365 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | $>=50$ | 314 | *** | 374 | 0.002 | *** | 0.004 | 350 | * | 364 | -0.002 | *** | -0.004 |
|  | Total | 5229 | *** | 2870 | 0.001 | *** | 0.003 | 5228 | *** | 2870 | -0.002 | *** | -0.003 |
| 200 period moving averages 2) | $<15$ | 3045 | *** | 1521 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 3048 | *** | 1526 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | 15-49 | 320 | *** | 254 | 0.000 | *** | 0.001 | 304 | *** | 254 | 0.000 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | >= 50 | 261 | * | 279 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 273 | - | 274 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
|  | Total | 3626 | *** | 2054 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 3625 | *** | 2054 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
| 400 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 2036 | *** | 1083 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 2021 | *** | 1086 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | 15-49 | 183 | - | 181 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 185 | - | 179 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | $>=50$ | 203 | - | 198 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 215 | * | 198 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
|  | Total | 2422 | *** | 1462 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 2421 | *** | 1462 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | Period 7: 2002/01/31-2002/07/19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Original data | < 3 | 36305 | *** | 26869 | 0.017 | *** | 0.018 | 36469 | *** | 26857 | -0.017 | *** | -0.018 |
|  | 3-9 | 6715 | *** | 8842 | 0.016 | *** | 0.018 | 6558 | *** | 8852 | -0.016 | *** | -0.018 |
|  | $>=10$ | 17 | *** | 73 | 0.017 | - | 0.018 | 10 | *** | 74 | -0.018 | - | -0.018 |
|  | Total | 43037 | *** | 35783 | 0.017 | *** | 0.018 | 43037 | *** | 35783 | -0.017 | *** | -0.018 |
| 50 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 7382 | *** | 3443 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 7408 | *** | 3429 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | 15-34 | 576 | *** | 462 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 586 | *** | 467 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
|  | >= 35 | 573 | *** | 679 | 0.002 | *** | 0.003 | 537 | *** | 687 | -0.002 | *** | -0.003 |
|  | Total | 8531 | *** | 4583 | 0.002 | *** | 0.003 | 8531 | *** | 4583 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
| 100 period moving averages 2) | $<15$ | 5220 | *** | 2415 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 5262 | *** | 2409 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | 15-49 | 534 | *** | 407 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 516 | *** | 412 | -0.001 | * | -0.001 |
|  | $>=50$ | 382 | *** | 415 | 0.002 | *** | 0.002 | 358 | *** | 417 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
|  | Total | 6136 | *** | 3237 | 0.001 | *** | 0.002 | 6136 | *** | 3237 | -0.001 | *** | -0.002 |
| 200 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 3555 | *** | 1771 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 3578 | *** | 1766 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | 15-49 | 380 | *** | 285 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 363 | *** | 289 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | >= 50 | 318 | - | 314 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 312 | - | 315 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | Total | 4253 | *** | 2370 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 4253 | *** | 2370 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
| 400 period moving averages 2) | < 15 | 2318 | *** | 1255 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 2298 | *** | 1262 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | 15-49 | 225 | - | 202 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 | 247 | *** | 196 | 0.000 | *** | 0.000 |
|  | $>=50$ | 238 | - | 235 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 237 | - | 233 | -0.001 | *** | -0.001 |
|  | Total | 2781 | *** | 1691 | 0.001 | *** | 0.001 | 2782 | *** | 1691 | 0.000 | *** | -0.001 |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per minute in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by $50(100,200,400)$ period moving average.

Notes: See table 8.

Tables $A / 5$ and $A / 6$ in the annex document the distribution of runs of the dollar/euro exchange rate based on 30-minutes data in an analogous manner as tables $A / 1$ and $A / 2$ for daily rates. The main characteristics of the distribution of exchange rate runs are very similar. In particular, also in the case of exchange rates based on 30-minutes data do relatively few but persistent runs based on 5 periods or on 50 periods moving averages (MA5 and MA50, respectively) account for most of the cumulative "gross" appreciation and depreciation. E. g., $71.6 \%$ of the "gross" depreciation ( 404.2 cents) during period A based on MA5 are brought about by downward runs lasting more than six 30-minutes intervals $(23.2 \%$ of all downward runs - table A/5). When a 50-periods MA is used, the concentration of the overall "gross" appreciation or depreciation on relatively few persistent runs is even greater (runs lasting longer than 6 intervals account for almost $99 \%$ of the overall "gross" exchange rate change).
Tables $A / 7$ and $A / 8$ in the annex have the same structure as tables $A / 2, A / 4$ and $A / 6$. They show the distribution of runs of the dollar/euro exchange rate based on 30-minutes data for the sub-periods 1,3 and 5 during the "bear market" of period $A$ (table $A / 7$ ) and for the subperiods $7,9,11$ and 13 during the "bull market" of period $C$ (table $A / 8$ ). The results obtained for the overall period A and period C (table 9) are confirmed: "Bearish" sub-periods are mainly due to persistent downward (upward) runs occurring more (less) frequently than according to the RWH (table A/7). Similarly, "bullish" sub-periods are characterized by persistent upward (downward) runs occurring more (less) frequently than under a random walk (table A/8).
Finally, the same "measurement exercise" is done for the dollar/euro exchange rate at 1 minute intervals. Due to the enormous amount of data the calculations are carried out only for one "bullish" sub-period and for one "bearish" sub-period, i. e., for the sub-periods 1 and 7. Each of the two periods is further subdivided into four "sub-sub-periods" (figure 10). The run distribution prevailing in these "bullish" and "bearish" periods is documented in the annex in table A/9 and table A/10, rspectively.
The features of the distribution of upward and downward runs of the dollar/euro exchange rate at 1-minute intervals can be summarized as follows (see table 10 as well as tables A/9 and $A / 10$ in the annex):

- The number of runs is significantly higher than under the RWH. The deviations from a random walk are even greater than in the case of 30-minutes data (compare table 10 to table 9).
- Even when smoothing the data with comparatively long moving averages (up to 400 periods) does the overall number of runs exceed the expected number according to the RWH.
- The pattern of persistent runs accumulating to an overall appreciation or depreciation is much less pronounced on the basis of 1-minute data than on the basis of daily data and 30-minutes data. Only over shorter "bullish" ("bearish") sub-periods do persistent upward
(downward) runs occur more frequently than persistent downward (upward) runs (see, e. g., the distribution of runs during the "bullish" period between June, 17 and June 28, 2002 - table A/10).
- The average slopes of runs are significantly less steep than according to the RWH.

One reason for why the distribution of upward and downward runs based on 1-minute data differs from the respective distribution of runs based on 30-minutes data might be the following. The periods for which exchange rate movements based on 1 -minute data are investigated are comparatively "longer" (in the sense of the amount of data points) than those used for 30-minutes data. As a consequence, the average change per time unit and, hence, the trend component, is particularly small in our sample periods of 1-minute data.

The results of chapter 3 can be summarized as follows:

- Exchange rates fluctuate most of the time around "underlying" short-term trends. This phenomenon is more pronounced on the basis of daily and 30-minutes data than on the basis of 1-minute data.
- Over a extended period of time (up to several years) these short-term trends (runs on the basis of smoothed data) last longer in one direction than in the other. The accumulation of upward runs lasting longer than downward runs brings about a "bull market" in a stepwise process (and vice versa for a "bear market").
- The difference in the slope of upward and downward runs contributes to the development of "bull markets" and "bear markets". Upward (downward) runs being steeper over an extended period of time than "counter-runs" runs cause short-term upward (downward) trends to become more persistent.
- The average slopes of exchange rate runs tend to be smaller than expected if the exchange rate followed a random walk. This tendency is particularly pronounced on the basis of intraday data.
This pattern of exchange rate dynamics conflicts with the basic assumptions of the "efficient market hypothesis". According to this concept any asset price reflects the fundamental equilibrium value of the respective asset (rational market participants permanently keep the price at this level). If new information arrives, actors will drive the price instantaneously to its new equilibrium. This (rational) behaviour assures that asset prices follow a random walk which in turn implies "weak market efficiency" (Fama, 1970; 1998). This concept means that one cannot systematically make trading profits from exploiting just the information contained in past prices (as do the popular trading rules of technical analysis).6)

In contrast to efficient market theory the empirical analysis presented above shows that the dynamics of exchange rates (and most probably of asset prices in general) is characterised by price fluctuations around underlying trends. The phenomenon of "trending" can be

[^5]observed on the basis of daily data as well as of intraday data. The "abnormally" frequent occurrence of persistent price movements represents the most important link between the short run and the long run in the dynamics of asset prices. This is so because short-term price runs accumulate to long-term trends.
The most popular trading technique in financial markets, the so called "technical analysis", is based on the (assumed) exploitability of asset price trends. The next chapter invetsigates therefore the profitability of technical trading systems in the dollar/euro market (1999/2006) and in the dollar/DM market (1987/1998).

## 4. Performance of technical currency trading

In this chapter, I shall first present an overview of the literature on technical trading in the foreign exchange market. I will then introduce into the basics of technical trading and explain the functioning of those types of models tested in the present study. The last sections document the performance of 2265 models based on daily exchange rates and of 2466 models based on 30-minutes exchange rates.

### 4.1 Extant research on technical currency trading

According to survey studies, technical analysis is the most widely used trading technique in foreign exchange markets. Over the 1990s the importance of technical analysis increased stronger than other trading practices like the orientation on fundamentals or on customer orders. Nowadays between $30 \%$ and $40 \%$ of professional currency traders use technical systems as their most important trading technique (for recent survey studies see Cheung-Chinn-Marsh, 2004; Cheung-Wong, 2000; Cheung-Chinn, 2001; Oberlechner, 2001; GehrigMenkhoff; 2004, 2005A and 2005B; the best survey of survey studies is Menkhoff-Taylor, 2007).
The results of the survey studies cast doubt on the conventional assumptions about trading behaviour in the foreign exchange market. Hence, many researchers investigated if trading rules were actually profitable in this market (see, e.g., Sweeney, 1986; Schulmeister, 1988; Levich-Thomas, 1993; Menkhoff-Schlumberger, 1995; Neely-Weller-Dittmar, 1997; Curcio-Goodhart-Guillaume-Payne, 1997; Gencay-Stengos, 1998; Chang-Osler, 1999; Neely-Weller, 1999; Gencay, 1999; LeBaron, 1999; Osler, 2000; Schulmeister, 2000; Maillet-Michel, 2000; Neely-Weller, 2003; Ohlson, 2004; Schulmeister, 2008A and 2008B).
All of these studies have found technical trading systems to be profitable when tested in sample based on daily exchange rates. However, their performance out of sample was in most cases found to be significantly worse. Some authors also found that the profitability of trading rules has declined over time (Marsh, 2000; Ohlson, 2004). Studies on the performance of technical currency trading based on intraday data arrive at mixed results. Dempster-Jones (2002) and Gencay-Dacarogna-Olsen-Pictet (2003) find this type of trading to be profitable, Curcio-Goodhart-Guillaume-Payne (1997) and Neely-Weller (2003) arrive at the opposite
result (for an excellent survey of all types of studies on technical analysis in different asset markets see Park-lrwin, 2004).
Several problems remain unexplained by the extant research.
First, the decline in the profitability of technical currency trading based on daily data is mostly attributed to an increase in market efficiency. It is argued that the information and communication technologies have improved the access to information, lowered transaction costs and increased liquidity in the currency markets (hypothesis 1). However, the new technologies also enable traders to use technical models on the basis of high frequency (intraday) data instead of daily data. This development might have caused intraday exchange rate movements to become more persistent and, hence, exploitable by technical models. At the same time, exchange rate changes on the basis of daily data have become bigger and more erratic which in turn causes technical trading to become less profitable on the basis of daily exchange rates (hypothesis 2). An evaluation of the two competing hypotheses necessitates an analysis of the profitability of technical currency trading on the basis of daily as well as of intraday data. This has not yet been done for a great variety of technical models actually used in practice.
Second, the relationship between the pattern of exchange rate dynamics, the performance of technical trading systems and their aggregate trading behaviour has not yet been analyzed on the basis of intraday data. Such an investigation is of high priority since most currency transactions are done in intraday trading. An analysis of the aggregate trading behaviour of a great variety of technical models will contribute to a better understanding of two characteristics in exchange rate dynamics. The first property concerns the trending behaviour of the exchange rate over the long run (Engel-Hamilton, 1990), as well as over the short run (Dewachter, 2001; Neely-Dueker; 2005). The second property concerns the phenomenon of price cascades in currency markets (Osler, 2003 and 2005).
Third, the extant research on the relationship between order flows and exchange rate movements has neglected the role of technical currency trading. Proponents of the microstructure approach hold that order flows are only driven by new (still private) information on fundamentals (Evans-Lyons, 2002; 2005). However, to the extent that news impact on exchange rates, they do also cause technical models to produce a sequence of buy or sell signals which in turn induce additional order flows.
Fourth, the interaction between exchange rate dynamics and technical analysis has not yet been analyzed for the exchange rates of the euro vis-à-vis the other most important currencies.

The present study tries to fill this gap by exploring the performance of technical trading systems in the dollar/euro market based on daily data as well as on 30-minutes data in sample and out of sample.

### 4.2 Basics on technical trading systems

Technical analysis tries to derive profitable buy and sell signals by isolating upward and downward price trends or runs around which the price fluctuates from oscillations around a stable level, called "whipsaws" in the traders' jargon (Kaufman, 1987; Murphy, 1986; "technical day trading" is dealt with in Deel, 2000, and Velez-Capra, 2000).
One can classify technical trading systems in two different ways. First, according to the method of processing price data one can distinguish between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Second, according to the timing of trading signals one can distinguish between trend-following strategies and contrarian strategies. Trend-following systems produce buy (sell) signals in the early stage of an upward (downward) trend whereas contrarian strategies produce sell (buy) signals at the end of an upward (downward) trend, e. g., contrarian models try to identify "overbought" ("oversold") situations. ${ }^{7}$ )

The qualitative approaches rely on the interpretation of some (purportedly) typical configurations of the ups and downs of price movements like head and shoulders, top and bottom formations or resistance lines (most of these approaches are contrarian, e. g., they try to anticipate trend reversals). The chartist trading techniques contain therefore an important subjective element.

The quantitative approaches try to isolate price runs from non-directional movements using statistical transformations of the series of past prices. Consequently, these models produce clearly defined buy and sell signals, which can be accurately tested. The most common quantitative trading systems are moving average models, momentum models and the socalled relative strength index. These types of models are tested in the study. For a simple explanation of how these models work it is in the following assumed that the models are applied to daily data (in the empirical part of this study also intraday data will be used, namely, exchange rates at 30 -minutes intervals).

### 4.3 Types of technical models and types of trading signal generation

The first type of model consists of a short-term moving average ( $M A S_{j}$ ) and an long-term moving average (MALk) of past prices. The length $j$ of MAS usually varies between 1 day (in this case the original price series serves as the shortest possible MAS - see figures 1 and 2 as examples) and 10 days, the length $k$ of MAL usually lies between 10 and 40 days.

The basic trading rule of average models is as follows (signal generation 1):
Buy (go long) when the short-term (faster) moving average crosses the long-term (slower) moving average from below and sell (go short) when the converse occurs. Or equivalently: Open a long position when the difference (MASj-MALk) becomes positive, otherwise open a

[^6]short position. If one expresses this difference as percentage of MALk one gets the moving average oscillator:
MAO $(\mathrm{j}, \mathrm{k})_{t}=\left[\left(\mathrm{MAS}_{j,+-}-\mathrm{MAL}_{k, t}\right) / \mathrm{MAL}_{k, t}\right]^{*} 100$
This type of representation facilitates a (graphical) comparison of the signal generation between moving average models and momentum models (see figures 1 and 2).
The second type of model works with the relative difference (rate of change in \%) between the current price and that i days ago:
$M(i)_{t}=\left[\left(P_{t}-P_{t-i}\right) / P_{t-i}\right]^{*} 100$
The basic trading rule of momentum models is as follows (signal generation 1):
Buy (go long) when the momentum $M$ (i) turns from negative into positive and sell (go short) in the opposite case.
The variables MAO(j,k) or M(i) are called "oscillators" because they fluctuate around zero (see figures 11 and as empirical example figure 12).
The basic trading rule of moving average models and momentum models (SG 1) is trendfollowing since $\mathrm{MAS}_{j, t}\left(\mathrm{P}_{\dagger}\right)$ exceeds (falls below) MALk,t ( $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{t}_{-i} \text { ) }}$ only if an upward (downward) price movement has persisted for some days (depending on the lengths of the moving averages and the time span $i$ in the case of momentum models, respectively).
There exist many modifications of the basic version of moving average and momentum models (see, e. g., Kaufman, 1987, chapters 5 and 6). The most common consists of a band with varying width around zero combined with different rules of opening a long, short or neutral position when the moving average oscillator or the momentum oscillator cross the upper bound, lower bound or the zero line. These rules - termed SG 2 to 6 in this study - are either trend-following or contrarian.
According to signal generation 2 one opens a long (short) position whenever the oscillator crosses the upper (lower) bound from below (above). When the model holds a long (short) position and the oscillator crosses the zero line from above (below) then the model switches to a neutral position. Figure 11 clarifies the meaning of this rule by comparing it to SG 1 .
Rule SG 2 is "more" trend-following than SG 1 since it opens a long or short position at a later stage of a price trend (dependent on the width of the band). At the same time SG 2 is more "cautious" than SG 1 since it always holds a neutral position between switching from long to short and vice versa. Holding a neutral position as long as a price movement has not gained some persistence aims at avoiding losses during "whipsaws".
Rule SG 3 differs from SG 2 insofar as the former switches from an open to a neutral position earlier than the latter. Whenever the oscillator crosses the upper (lower) band from above (below) rule SG 2 turns from long (short) to neutral. Hence, when following SG 2 a trader holds a neutral position as long as the oscillator remains within the band around the zero line. This means in the case of a momentum oscillator, e. g., that one closes a long position even if the
current price still exceeds the price $i$ days ago, provided that the (positive) rate of change $\left[\left(P_{\dagger}-P_{t-i}\right) / P_{t-i}\right]^{*} 100$ is declining and falls below the level of the upper bound.

Figure 11: Signal generation of technical trading systems
Trend-following systems


Contrarian Systems

$\begin{array}{ll}\text { SG } & \text { Signal generation } \\ \text { L } & \text { Open a long position (buy) } \\ \text { S } & \text { Open a short position (sell) } \\ \text { N } & \text { Go neutral (close the long position = sell; close the short position = buy) } \\ \text { MAO } & \text { Moving average oscillator } \\ \text { M } & \text { Momentum oscillator } \\ \text { RSIN } & \text { Relative strength oscillator (normalized) } \\ \text { UB } & \text { Upper bound } \\ \text { LB } & \text { Lower bound }\end{array}$

The trading rules SG 4 to 6 can be considered contrarian since they try to identify "overbought" ("oversold") situations. A price configuration is believed to indicate an overbought situation when the moving average (momentum) oscillator is falling below a certain - still positive - level (marked by the upper bound of the band). If the oscillator is rising - though still negative - the situation is considered oversold once the oscillator crosses the lower bound from below. Figure 11 shows the differences between the 3 contrarian trading rules:

Rule SG 4 is always either long or short (as is the trend-following rule SG 1). According to SG 4 a trader switches from a long (short) to a short (long) position once the moving average or momentum oscillator crosses the upper (lower) bound from above (below). Hence, even if the rate of price change in the case of a momentum model is still positive the model SG 4 switches from a long to a short position once the rate of price change falls below the level of the upper bound.

Rule SG 5 is more "cautious" than SG 4 insofar as the former goes at first neutral when the oscillator penetrates the upper (lower) bound from above (below), and switches to a short (long) position only if the oscillator penetrates the zero line.
Rule SG 6 operates with a second (inner) band marked by UB2 and LB2 (UB1>UB2>LB2>LB1). This model holds a neutral position whenever a falling (rising) oscillator lies between UB1 and UB2 (LB1 and LB2) and, hence, is less often neutral as compared to SG 5 . Model SG 6 opens a new long (short) position later than SG 4 but earlier that SG 5, SG 6 can therefore be considered a combination of SG 4 and SG 5. At the extreme values of UB2 (LB2) the model $S G 6$ is identical either with SG 4 (when UB2=UB1 and LB2=LB1) or with SG 5 (when UB2=LB2=0).
One of the most popular indicators for identifying overbought and oversold conditions is the so-called Relative Strength Index (RSI). Since the strategy of following this index is contrarian only the trading rules SG 4 to SG 5 can be applied. The n-day Relative Strength Index is defined as follows (Kaufman, 1987, p. 99).
RSI (n) $+100-\left\{100 / 1+\left[\right.\right.$ Upt $_{+}(n) /$ Downt $\left._{t}(n)\right\}$
Where
$U p_{f}(n)=1 / n \Sigma D_{i} \quad$ for $D_{i}>0$
$\operatorname{Downt}^{(n)}=1 / n \Sigma D_{i}$ for $D_{i}<0$
and $D_{i}$ is the (daily) priced change:
$D_{i}=P_{t-i+1}-P_{t-1} \quad$ for $i=1 \ldots \ldots . . n$
The size of the $\operatorname{RSI}(n)$ oscillator does not only depend on the overall price change $P_{t}-P_{t-n}$ (as the momentum oscillator) but also the persistence (degree of monotonicity) of this change, e. g., the less counter-movements occur during an upward (downward) trend the higher (lower) is RSI(n) for any given price change $P_{t}-P_{t-n}$. If the RSI( $n$ ) falls (rises) again below (above) a certain level (the upper/lower bound of the RSI oscillator) the situation is considered overbought (oversold).
The original RSI fluctuates between 0 and 1 . To make this oscillator comparable to the moving average and the momentum oscillator, respectively, one can calculate a normalized RSI (=RSIN) which fluctuates around zero:
$\operatorname{RSIN}(n)+1 / 100[\operatorname{RS}(n)+-0,5]^{*} 2$
The contrarian trading rules SG 4, SG 5 and SG 6 can then be applied to this normalized index in the same way as to the moving average oscillator and the momentum oscillator, respectively.

### 4.4 Model selection

The study investigates a great variety of technical models. When testing the performance of trading based on 30 -minutes data the length of the short-term and long-term moving average (MAS and MAS, respectively) as well as the time span $i$ in the case of momentum models are greater than when trading is based on daily data. This reason for that differentiation is simple: As the data frequency of 30 -minutes exchange rates is 48 times higher than of daily rates, the "underlying" trends comprise in general more time units when 30 -minutes data are used that when daily data are used. However, in order to avoid the suspicion of "model mining", the parameters of the daily models and of the 30-minutes models differ not "too" much from each other. ${ }^{8)}$
More specifically, the following models are selected for testing the profitability of currency trading based on daily data:

- Bands: As wider upper and lower bound (UB1 and LB1, respectively) a value of 0.3 and 0,3 , respectively, is chosen for all models. The values of the inner band are 0.15 and -0.15 , respectively.
- Moving average models: All combinations of a short-term moving average (MAS) between 1 and 15 days and a long-term moving average (MAL) between 30 and 50 days are tested. Hence, 315 moving average models are used for each of the six types of signal generation, for a total of 1890 models ( $=6 * 315$ ).
- Momentum models: All models with a time span I between 20 and 50 days are tested, i. e., a total of 186 models ( $=6 * 31$ ).
- RSIN models: All models with a time span i between 10 and 30 days are tested. Since RSIN models are only of the contrarian type, additional values for the wider band and the inner band are used, namely (-)0.35/(-)0.175 and (-)0.4/(-)0.2. Hence, a total of 189 RSIN models are tested $\left(=\left(3^{*} 3^{*} 21\right)\right.$.
- In total, the performance of 2265 technical models in trading daily exchange rates is investigated.
When trading based on 30-minutes exchange rates is simulated, the following models are used:
- Bands: The same bands are used as for daily models.
- Moving average models: All combinations of a short-term moving average (MAS) between 10 and 20 time units (i. e., 30-minutes intervals) and a long-term moving average (MAL) between 40 and 70 time units are investigated. Hence, a total of 2046 moving average models is tested ( $=6^{*} 11^{*} 21$ ).

[^7]- Momentum models: All models with a time span I between 30 and 50 days are selected. In addition to the standard bands (-)0.3/(-)0.15 also the band (-)0.4/(-)0.2 are tested, i. e., a total of 231 models $\left(=21+2 * 5^{*} 21\right)$.
- RSIN models: The same models are tested as in the case of daily data (189 models).
- In total, the performance of 2466 technical models in trading 30-minutes exchange rates is simulated.

The samples comprise a wide range of different technical models. The "fastest" daily models like a RSIN model with a time span of 10 (days) produce roughly 45 trading signals per year. Hence, open positions generated by these models last only 8 days on average. ${ }^{9}$ ) The "slowest" models like the MA model 15/50 (MAS=15, MAL=50) produce only 6 trading signals per year, their open positions last roughly 60 days on average. When trading based on 30minutes data is simulated, open positions of the "slowest" models last even 11 times longer than open positions generated by the "fastest" 30 -minutes models (roughly 2 days and 4 hours, respectively).
The approach of model selection adopted in this study differs from the usual procedure of testing the profitability of trading rules. In most studies, this is done in the following way. The researcher selects out of a sample of some hundreds or even thousands different rules the best performing one and then tests for the statistical significance of their profitability. This is done using the "bootstrap" methodology (see, e. g., Brock-Lakonishok-LeBaron, 1992; Levich-Thomas, 1993) and in addition the "reality check for data snooping" (see, e. g., Sullivan - Timmermann - White, 1999; Park-Irwin, 2005; Neely - Weller - Ulrich, 2007; Marshall - Cahan Cahan, 2008). In most cases it then turns out that the ex-post best performing models do not survive these tests. The reason is simple: Their ex-post-profitability is mainly due to "data snooping" or "model mining" and, hence, is achieved just by chance.

To put it differently: Since the researcher restricts the analysis of the performance of trading systems to only a few ex-post best performing models he himself practices a "biased selection" which he then "detects" by testing for a "data snooping bias". From this result it is then concluded that technical trading in general is not consistently profitable. Such a conclusion is not warranted because in practice (experienced) technical traders do not use such a (necessarily biased) optimization procedure. By contrast, the literature for practitioners warns against (over)optimization precisely because this causes one to select a model out of the extreme right tail of a probability distribution of a great number of models. In particular, it is warned against the use of a very great number of "test models" since the probability of committing a "selection error" increases with the number of "test models". For these reasons practitioners restrict their selection to a range of models which have performed relatively
9) For models which are always in the market (no neutral positions) like SG1 or SG3, the relationship between trading signals, transactions and open positions is as follows. The number of overall transactions is twice the number of trading signals minus 2 since every signal induces two transactions, namely, closing the former position and opening the new one (except for the first and last signal). The number of open positions is therefore half the number of transactions.
stable over the long run (the literature often concretizes the parameter ranges for a specific market) instead of choosing a model which performed best over a recent (and arbitrarily specified) "test period".
The present study documents therefore the performance of the total sample of more than 2000 technical models, which are selected according to a certain range of the model parameters. Due to the generally defined selection criteria used for the dollar/euro market as well as for the dollar/DM market, many of the models under investigation produce substantial losses (as shall later be documented). In addition, the procedure of analyzing technical trading systems applied in the present study was already used in studies on the performance trading systems in the foreign exchange market as well as in the stock market and in the commodity futures market (Schulmeister, 2006, 2008A, 2009B, 2009C, 2009A). For these reasons, the results of these studies as well as of the present study can hardly be attributed to "data snooping".

### 4.5 Assumptions underlying the simulation of technical currency trading

The data base for testing technical currency trading covers the actual spot rate at 17 hours Greenwich mean time or the first rate realized thereafter. At this time, the foreign exchange market is particularly liquid (trading is done in London as well as in the US). The 30-minute data run each week from Sunday, 22,30 hours Greenwich mean time (when trading starts on Monday in East Asia) to Friday, 22,00 hours.
Transaction costs are estimated at $0.01 \%$. This estimate implies a bid-ask spread of 3 basis points as is typical for the most liquid foreign exchange market, i. e., the dollar/euro market.
The profitability of the trading systems is calculated in the following way. The single rate of return (SRRi) from any position i opened at time $t$ and closed at $t+n$ is
SRR ${ }_{i}=\left\{\left(P_{t+n}-P_{t}\right) / P_{t}\right\} * 100 \quad$ for long positions ( $P_{t+n}$ is the sell price)
$S R R R_{i}=\left\{\left(P_{+}-P_{t+n}\right) / P_{+}\right\} * 100$ for short positions ( $\mathrm{P}_{+}$is the sell price)
The single rates of return can be considered as absolute returns in cents if one assumes that there is always $1 \$$ in the game (value of any open position). The sum of all positive (negative) returns gives the gross profits (losses). The gross rate of return (per year) is then the difference between gross profits (per year) and gross losses (per year). If one subtracts transaction costs one gets the net rate of return (the number of transactions is always twice the number of open positions and, hence, of the single returns).
For any open position, interest is earned from the long position and paid for the short position. If one calculates the overall interest effect using the information on the duration of the long and the short dollar positions and on the interest differential it turns out that this effect was close to zero during the sample period (similar results were already reported in by LeBaron, 1999, and Schulmeister, 2000).

Figure 12: Technical trading signals for DM/euro trading 1999/01/04-2001/12/31


The gross rate of return (GRR) of any technical trading model can be split into six components, the number of profitable/unprofitable positions (NPP/NPL), the average return per day during profitable/unprofitable positions (DRP/DRL), and the average duration of profitable/unprofitable positions (DPP/DPL). The following relationship holds:

GRR $=$ NPP*DRP*DPP - NPL*DRL*DPL
The probability of making an overall loss when blindly following a technical trading model is estimated by testing the mean of the single rates of return against zero (only if it is negative does the trading rule produce an overall loss). ${ }^{10}$ )

[^8]
### 4.6 Performance of technical trading based on daily dollar/euro rates 1999-2006

Figure 12 and table 11 show how a simple moving average model ( $\mathrm{MAS}=1, \mathrm{MAL}=40$ ) and a momentum model (time span $i=25$ ) perform when trading the dollar/euro exchange rate based on daily data between January 2, 1999 and December 31, 2001. After five single losses, the MA model successfully exploits a downward trend between January 15, and May 6, 1999: The current exchange rate, which serves as MAS, is lower than the MAL (the MA oscillator is negative), hence, the model keeps holding a short position. The single profit from this position amounts to $7.40 \%$ or cents if one assumes that there is always $1 \$$ in the "game". Figure 12 and table 11 demonstrate that the MA model produces many more single losses than single profits, however, the losses are much smaller than the profits since the former are due to minor price fluctuations whereas the latter stem from "riding" persistent trends (this pattern of profitability is typical for technical trading in general).
Over the entire trading period of 3 years, the MA model $1 / 40$ would have achieved a gross rate of return per year (GRR) of $8.8 \% \%$ per year (the GRR of the momentum model was 25 11.9). The components of the profitability of the sample model are as follows (table 11):

- The number of profitable trades per year is lower than the number of unprofitable trades (5 relative to 9).
- The average return per day during profitable positions is smaller (in absolute terms) than during unprofitable positions ( 0.06 relative to -0.13 ).
- Profitable positions last on average almost 10 times longer than unprofitable positions ( 60.5 days relative to 6.9).
The overall profitability of the model is therefore due to the exploitation of persistent exchange rate trends. This pattern is typical for the performance of technical trading systems in general: Smaller fluctuations often cause technical models to produce losses, which, however, are small, precisely because the fluctuations are small.
The distribution of the single rates of return reflects these properties of technical trading systems (for the MA model 1/40 see table 11):
- The median is negative.
- The standard deviation is several times higher than the mean.
- The distribution is skewed to the right and leptokurtotic.

The probability of making an overall loss by blindly following a technical trading system is estimated by testing the mean of the single rates of return against zero (only if it is negative does the trading rule produce an overall loss). For our sample model the t-statistic amounts to

[^9]
### 1.72. Hence, the probability of making an overall loss by following this model over the entire sample period of 3 years was roughly $5 \%$.

Table 11: Performance of a moving average model 1999-2001


| The Profitability of the trading system |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Gross rate of return | 8.77 |
| Net rate of return | 8.49 |
| Average duration of positions | 26.00 |
| Long | 15.76 |
| Short | 36.24 |
| $\quad$ Neutral | 0.00 |
| Sum of profits per year | 16.79 |
| Profitable positions |  |
| $\quad$ Number per year (NPP) | 5.01 |
| Average return |  |
| $\quad$ Per position (RPP) | 3.35 |
| $\quad$ Per day (DRP) | 0.055 |
| Average duration (DPP) | 60.47 |
| Sum of losses per year | -8.02 |
| Unprofitable positions |  |
| Number per year (NPL) | 2.68 |
| Average return | -0.89 |
| $\quad$ Per position (RPL) | -0.130 |
| Per day (DRL) | 6.85 |
| Average duration (DPL) |  |
| Distribution of the single rates of return | 0.63 |
| Mean | 1.49 |
| t-statistic | -0.51 |
| Median | 2.68 |
| Standard deviation | 1.72 |
| Skewness | 2.03 |
| Excess kurtosis | 42 |
| Sample size |  |

Table 12: Components of the profitability of 2265 trading systems 1999-2006 Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate

| Number of models |  |  |  |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Abolute | Share <br> in \% | Gross rate of return | tstatistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | Number | Return | Duration | Number | Return | Duration |
|  |  |  |  |  | per year | per day | in days | per year | per day | in days |


| t-statistic of the mean of the single returns |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $<0$ | 59 | 2.6 | -1.1 | -0.350 | -1.5 | 7.87 | 0.078 | 25.93 | 14.00 | -0.116 | 11.69 |
| $0-<1.0$ | 456 | 20.1 | 2.1 | 0.623 | 1.7 | 6.10 | 0.062 | 44.62 | 11.04 | -0.109 | 11.85 |
| 1.0-<=2.0 | 1679 | 74.1 | 4.8 | 1.487 | 4.6 | 3.85 | 0.049 | 71.44 | 6.28 | -0.081 | 18.52 |
| > 2.0 | 71 | 3.1 | 6.9 | 2.118 | 6.6 | 5.61 | 0.054 | 54.05 | 8.05 | -0.089 | 13.37 |
| All models | 2265 | 100.0 | 4.2 | 1.285 | 3.9 | 4.47 | 0.052 | 64.31 | 7.49 | -0.088 | 16.84 |
| Moving average models | 1890 | 83.4 | 4.5 | 1.374 | 4.3 | 3.76 | 0.049 | 70.88 | 6.35 | -0.082 | 18.46 |
| Momentum models | 186 | 8.2 | 4.3 | 1.259 | 3.9 | 6.90 | 0.053 | 40.78 | 12.08 | -0.104 | 8.25 |
| RSIN models | 189 | 8.3 | 1.1 | 0.416 | 0.6 | 9.11 | 0.084 | 21.81 | 14.40 | -0.127 | 9.05 |
| 1999-2000 | 2265 | - | 8.7 | 1.038 | 8.5 | 4.35 | 0.068 | 72.21 | 6.11 | -0.102 | 17.11 |
| 2001-2002 | 2265 | - | 2.9 | 0.427 | 2.6 | 4.98 | 0.056 | 55.68 | 9.05 | -0.099 | 14.92 |
| 2003-2004 | 2265 | - | 5.1 | 0.709 | 4.8 | 4.74 | 0.058 | 61.07 | 7.33 | -0.117 | 15.06 |
| 2005-2006 | 2265 | - | 0.6 | 0.109 | 0.3 | 4.28 | 0.043 | 58.18 | 8.30 | -0.061 | 21.20 |

Table 12 classifies all models according to their performance as measured by the t-statistic into four groups and quantifies the components of profitability for each of them. A t-statistic greater than 2.0 is achieved by only $3.1 \%$ of all models, the average rate of return per year (GRR) over these models amounts to $6.9 \%$. The $t$-statistic of most models ( $74.1 \%$ ) lies between 1.0 and 2.0 (GRR: 4.6\%), 20.1\% generate a t-statistic between 0.0 and 3.5 (GRR: 2.1\%). The share of unprofitable models is $2.6 \%$, their average rate of return is $-1.1 \%$. All 2265 technical models produce an average GRR of $4.2 \%$ per year. Since the models produce only 13.7 open positions per year on average, the net rate of return (NRR) is only slightly smaller (3.9\%) than the gross rate.

Moving average models perform slightly better than momentum models (GRR: 4.5\% and 4.3\% per year, respectively), RSIN models perform comparatively poorly (GRR: 1.1\%).
The pattern of profitability is the same for each class of models (table 12). The number of single losses exceeds the number of single profits, the average return per day (in absolute terms) is higher during unprofitable positions than during profitable positions, hence, the overall profitability is only due to profitable positions lasting roughly four times longer than unprofitable positions. The same pattern of profitability was found when testing the performance of technical trading systems in the dollar/deutschmark market (Schulmeister, 2008A), in the yen/dollar market (Schulmeister, 2009B), in the US stock market (Schulmeister, 2009C) and in four commodity futures markets (Schulmeister, 2009A).
In order to investigate the performance of technical trading in the dollar/euro market, the overall sample period 1999/2006 is divided into 4 sub-periods each lasting 2 years. As table 12 shows, the models would have been profitable over each sub-period on average. However,
their performance varies across sub-periods: Over the first sub-period (1999/2000), the models would have produced an average GRR of $8.7 \%$ per year, whereas their GRR would have amounted to only $0.6 \%$ over the last sub-period $(2005 / 2006)$.
Table 18 shows that the same 2265 models would have been similarly profitable when trading the dollar/DM exchange rate between 1987 and 1998. Also over this period did the profitability decline over time. This result is in line with other studies on technical trading in the foreign exchange market (Ohlson, 2004; Neely - Weller - Ulrich, 2007; Schulmeister, 2008B) as well as in the stock market (Schulmeister, 2009C).
The decline in the profitability of technical trading can be explained in four different ways:

- In the first case, the profitability of trading rules as reported in several studies was merely the result of "data mining" and, hence, cannot be reproduced out of sample. In a recent study Neely - Weller - Ulrich (2007) reject this hypothesis for most studies they evaluated.
- In the second case, markets become gradually more efficient in an evolutionary process as expected by the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH). This theoretical concept was developed by Lo (2004) as an alternative to the too rigid Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). By learning to exploit profit opportunities, market participants will gradually erode these opportunities. According to Neely - Weller - Ulrich (2007) the results of their out-of-sample-tests support the AMH.
- In the third case, the continuous rise in the "speed" of transactions causes technical traders to use increasingly intraday data instead of daily data. ${ }^{11}$ ) This development could have caused intraday exchange rate movements to become more persistent and, hence, exploitable by technical models. As a consequence, exchange rate changes based on daily data have become bigger and more erratic which in turn causes technical trading on the basis of daily data to become less profitable. ${ }^{12}$ )
- In the fourth case, technical traders use increasingly more complex trading models instead of traditional rules like moving average or momentum rules. Such a shift will in turn change the trending pattern of exchange rates and, hence, cause traditional models to become unprofitable (for the feed-back of the aggregate trading behaviour of technical models on exchange rate movements see Schulmeister, 2006 and 2009B). Such a shift to more complex trading rules will be strengthened by the shift to intraday data

[^10]since the latter call for more sophisticated techniques to filter out short-term trends (exchange rate volatility rises with data frequency as is documented in chapter 3 of this study).
Also the AMH expects that new and more sophisticated trading strategies will emerge once the "old" and simpler rules have become unprofitable. The main difference between the AMH and the hypotheses 3 and 4 sketched above is as follows. The AMH assumes that any originally profitable trading rules will become gradually less profitable because more and more people use them (i.e., through the classical arbitrage mechanism). As a consequence, smart traders seek for and finally discover new profitable rules.
By contrast, the hypotheses 3 and 4 assume that the causality runs from the use of new and more complex rules based on an ever increasing data frequency to the erosion of the profitability of the older and simpler rules. This effect is mainly due to the change in the trending pattern of asset prices caused by the gradually increasing use of the new trading strategies. To shed more light on this issue, sections 4.7 and 4.9 of this study explores the performance of technical currency trading based on 30-minutes data.

Table 13: Cluster of 2265 trading systems according to profit components 1999-2006
Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate

|  | Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate of return | t-statistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |
| All models |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cluster 1 | 444 | 19.6 | 2.9 | 0.901 | 2.5 | 8.06 | 0.068 | 30.97 | 14.40 | -0.122 | 7.34 |
| Cluster 2 | 1039 | 45.9 | 4.3 | 1.288 | 4.1 | 4.10 | 0.052 | 61.12 | 6.96 | -0.088 | 15.52 |
| Cluster 3 | 782 | 34.5 | 4.7 | 1.499 | 4.6 | 2.91 | 0.045 | 87.47 | 4.28 | -0.068 | 23.99 |
| Total | 2265 | 100.0 | 4.2 | 1.285 | 3.9 | 4.47 | 0.052 | 64.31 | 7.49 | -0.088 | 16.84 |

In order to detect similarities in the trading behaviour of certain groups of technical models, statistical clustering techniques are used. These methods classify all models into similar groups in the following way. All models characterized by a certain number of variables (profitability components in our case) are assigned to different clusters under the condition that the differences between the models are minimized within each cluster and maximized across clusters. For this (descriptive) exercise the simple approach called K-Means Cluster Analysis was adopted (provided by the SPSS software package). In this case the number of clusters has to be predetermined (here three clusters are sufficient to illustrate characteristic differences in the trading behaviour of technical models).
Table 13 displays the results of the cluster analysis. When trading the daily dollar/euro exchange rate the 444 models of cluster 1 produce the highest number of open positions (22.4 per year on average), mainly for that reason the duration of profitable positions is
relatively short (31.0 days on average). Cluster 1 comprises therefore those ("fast") models which are most sensitive to price changes. The 1039 models of cluster 2 signal 14.1 open positions per year, the profitable positions last 61.1 days on average. Cluster 3 comprises 782 models holding only 7.2 open positions per year, their profitable positions last 87.5 days on average ("slow" models).
The results of the cluster analysis con be interpreted in the following way (table 13). First, the models of cluster 1 "specialize" on the exploitation of short-term exchange rate trends, those of cluster 2 "specialize" on medium-term trends, whereas the models of cluster 3 exploit mainly long-term trends. Second, since exchange rate trends tend to be the steeper the shorter they last, the daily returns during profitable positions are highest for the models of cluster 1 and lowest for the models of cluster 3. Third, the daily losses during the comparatively shorter - unprofitable positions are also highest in the case of cluster 1 , and lowest in the case of cluster 3 (the slope of the ups and downs during whipsaws are steeper than during trends, even if the trends last only short). Fourth, the ratio between the number of profitable and unprofitable positions is smaller for the models of cluster 1 and highest for the models of cluster 3.
As result of the differences in the profitability pattern, the models of cluster 1 produce on average a smaller GRR (2.9\%) than the models of cluster 2 and cluster $31.3 \%$ and $4.7 \%$, respectively).
Chapter 3 of this study has shown that persistent exchange rate trends occur "abnormally" frequently. In this chapter, the ex-post-analysis of the profitability pattern of technical currency trading reveals that it is precisely this trending behaviour of exchange rates which causes technical models to be profitable. However, the relationship between exchange rate trending and ex-post-profits from technical trading does not ensure the profitability of technical trading ex ante. If, e. g., a trader selects a model that would have performed best over the most recent past for trading over a subsequent period, then he might become a victim of his own "model mining" for the following reason.

Table 14: Performance of the 25 most profitable trading systems by subperiods in sample and out of sample 1999-2006
Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate
Gross rate

of return $\quad$\begin{tabular}{c}
t-statistic <br>
of return

$\quad$

Duration of <br>
profitable <br>
positions

$\quad$

Gross rate <br>
of return

$\quad$

t-statistic

 

Net rate <br>
of return

 

Duration of <br>
profitable <br>
positions
\end{tabular}

| $1999-2000$ | 18.5 | 2.2 | 18.2 | 42.5 |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $2001-2002$ | 10.1 | 1.4 | 9.9 | 59.2 |
| $2003-2004$ | 11.8 | 1.6 | 11.5 | 52.1 |
| $2005-2006$ | 9.7 | 1.7 | 9.4 | 33.8 |
| $1999-2006$ | 12.5 | 1.7 | 12.3 | 46.9 |

Out of sample

| -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.9 | 29.8 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 5.7 | 0.8 | 5.4 | 57.6 |
| -0.1 | 0.0 | -0.4 | 52.3 |
| 1.8 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 46.6 |

The ex-post profitability of the best models consists of two components. The first stems from the "normal" non-randomness of exchange rate dynamics, namely, the occurrence of persistent price trends. The second component stems from the selection or overfitting bias since a part of the ex-post profits of the best models would have been produced only by chance (Sullivan-Timmerman-White, 1999). Now, if the "optimal" profitability of a selected model is mainly the result of this "model mining" then this model will perform much worse over the subsequent period. However, if the in-sample profitability stems mainly from the exploitation of "usual" exchange rate trends then it might be reproduced out of sample.
In order to investigate this matter, I shall simulate a hypothetical "model optimization" in the following way. In a first step, the 25 best models are identified on the basis of their ex-postperformance (measured by the net rate of return) over the most recent sub period (in sample). Then the performance of the selected models is simulated over the subsequent subperiod (out of sample).
Table 14 shows that the gross and net rates of return of the 25 best models would have been roughly three times higher than the average returns of all 2265 models (table 12). However, the out-of-sample-performance of the 25 best models is rather poor, only over the sub-period 2003/04 would these models have been markedly profitable. This result is in line with previous studies on technical trading in the dollar/DM market and in the dollar/yen market. In both cases, technical currency trading based on daily data was highly profitable in sample as well as out of sample until the mid 1990s. Since then, however, this trading strategy would have been no longer profitable.
In the following section, I shall address the question whether this result could be due to a shift in technical trading from daily data to intraday data. More specifically, section 4.7 deals with the performance of 2466 technical models when trading the dollar/euro exchange rate based on 30-minutes data.

### 4.7 Performance of technical trading based on dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals 1999-2006

As a comparison of table 15 with table 12 shows, that technical currency trading performed worse when based on 30 -minute data than when based on daily data. This difference is particularly great in the case of net returns. Whereas the daily models produce a net rate of return (NRR) of $3.9 \%$ per year on average, the 30 -minutes models would have incurred an annual net loss of $6.1 \%$. The reason for that is simple. The models based on 30 -minutes data produce on average 363 open positions per year (daily models: 11.4). The related transaction costs cause the NRR to be by 7.2 percentage points smaller than the still slightly positive GRR (1.1\% on average).

Table 15: Components of the profitability of 2466 trading systems 1999-2006 Prices series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate

| Number of | models | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate | statistic | Net rate |  | be p | ons | Unp | able | tions |
|  |  | of return |  | of return | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |


| $<0$ | 811 | 32.9 | -2.4 | -0.886 | -11.0 | 158.7 | 0.309 | 1.89 | 271.7 | -0.454 | 0.83 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $0-<1.0$ | 930 | 37.7 | 1.5 | 0.524 | -4.9 | 122.8 | 0.306 | 1.51 | 196.5 | -0.449 | 0.72 |
| 1.0-<=2.0 | 649 | 26.3 | 4.3 | 1.373 | -2.3 | 134.0 | 0.314 | 1.65 | 195.2 | -0.442 | 0.96 |
| > 2.0 | 76 | 3.1 | 7.7 | 2.272 | -1.7 | 186.9 | 0.328 | 1.71 | 281.8 | -0.470 | 1.09 |
| All models | 2466 | 100.0 | 1.1 | 0.338 | -6.1 | 139.5 | 0.310 | 1.68 | 223.5 | -0.449 | 0.83 |
| Moving average models | 2046 | 83.0 | 1.3 | 0.386 | -2.7 | 80.0 | 0.274 | 1.90 | 117.9 | -0.371 | 0.96 |
| Momentum models | 231 | 9.4 | 3.4 | 1.085 | -12.9 | 294.5 | 0.393 | 0.79 | 517.6 | -0.733 | 0.25 |
| RSIN models | 189 | 7.7 | -3.5 | -1.096 | -35.6 | 595.0 | 0.592 | 0.32 | 1007.0 | -0.953 | 0.12 |
| 1999-2000 | 2466 | - | -5.2 | -0.816 | -12.8 | 141.9 | 0.344 | 1.69 | 238.9 | -0.542 | 0.78 |
| 2001-2002 | 2466 | - | 2.5 | 0.409 | -4.9 | 144.1 | 0.318 | 1.62 | 225.6 | -0.465 | 0.80 |
| 2003-2004 | 2466 | - | 3.8 | 0.578 | -3.5 | 141.5 | 0.324 | 1.64 | 223.5 | -0.436 | 0.85 |
| 2005-2006 | 2466 | - | 3.4 | 0.773 | -3.4 | 131.5 | 0.255 | 1.78 | 207.2 | -0.353 | 0.91 |

As in the case of daily models, the worst performing type of technical model are the RSIN models, mainly because these models trade extremely frequently (they produce 1007.0 unprofitable positions per year on average). By contrast, the MA models produce much less trading signals, their performance is the best of all three types of models, in particular in term of net returns (even though NRR is slightly negative also for MA models - table 15).

Table 16: Cluster of 2466 trading systems according to profit components 1999-2006
Price series: Dollar/euro exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals

| Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate of return | t-statistic | Net rate of return | Profi | able po | tions | Unpro | itable p | sitions |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | Number | Return | Duration | Number | Return | Duration |
|  |  |  |  |  | per year | per day | in days | per year | per day | in days |


| All models |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cluster 1 | 102 | 4.1 | -7.0 | -2.159 | -45.1 | 708.8 | 0.642 | 0.26 | 1195.4 | -0.992 |
| Cluster 2 | 252 | 10.2 | 2.8 | 0.858 | -18.8 | 393.8 | 0.460 | 0.52 | 682.3 | -0.835 |
| Cluster 3 | 2112 | 85.6 | 1.3 | 0.396 | -2.7 | 81.7 | 0.276 | 1.89 | 121.8 | -0.377 |
| Total | 2466 | 100.0 | 1.1 | 0.338 | -6.1 | 139.5 | 0.310 | 1.68 | 223.5 | -0.449 |

The structure of profitability of the 30-minutes models is qualitatively the same as in the case of daily models, however, the pattern is less pronounced with respect to the sole profit source of technical trading, i. e., the difference in duration of profitable and unprofitable positions. When trading is based on daily data, profitable positions last roughly four times longer than
unprofitable positions (table 12) but only twice as long when 30-minutes data are used (table 15). This difference reflects the fact that the trending behaviour of exchange rates is the less pronounced the higher is the data frequency (as shown in chapter 3).
Table 16 displays the results of the cluster analysis (again the K-Means Cluster Analysis as provided by the SPSS software package was applied). The "fastest" models of cluster 1 signal a very great number of open positions ( 1076.1 per year) since these models react quickly even to only minor price movements (such ups and downs occur more frequently on the basis of 30 -minutes data than on the basis of daily data). The high transaction frequency of the cluster 1 models causes their average NRR to be almost 40 percentage points smaller than their average GRR.

Table 17: Performance of the 25 most profitable trading systems by subperiods in sample and out of sample 1999-2006
Price series: Dollar/euro exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals

| Gross rate <br> of return | $t$-statistic | Net rate <br> of return | Duration of <br> profitable <br> positions | Gross rate <br> of return | $t$-statistic | Net rate <br> of return | Duration of <br> profitable <br> positions |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | In sample |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.4 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 2.4 |  |  |  |  |
| 12.9 | 2.0 | 9.3 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 0.6 | -0.3 | 2.5 |
| 19.3 | 2.5 | 16.0 | 2.5 | 12.3 | 1.7 | 8.6 | 2.2 |
| 13.3 | 2.3 | 10.0 | 2.6 | 8.0 | 1.4 | 5.5 | 3.5 |
| 12.5 | 1.8 | 8.8 | 2.4 | 8.2 | 1.2 | 4.6 | 2.7 |

The 25 ex-post best performing models produce a GRR of $12.5 \%$, and an NRR of $8.8 \%$ per year on average over the entire sample period (table 17). Their profitability was significantly smaller over the first sub-period 1999/2000 (GRR: 4.4\%, NRR: 0.0\%), it was much greater over the third sub-period 2003/2004 (GRR: 19.3\%, NRR: 16.0\%). The 25 best models produced positive gross and net returns also out of sample (with the exception of the NRR over the first out-of-sample sub-period). Over the entire out-of-sample period 2001/2006, the 25 best models would have produced an ex-ante GRR of $8.2 \%$ per year and a NRR of $4.6 \%$ per year. The comparatively high profitability of these models is due to the fact that they focused on the exploitation of relatively long 30 -minutes trends: The profitable positions of the 25 best performing models (in sample as well as out of sample) last on average almost twice as long as the profitable positions of all 2466 models (tables 17 and 15).

Table 18: Components of the profitability of 2265 trading systems by classes of the -statistic, by types of models and by subperiods 1987-1999

Price series: Daily dollar/DM exchange rate

|  | Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Abolute | Share in \% |  | tstatistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |
| t-statistic of the mean of the single returns |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $<0$ | 23 | 1.0 | -0.8 | -0.252 | -1.3 | 10.31 | 0.092 | 21.51 | 17.75 | -0.132 | 8.69 |
| $0-<1.0$ | 347 | 15.3 | 2.2 | 0.764 | 1.9 | 5.56 | 0.061 | 53.12 | 9.39 | -0.097 | 16.33 |
| 1.0-<=2.0 | 1717 | 75.8 | 4.1 | 1.440 | 3.9 | 4.26 | 0.053 | 62.57 | 6.87 | -0.084 | 18.86 |
| > 2.0 | 178 | 7.9 | 6.2 | 2.228 | 6.0 | 4.59 | 0.053 | 68.46 | 6.79 | -0.074 | 22.65 |
| All models | 2265 | 100.0 | 3.9 | 1.381 | 3.7 | 4.55 | 0.055 | 61.17 | 7.36 | -0.085 | 18.67 |
| Moving average models | 1890 | 83.4 | 4.1 | 1.436 | 3.9 | 3.76 | 0.050 | 67.64 | 6.08 | -0.078 | 20.76 |
| Momentum models | 186 | 8.2 | 4.1 | 1.354 | 3.7 | 7.10 | 0.057 | 38.02 | 12.19 | -0.105 | 8.56 |
| RSIN models | 189 | 8.3 | 2.3 | 0.855 | 1.8 | 9.91 | 0.098 | 19.20 | 15.43 | -0.136 | 7.66 |
| 1987-1989 | 2265 | - | 7.7 | 1.176 | 7.5 | 4.42 | 0.066 | 62.14 | 6.90 | -0.070 | 20.66 |
| 1990-1992 | 2265 | - | 4.9 | 0.689 | 4.7 | 4.69 | 0.068 | 61.93 | 7.43 | -0.114 | 17.42 |
| 1993-1995 | 2265 | - | 1.0 | 0.228 | 0.8 | 4.98 | 0.044 | 54.93 | 7.36 | -0.090 | 20.45 |
| 1996-1998 | 2265 | - | 2.1 | 0.438 | 1.8 | 4.66 | 0.046 | 57.10 | 8.13 | -0.077 | 17.71 |

### 4.8 Performance of technical trading based on daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998

This section reports the performance of the 2265 technical models in the dollar/deutschmark market between 1987 and 1998 based on daily data. Over the entire period, the models produce an average GRR of $3.9 \%$ per year, and an average NRR of $3.7 \%$ per year (table 18). The performance of the daily models in the dollar/DM market 1987/1998 is very similar to their performance in the dollar/euro market 1999/2006 (GRR: 4.2\%; NRR: 3.9\%). In both markets do the RSIN models produce the smallest returns. Also the pattern of profitability is similar. When trading the dollar/DM rate, profitable positions last on average 62.1 days, when trading the dollar/euro rate 64.3 days (tables 12 and 18). The results of the cluster analysis reflect these similarities (tables 13 and 19).
The 25 best performing daily models yield a GRR of $11.7 \%$ per year in the dollar/DM market in sample (1987/1998) and an GRR of (only) $2.2 \%$ per year out of sample (1990/1998). These results are (also) very similar to the performance of the 25 best models in the dollar/euro market (tables 14 and 20).

Table 19: Cluster of 2265 trading systems according to profit components 1987-1999 Price series: Daily dollar/DM exchange rate

|  | Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate of return | t-statistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |
| All models |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cluster 1 | 440 | 19.4 | 3.8 | 1.283 | 3.3 | 8.32 | 0.076 | 29.68 | 14.47 | -0.123 | 7.35 |
| Cluster 2 | 1197 | 52.8 | 4.0 | 1.368 | 3.8 | 4.02 | 0.052 | 61.32 | 6.49 | -0.085 | 17.70 |
| Cluster 3 | 628 | 27.7 | 4.0 | 1.475 | 3.8 | 2.90 | 0.045 | 82.94 | 4.04 | -0.060 | 28.44 |
| Total | 2265 | 100.0 | 3.9 | 1.381 | 3.7 | 4.55 | 0.055 | 61.17 | 7.36 | -0.085 | 18.67 |

Table 20: Performance of the 25 most profitable trading systems by subperiods in sample and out of sample 1987-1989
Price series: Daily dollar/DM exchange rate

| Gross rate <br> of return | t-statistic | Net rate <br> of return | Duration of <br> profitable <br> positions | Gross rate <br> of return | t-statistic | Net rate <br> of return |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Duration of <br> profitable <br> positions |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| In sample |  | Out of sample |  |  |  |  |


| $1987-1989$ | 17.6 | 2.4 | 17.4 | 58.3 |  |  |  |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| $1990-1992$ | 13.3 | 1.8 | 13.1 | 80.0 | 4.8 | 0.6 | 4.5 | 49.9 |
| $1993-1995$ | 9.6 | 1.8 | 9.2 | 27.9 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 80.7 |
| $1996-1998$ | 6.4 | 1.4 | 6.1 | 63.9 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.9 |
| $1987-1998$ | 11.7 | 1.8 | 11.4 | 57.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 52.8 |

### 4.9 Performance of technical trading based on dollar/deutschmark rates at 30minutes intervals 1987-1998

The 2466 30-minutes models would have performed slightly better when trading the dollar/DM rate between 1987 and 1998 than when trading the dollar/euro rate between 1999 and 2006 (GRR: $3.4 \%$ and $1.1 \%$, respectively). The differences in the performance of the three types of models as well as the pattern of the profitability of technical trading are very similar in the dollar/DM market and in the dollar/euro market (tables 15 and 21). As a consequence, the cluster analysis yields similar results for technical trading based on 30-minutes data in both markets (tables 16 and 22).

Table 21: Components of the profitability of 2466 trading systems 1987-1989
Price series: Dollar/DM exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals

|  | Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate of return | tstatistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |
| t-statistic of the mean of the single returns |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $<0$ | 312 | 12.7 | -1.3 | -0.490 | -12.2 | 206.21 | 0.353 | 2.02 | 340.74 | -0.533 | 0.92 |
| $0-<1.0$ | 587 | 23.8 | 1.5 | 0.565 | -6.3 | 148.66 | 0.332 | 1.87 | 242.48 | -0.491 | 0.86 |
| $1.0-<=2.0$ | 1035 | 42.0 | 3.9 | 1.537 | -1.2 | 100.84 | 0.317 | 1.74 | 156.20 | -0.436 | 0.82 |
| > 2.0 | 532 | 21.6 | 7.3 | 2.654 | -0.3 | 147.91 | 0.338 | 1.54 | 234.31 | -0.496 | 0.72 |
| All models | 2466 | 100.0 | 3.4 | 1.290 | -3.6 | 135.71 | 0.330 | 1.76 | 216.93 | -0.474 | 0.82 |
| Moving average models | 2046 | 83.0 | 3.2 | 1.234 | -0.6 | 76.57 | 0.296 | 2.00 | 115.42 | -0.394 | 0.95 |
| Momentum models | 231 | 9.4 | 7.7 | 2.705 | -8.1 | 290.20 | 0.413 | 0.81 | 501.67 | -0.761 | 0.24 |
| RSIN models | 189 | 7.7 | 0.4 | 0.173 | -30.7 | 587.06 | 0.595 | 0.33 | 967.91 | -0.996 | 0.12 |
| 1987-1989 | 2466 | - | 5.0 | 0.958 | -1.7 | 132.78 | 0.324 | 1.80 | 203.09 | -0.466 | 0.82 |
| 1990-1992 | 2466 | - | 6.4 | 1.010 | -1.0 | 144.63 | 0.386 | 1.74 | 226.09 | -0.573 | 0.76 |
| 1993-1995 | 2466 | - | 2.3 | 0.415 | -4.9 | 138.26 | 0.321 | 1.76 | 223.58 | -0.478 | 0.81 |
| 1996-1998 | 2466 | - | -0.1 | -0.027 | -6.9 | 127.78 | 0.278 | 1.76 | 215.51 | -0.384 | 0.91 |

The returns of the 25 best models out of sample are slightly lower in the dollar/DM market between 1987 and 1998 (GRR: 7.1, NRR: 1.4\%) than in the dollar/euro market between 1999 and 2006 (GRR: $8.2 \%$, NRR: $4.6 \%$ ). In both cases, the 25 best models focus on the exploitation of relatively persistent trends of exchange rates at 30 -minutes intervals, when trading in the dollar/euro market even more so than when trading in the dollar/DM market. As a consequence, the difference between GRR and NRR (i. e., transaction costs) are lower when the dollar/euro rate is traded than when the dollar/DM rate is traded (tables 17 and 23).

Table 22: Cluster of 2466 trading systems according to profit components 1987-1989
Price series: Dollar/DM exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals

|  | Number of models |  | Mean over each class of model |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Abolute | Share in \% | Gross rate of return | t-statistic | Net rate of return | Profitable positions |  |  | Unprofitable positions |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days | Number per year | Return per day | Duration in days |
| All models |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cluster 1 | 102 | 4.1 | 0.1 | 0.039 | -36.7 | 700.13 | 0.635 | 0.28 | 1140.29 | -1.059 | 0.10 |
| Cluster 2 | 252 | 10.2 | 5.7 | 1.956 | -15.3 | 387.50 | 0.475 | 0.52 | 662.70 | -0.852 | 0.16 |
| Cluster 3 | 2112 | 85.6 | 3.3 | 1.271 | -0.6 | 78.41 | 0.298 | 1.98 | 119.15 | -0.401 | 0.93 |
| Total | 2466 | 100.0 | 3.4 | 1.290 | -3.6 | 135.71 | 0.330 | 1.76 | 216.93 | -0.474 | 0.82 |

This section has shown that the profitability of the best performing technical models is sufficiently high in the dollar/euro market to "seduce" an increasing number of market
participants to use them as one basis for their trading decisions. The next section investigates therefore the dynamics of excess demand or supply stemming from the aggregate trading signals of different technical models in the dollar/euro market.

Table 23: Performance of the 25 most profitable trading systems by subperiods in sample and out of sample 1987-1989
Price series: Dollar/DM exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals
$\left.\begin{array}{ccccccccc} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Gross rate } \\ \text { of return }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { t-statistic }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Net rate } \\ \text { of return }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Duration of } \\ \text { profitable } \\ \text { positions }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Gross rate } \\ \text { of return }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { t-statistic }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Net rate } \\ \text { of return }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Duration of } \\ \text { profitable } \\ \text { positions }\end{array} \\ \text { Out of sample }\end{array}\right]$

## 5. Interaction between technical trading systems and exchange rate movements in the dollar/euro market

At first, I show how indices of the aggregate transactions and positions of the technical models are calculated. Based on these indices, I document the concentration of transactions in terms of buys and sells and of position holding in terms of long and short. Finally, I analyze the relationship between the level and the change of the net position index and the subsequent exchange rate movements. In each section I shall first present the results for the daily models and then for the models based on 30-minutes data. ${ }^{13}$ )

### 5.1 The aggregation of trading signals

The open positions of technical models are aggregated as follows. For every trading period (day or 30 -minutes interval, respectively) the number $+1(-1)$ is assigned to any long (short) position of each single model (to any neutral position the number 0 is assigned). The net position index (PI) is then calculated as the sum of these numbers over all models divided by the number of models. Therefore, an index value of $+100(-100)$ means that $100 \%$ of the models hold a long (short) position. A value of $90(-90)$ indicates that $95 \%$ of the models are long (short) and $5 \%$ short (long). The percentage share of models holding a long position can

[^11]generally be derived from the value of the net position index (PI) as $[\mathrm{PI}+100] / 2$ (if PI equals 0 , then half the models signal a long position and half signal a short position.

Figure 13: Aggregate trading signals of 2265 technical models and exchange rate movements 2000
Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate 2000



The net transaction index (TI) is the first difference of the net position index. Its theoretical maximum (minimum) value is twice as high (in absolute terms) as in the case of the net position index since the number of transactions is always twice the number of (changed) open positions. The extreme value of $+200(-200)$ would be realized if all models change the open position from short to long (from long to short) between two consecutive trading days.
In order to investigate the extent to which the signals from technical models balance each other, the components of the net transaction index are also documented, i.e., the number of buys and sells on each trading day (divided by the number of all models).

### 5.2 Similarities in position taking of technical models

Figure 13 shows the gradual adjustment of the 2265 daily models to exchange rate movements, using the year 2000 as example. Due to a depreciation trend in December 1999, most models hold a short position on January 2 . The short appreciation movement of the dollar/euro rate in early January causes roughly $90 \%$ of the models to switch their positions from short to long. These changes are again quickly reversed due the subsequent downward trend which lasts for roughly three months. Almost all models profit from keeping short positions during this depreciation trend.
An investigation into the trading behaviour of the 2265 daily models over the entire sample reveals the following. First, most of the time the great majority of the models is on the same side of the market. Second, the process of changing open positions usually takes off 1 to 3 days after the local exchange rate minimum (maximum) has been reached. Third, it takes between 10 and 20 trading days to gradually reverse the positions of (almost) all models if a persistent exchange rate trend develops. Fourth, after all technical models have adjusted their open positions to the current trend, the trend often continues for some time.
Table 24 quantifies some of these observations. On $21.3 \%$ ( $19.6 \%$ ) of all days more than $95 \%$ of the models hold a long (short) position. Hence, on $40.9 \%$ of all days more than $95 \%$ of the models hold the same - long or short - position. By contrast, periods during which short positions and long positions are roughly in balance seldom occur (the position index lies between 10 and -10 on only $2.7 \%$ of all days).
On $77.4 \%$ of all days less than $5 \%$ of the models execute buy or sell signals ( T l lies between 10 and -10 ). There are two reasons for that. First, the majority of the models hold the same position for most of the time. Second, the process of changing open positions evolves only gradually.

Table 24: Distribution of time by positions and transactions of 2265 technical trading systems Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate 1999-2006

| Aggregate positions |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Share in total | Mean of the | Mean of the gross position index |  |  |
| Net position | Sample period | net position |  |  |  |
| index | in \% | index | Long | Short | Neutral |
| $>90$ | 21.32 | 96.56 | 97.64 | -1.08 | 1.28 |
| 70-90 | 13.67 | 82.95 | 89.58 | -6.63 | 3.79 |
| 50-70 | 5.00 | 60.96 | 75.60 | -14.65 | 9.75 |
| 30-50 | 3.61 | 40.95 | 63.75 | -22.80 | 13.45 |
| 30-10 | 2.79 | 20.09 | 53.02 | -32.94 | 14.04 |
| -10-10 | 2.65 | 0.82 | 43.65 | -42.83 | 13.53 |
| -30--10 | 2.74 | -19.93 | 33.43 | -53.36 | 13.21 |
| -50--30 | 4.23 | -40.39 | 23.55 | -63.93 | 12.52 |
| -70--50 | 6.79 | -61.15 | 15.17 | -76.32 | 8.51 |
| -90--70 | 17.56 | -83.50 | 6.47 | -89.97 | 3.56 |
| $<-90$ | 19.63 | -95.01 | 1.71 | -96.72 | 1.57 |
| Total | 100.00 | -2.69 | 46.19 | -48.89 | 4.92 |
| Aggregate Transactions |  |  |  |  |  |


|  | Share in total <br> Sample period <br> in \% | Mean of the <br> net transaction <br> index | Mean of the gross tran |  |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
|  | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | Short |
| $>70$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| $50-70$ | 1.73 | 37.58 | 38.04 | -0.00 |
| $30-50$ | 9.67 | 17.47 | 19.32 | -1.84 |
| $30-10$ | 77.43 | -0.11 | 2.48 | -2.59 |
| $-10-10$ | 10.11 | -17.96 | 1.67 | -19.64 |
| $-30--10$ | 0.91 | -37.28 | 0.70 | -37.98 |
| $-50--30$ | 0.14 | -55.69 | 0.16 | -55.85 |
| $-70--50$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| $<-70$ |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 100.00 | 0.02 | 4.62 | -4.60 |

Table 24 also shows that the signals produced by technical models would cause their users to trade very little with each other. If the models move relatively fast from short to long positions $(10<T l<30)$ or vice versa ( $-10>T 1>-30$ ) then roughly 10 times more buy (sell) signals are produced than sell (buy) signals. On days when less than $5 \%$ of the models trade ( $10>\mathrm{Tl}>-10$ ) roughly the same number of buys and sells are executed, however, their size is rather small.

Table 25: Similarity of different types of daily trading systems in holding open positions Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate 1999-2006
Relative share of models
holding the same - long or short - position
$97.50 \%$
$(|\mathrm{Pl}|>95) \quad(|\mathrm{Pl}|>90)$
Share in total sample period in $\%$

| Types of models |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| By the t-statistic of the mean |  |  |  |
| rate of return |  |  |  |
| $<0.0$ | 11.69 | 17.47 | 28.15 |
| $0.0-<=1.0$ | 14.97 | 21.94 | 35.08 |
| $1.0-<=2.0$ | 59.19 | 66.07 | 74.35 |
| $>2.0$ | 36.43 | 58.47 | 70.60 |
| By stability |  |  |  |
| Stable models | 56.79 | 66.27 | 74.88 |
| Unstable models | 18.19 | 28.97 | 51.83 |
| By duration of profitable positions |  |  |  |
| Short-term | 14.97 | 22.47 | 38.55 |
| Medium-term | 66.99 | 72.23 | 78.73 |
| Long-term | 81.81 | 84.74 | 88.50 |
| All models | 23.29 | 40.95 | 64.63 |

Table 25 shows the similarity in the trading behaviour of different classes of technical models. The trading behaviour of those models, which perform comparatively well, is more similar than the trading behaviour of the comparatively worse performing models (the t-statistic is taken as performance criterion. E. g., more than $95 \%$ of the models hold the same open position on roughly $60 \%$ of all days in the case of the best performing models ( $t$-statistic $>1.0$ ) as compared to roughly $20 \%$ of all days in the case of the worst performing models (t-statistic < 1.0). In line with this tendency, the position holding of stable models (those models, which are profitable over each sub-period) is more similar as compared to unstable models. Since the comparatively better performing and more stable models are those which "specialize" on the exploitation of medium-term and long-term exchange rate trends, the medium-term and long-term models display a more similar trading behaviour than the short-term models.

Table 26: Distribution of time by positions and transactions of 2466 technical trading systems Price series: Dollar/euro exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals 1999-2006

| Aggregate positions |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net position index | Share in total |  | Mean of the gross position index |  |  |
|  | Sample period in \% | Mean of the net position index | Long | Short | Neutral |
| $>90$ | 5.77 | 95.88 | 97.15 | -1.27 | 1.58 |
| 70-90 | 5.95 | 79.96 | 83.68 | -3.72 | 12.60 |
| 50-70 | 11.17 | 59.09 | 65.56 | -6.47 | 27.97 |
| 30-50 | 10.64 | 40.21 | 55.01 | -14.80 | 30.19 |
| 30-10 | 11.30 | 20.21 | 44.04 | -23.83 | 32.12 |
| -10-10 | 10.53 | -0.04 | 32.29 | -32.33 | 35.38 |
| -30--10 | 11.15 | -20.01 | 23.77 | -43.78 | 32.45 |
| -50--30 | 11.22 | -40.18 | 14.83 | -55.01 | 30.16 |
| -70--50 | 11.29 | -59.04 | 6.44 | -65.48 | 28.08 |
| -90--70 | 5.60 | -79.74 | 3.61 | -83.36 | 13.03 |
| <-90 | 5.38 | -95.78 | 1.28 | -97.06 | 1.66 |
| Total | 100.00 | 0.42 | 37.45 | -37.03 | 25.52 |
| Aggregate Transactions |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Share in total | Mean of the net | Mean of the gross transaction index |  |  |
|  | Sample period in \% | transaction index | Long | Short |  |
| $>70$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  |
| 50-70 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  |
| 30-50 | 0.03 | 34.72 | 34.84 | -0.12 |  |
| 30-10 | 3.61 | 13.44 | 13.73 | -0.30 |  |
| -10-10 | 92.58 | 0.02 | 2.60 | -2.59 |  |
| -30--10 | 3.76 | -13.37 | 0.31 | -13.68 |  |
| -50--30 | 0.02 | -33.75 | 0.08 | -33.84 |  |
| -70--50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  |
| $<-70$ | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  |
| Total | 100.00 | 0.00 | 2.93 | -2.93 |  |

Table 26 shows the concentration of 2466 technical models based on 30 -minutes data on either long or short positions when trading the dollar/euro exchange rate between 1999 and 2006. This concentration is much less pronounced in the case of 30 -minutes models than in the case of daily models (table 24). This difference is due to persistent trends occurring more seldom on the basis of 30-minutes exchange rates than on the basis of daily rates (as has been shown in chapter 3). However, also the 30 -minutes models are much more often on the same side of the market than is to be expected if the exchange rate followed a random walk
(in this case, the net position index should lie between 10 and -10 most of the time). E. g., on $22.9 \%$ of all 30-minutes-intervals of the entire sample period more than $75 \%$ of the models hold a long position ( $\mathrm{Pl}>50$ ), and on $22.3 \%$ of all intervals more than $75 \%$ of the models hold a short position ( $\mathrm{Pl}<-50$ ). Hence, on $45.2 \%$ of all trading intervals more than $75 \%$ of the models hold the same - long or short - position.

Table 27: Similarity of different types of 30-minutes trading systems in holding open positions
Price series: Dollar/euro exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals 1999-2006

| Relative share of models |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| holding the same - long or short - position |  |
| $97.50 \%$ |  |
| $(\|\mathrm{Pl}\|>95)$ |  |
|  |  |

Share in total sample period in \%

| Types of models |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| By the t-statistic of the mean |  |  |  |
| rate of return |  |  |  |
| < 0.0 | 2.14 | 5.62 | 13.15 |
| 0.0-<=1.0 | 10.25 | 13.63 | 19.61 |
| $1.0-<=2.0$ | 11.36 | 17.74 | 38.13 |
| > 2.0 | 25.35 | 31.62 | 41.70 |
| By stability |  |  |  |
| Stable models | 17.62 | 20.05 | 26.36 |
| Unstable models | 6.47 | 11.04 | 16.72 |
| By duration of profitable positions |  |  |  |
| Short-term | 3.17 | 4.89 | 9.43 |
| Medium-term | 13.24 | 16.08 | 21.84 |
| Long-term | 11.14 | 13.72 | 19.19 |
| All models | 6.62 | 11.15 | 16.86 |

By contrast, on only $10.5 \%$ of all 30-minutes-intervals are short and long positions roughly in balance (|PI|<10). These situations occur primarily during the change of the models from short to long positions and vice versa. In these phases the share of neutral positions reaches a maximum ( $35.4 \%$ of the models hold neutral positions when $|\mathrm{PI}|<10$ ).

Table 27 shows that the position holding of different classes of 30 -minutes models is similar to the position holding of daily models (table 25): The trading behaviour of the best performing models ( $t$-statistic > 2) is more similar than the trading behaviour of the comparatively worse performing models ( $t$-statistic $<=1$ ). The same is true for stable models relative to unstable models, and for long-term models relative to short-term models.

### 5.3 Exchange rate "trending" and aggregate technical trading - a stylized representation

In this section, the possible interactions between the aggregate trading behaviour of technical models and the development of an exchange rate trend shall be discussed in a stylized manner, taking an appreciation trend as example.

Figure 14: Exchange rate trends and aggregate positions of technical models


The first phase of a trend (marked by A and B in figure 14) is brought about by the excess demand of non-technical traders, usually triggered off by some news (causing news-based traders to expect a dollar appreciation and, hence, to open long dollar positions).
During the second phase of an upward trend (between B and C in figure 2) technical models produce a sequence of buy signals, the fastest models at first, the slowest models al last. The execution of the respective order flows then contributes to the prolongation of the trend.

Over the third phase of the trend all technical models hold long positions while the trend continues for some time (marked by C and E in figure 2). Since technical models already hold a long position the prolongation of the trend is caused by an additional demand of non-
technical traders, possibly amateur "bandwagonists" who jump later on trends than professional traders (the latter consider bandwagon effects as one of the four most important factors driving exchange rates - see Cheung-Chinn-Marsh, 2004; Cheung-Wong, 2000; Cheung-Chinn, 2001).
As the exchange rate trend continues the probability that it ends becomes progressively greater. This is so for at least three reasons. First, the number of traders who get on the bandwagon declines. Second, the incentive to cash in profits rises. Third, more and more contrarian traders consider the dollar overbought (oversold) and, hence, open a short (long) position in order to profit from the expected reversal of the trend.
When the appreciation trend finally comes to an end, mostly triggered by some news, a countermovement usually takes off. With some lag technical models start to close the former positions and open new counter-positions (on day Fin figure 14).
For technical currency trading to be overall profitable, it is necessary that appreciation (depreciation) trends continue for some time after the models have taken long (short) positions. This is so for three reasons. First, all models have to be compensated for the losses they incur during "whipsaws". Second, fast models often make losses during an "underlying" exchange rate trend as they react to short-lasting counter-movements. Third, slow models open a long (short) position only at a comparatively late stage of an upward (downward) trend so that they can exploit the trend successfully only if it continues for some time.

### 5.4 Aggregate technical trading and exchange rate exchange rate movements

In order to explore the interaction between exchange rate movements and the trading behaviour of technical models the following exercise is carried out. At first, some conditions concerning the change and the level of the net position index are specified. These conditions grasp typical configurations in the aggregate trading behaviour of technical models. Then the difference between the means of the exchange rate changes observed under these conditions from their unconditional means is evaluated.
The first type of conditions concerns the speed at which technical models switch their open positions from short to long (condition 1L) or from long to short (condition 1S). Condition IL comprises all cases where $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of all models have been moving continuously from short to long positions over the past $3(5,10)$ business days (PI increases monotonically). In addition, the condition 1 L excludes all cases where more than $90 \%$ of the models hold long positions (these cases are comprised by condition 2 L ). Hence, condition 1 L is defined as follows.
More formally condition 1 L is defined as follows.

$k=20,40,80$
$i=\quad 3,5,10$
$n=0,1, \ldots(i-1)$

Condition 15 comprises the analogous cases of changes positions from long to short.
Condition 1S: [ $\left.\mathrm{PI}_{t}-\mathrm{PI}_{-\mathrm{t}}\right]<-\mathrm{k} \cap\left[\mathrm{PI}_{\left.-n-n-\mathrm{Pl}_{-n-1}\right]}\right] \leq 0 \cap\left[\mathrm{PI}_{t} \geq-80\right]$
$k=\quad 20,40,80$
$\mathrm{I}=3,5,10$
$n=0,1, \ldots(i-1)$
Condition $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ comprises all cases where more than $90 \%$ of all models hold long (short) positions:
Condition 2L(S): $\mathrm{Pl}>80(\mathrm{PI}<80)$
Figure 14 gives a graphical representation of the meaning of these four conditions (the subdivision of the conditions 1 and 2 , marked by " A " and " B ", will be discussed later).
For each trading interval $\dagger$ (day and 30 -minutes interval) on which these conditions are fulfilled the rate of change (CERt) between the current exchange rate (ERt) and the exchange rate j days ( $E R_{t+j}$ ) ahead is calculated ( $j . .5,10,20,40$ ). Then the means over the conditional exchange rate changes are compared to the unconditional means over the entire sample and the significance of the differences is estimated using the t-statistic. This comparison shall examine if and to what extent the exchange rate continues to rise (fall) after $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of technical models have changed their position from short (long) to long (short), and if and to what extent this is the case when $90 \%$ of all models hold long (short) positions.
For each day on which condition 1 is fulfilled also the exchange rate changes over the past 3 $(5,10)$ days are calculated and compared to the unconditional exchange rate changes. The purpose of this exercise is to estimate the strength of the interaction between exchange rate movements and the simultaneous execution of technical trading signals induced by these movements.
Table 28 shows that the conditions 1 are rather frequently fulfilled. E. g., in 212 (212) cases more than $10 \%$ of all models change their open positions from short to long (from long to short) within 3 business days (conditions $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ with $\mathrm{k}=20$ and $\mathrm{i}=3$, abbreviated as condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})[20 / 3)]$ ). In 146 (158) cases more than $20 \%$ of the models change their open position in the same direction within 10 business days. Conditions $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})[80 / 10]$ are realized in only 96 (103) cases. The number of cases fulfilling conditions 1 is decreasing as the parameter k rises. E. g., if $\mathrm{k}=80$ then the possible realizations of condition 1 L are restricted to a range of the position index between 0 and 90 , however, if $k=20$ then condition 1 L could be fulfilled within a range of the position index between -60 and 90 .

Table 28: Aggregate trading signals of 2265 daily models and subsequent exchange rate movements
Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate

| Parameters of the conditions for | Time span j <br> of CER | More than $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of all models change open positions in the same direction within 3 (5,. 10) business days |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| k | j | From short to long positions (condition 1L) |  |  | From long to short position (condition 1S) |  |  |
|  |  | Number of cases | Mean of $\mathrm{CER}_{\mathrm{t}+\mathrm{j}}$ | t-statistic | Number of cases | Mean of $\mathrm{CER}_{\mathrm{f}+\mathrm{j}}$ | t-statistic |
| 20 | -3 | 212 | 0.9105 | 14.7520 | 212 | -0.8971 | -14.0803 |
|  | 5 | 212 | 0.0206 | -0.1595 | 212 | 0.0117 | -0.2588 |
|  | 10 | 212 | 0.0981 | 0.1937 | 212 | 0.0155 | -0.4097 |
|  | 20 | 212 | 0.5002 | 1.6777 | 212 | 0.0786 | -0.3524 |
|  | 40 | 212 | 1.4159 | 3.4090 | 212 | 0.1868 | -0.4550 |
| 40 | -5 | 146 | 1.3433 | 15.7789 | 158 | -1.3976 | -17.2058 |
|  | 5 | 146 | 0.0496 | 0.1175 | 158 | 0.0286 | -0.0683 |
|  | 10 | 146 | 0.1927 | 0.7553 | 158 | 0.1263 | 0.3449 |
|  | 20 | 146 | 0.6572 | 2.0494 | 158 | 0.1387 | -0.0320 |
|  | 40 | 146 | 1.4488 | 2.9851 | 158 | 0.3047 | -0.0848 |
| 80 | -10 | 96 | 2.0878 | 16.3233 | 103 | -2.0531 | -18.5029 |
|  | 5 | 96 | -0.0759 | -0.7795 | 103 | -0.1692 | -1.5743 |
|  | 10 | 96 | 0.2339 | 0.8645 | 103 | -0.1982 | -1.5875 |
|  | 20 | 96 | 0.6291 | 1.8262 | 103 | -0.2361 | -1.6451 |
|  | 40 | 96 | 1.2891 | 2.1973 | 103 | -0.1998 | -1.2313 |
|  |  | More than $90 \%$ of all models hold the same type of open positions |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Long positions (condition 2L) |  |  | Short positions (condition 2S) |  |  |
|  | 5 | 657 | 0.1550 | 1.9369 | 686 | -0.0095 | -0.7723 |
|  | 10 | 657 | 0.3180 | 2.7337 | 686 | -0.0381 | -1.3593 |
|  | 20 | 657 | 0.5629 | 3.3276 | 686 | -0.2469 | -3.4639 |
|  | 40 | 657 | 0.5392 | 1.1534 | 686 | -0.2504 | -3.5452 |

The table presents the means of exchange rates changes over i business days ( $C^{2} R_{t+j}$ ) under four different conditions.
Condition IL (S) comprises all situations where more than $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of all trading systems have been moving monotonically from short to long (long to short) positions over the past $3(5,10)$ business days. The moves are restricted to a range of the position index Plt between 80 and -80 .
Condition $2 \mathrm{~L}(S)$ comprises all situations beyond this range. i.e. where more than $90 \%$ of all trading systems hold long (short) positions.
More formally these conditions are defined as follows:
Condition IL (S): $\quad\left[\mathrm{PI}_{t}-\mathrm{Pl}_{\left.\mathrm{t}_{-1}\right]}>\mathrm{k}(<-\mathrm{k}) \cap\left[\mathrm{Pl}_{t_{-n}}-\mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}_{-n-1}}\right] \geq 0(\leq=0) \cap\left[-80 \leq \mathrm{PI}_{t} \leq 80\right]\right.$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { k..... } 20,40,80 \\
& \text { i...... } 3,5,10 \\
& \text { n...... } 0,1, \ldots \mathrm{i}_{-1}
\end{aligned}
$$

Condition 2L (S): $\mathrm{PI}>80(<-80)$
CER $_{++j}=100^{*}\left[E R_{+j}-E R_{+}\right] / E R_{+}$

```
for \(j . . . . . . .5,10,20,40\)
```

CER ${ }_{t+j}=100^{*}\left[E R_{t}-E R_{t+j}\right] / E R_{+} \quad$ for $j \ldots \ldots . . .-3,-5,-10$
The t-statistic tests for the significance of the difference between the mean of the conditional exchange rate changes and the unconditional mean over the entire sample, the latter being as follows:

For $j=$| 3 | 0.0220 |
| ---: | ---: |
| 5 | 0.0362 |
| 10 | 0.0717 |
| 20 | 0.1456 |
|  | 40 |

Conditions 2 occur more frequently than conditions 1 . In 657 cases more than $90 \%$ of all models hold a long position (condition 2L). Since the dollar was depreciating over the entire sample period, condition $2 S$ was slightly more frequently realized ( 686 cases).
Despite the different restrictions imposed on conditions $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ and $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ either of them is fulfilled on 1767 days out of the entire sample of 2080 days. ${ }^{14}$ ) This behaviour of technical models can hardly be reconciled with the hypothesis that daily exchange rates follow a (near) random walk.

The means of the exchange rate changes (CERt) on all days satisfying condition 1 over the past $3(5,10)$ days are very much higher than the unconditional means over the entire sample period. E. g., the average (relative) exchange rate change over 5 consecutive days amounts to $0.0362 \%$ between 1999 and 2006, however, when $20 \%$ of the technical models turn their open position from short to long within 5 days the exchange rate increases on average by $1.343 \%$. This highly significant difference ( $t$-statistic: 15.8 ) can be explained as the result of the simultaneous interaction between exchange rate movements and the changes of open positions by technical models.
The means of the conditional exchange rate changes over the $5(10,20,40)$ days following the realization of condition 1 L have the same (positive) sign as the preceding change in the position index (except for 2 out of 12 cases) and are significantly different from the unconditional means in 6 cases. These cases concern the exchange rate changes over the 20 and 40 days subsequent to the realization of condition IL (table 28). This result suggests that the switching of technical models from short to long positions reinforces the appreciation movement.

Such a price effect of technical trading seems to be weaker when models change their position from long to short. Only when more than $40 \%$ of the models switch from long positions to short positions within 10 business days (condition $1 S[80 / 10]$ ) are the subsequent exchange rate changes markedly smaller than on average over the entire sample. However, the statistical significance of this relationship is comparatively weak.
Subsequent to the realizations of condition 2, i. e., when $90 \%$ of all models hold a long (short) position, the exchange rate rises (falls) much stronger than on average over the entire sample (table 28). The means of the conditional (ex-ante) exchange rate changes have the same sign as the preceding change in the position index, and are more significantly different from the unconditional means than in the case of conditions 1 . This implies that the probability of a prolongation of an exchange rate trend is higher after (almost) all models have opened the same - long or short - position as compared to those phases where the models are still changing their positions. The frequent continuation of exchange rate trends after conditions 2 are satisfied must be attributed to the transactions of non-technical traders ("bandwagonists") since technical traders are just keeping their positions.

[^12]Table 29: Eight phases of technical trading of 2265 daily models and subsequent exchange rate movements
Price series: Daily dollar/euro exchange rate

| Conditions for CER $_{t+j}$ | Time spanj of CER $_{\text {t }}$ j | (Increasing) Long positions (Conditions .L.) |  |  | (Increasing) Short position (Conditions.S.) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { I= Phases } \\ \text { of } \end{gathered}$ |  | Number of cases | Mean of $C E R_{t+j}$ | t-statistic | Number of cases | Mean of $\operatorname{CER}_{t+j}$ | t-statistic |
| Technical trading) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 A | 5 | 43 | 0.0972 | 0.3166 | 119 | 0.0185 | -0.1351 |
| 1 B | 5 | 103 | 0.0297 | -0.0471 | 39 | 0.0593 | 0.1166 |
| 2A | 5 | 267 | 0.0536 | 0.1986 | 286 | 0.0425 | 0.0768 |
| 2 B | 5 | 390 | 0.2243 | 2.4572 | 400 | -0.0466 | -1.1052 |
| 1 A | 10 | 43 | -0.1301 | -0.6451 | 119 | 0.1162 | 0.4099 |
| 1 B | 10 | 103 | 0.3275 | 1.4126 | 39 | 0.1573 | 0.2659 |
| 2A | 10 | 267 | 0.2285 | 1.1356 | 286 | 0.0254 | -0.4063 |
| 2 B | 10 | 390 | 0.3793 | 2.8474 | 400 | -0.0835 | -1.5507 |
| 1 A | 20 | 43 | 0.4721 | 0.6760 | 119 | 0.2120 | 0.2669 |
| 1 B | 20 | 103 | 0.7344 | 2.0532 | 39 | -0.0848 | -0.5602 |
| 2A | 20 | 267 | 0.8929 | 3.7616 | 286 | -0.3456 | -3.1883 |
| 2 B | 20 | 390 | 0.3369 | 1.3220 | 400 | -0.1763 | -2.2485 |
| 1 A | 40 | 43 | 1.1849 | 1.1885 | 119 | 0.2213 | -0.2645 |
| 1 B | 40 | 103 | 1.5590 | 2.8415 | 39 | 0.5589 | 0.2915 |
| 2A | 40 | 267 | 0.9090 | 2.0766 | 286 | 0.0760 | -1.0420 |
| 2 B | 40 | 390 | 0.2860 | -0.2541 | 400 | -0.4838 | -4.2617 |

Each of the four phases of technical trading defined by the conditions $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ and the conditions $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ for $\mathrm{k}=40$ and $\mathrm{i}=5$ (see table 4) is divided into two subphases by the conditions A and B :
Condition IL (S): More than $20 \%$ of all trading systems have been moving from short to long (long to short) positions over the past five 30 -minutes-intervals within the range $\left\{-80 \leq \mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}} \leq 80\right\}$ and ....
Condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S}) \mathrm{A}$ : Less than $50 \%$ of the models hold long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}} \leq 0\left(\mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}} \geq 0\right)$.
Condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S}) \mathrm{B}$ : More than $50 \%$ of the models hold long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{+} \geq 0\left(\mathrm{Pl}_{+} \leq 0\right)$.
Condition 2L (S): More than $90 \%$ of all trading systems hold long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{+}>80$ ( $\mathrm{Pl}+<-80$ ).
Condition $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S}) \mathrm{A}$ : Comprises the first five 30-minutes-intervals for which condition $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ holds true.
Condition 2L (S) B: Comprises the other 30-minutes-intervals for which condition 2L (S) holds true.
The $t$-statistics tests for the significance of the difference between the mean of the conditional stock price changes and the unconditional mean over the entire sample, the latter being 0.0362 (for $\mathrm{j}=5$ ).

Finally, the following exercise is carried out. Each of the four phases of technical trading as defined by the conditions $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ and $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ is divided into two sub-phases by the (additional) conditions $A$ and $B$ (the parameters of condition 1 are set at $k=40$ and $i=5$ ). The meaning of the (sub)conditions $A$ and $B$ is explained as follows, taking an upward trend as example (figure 14):

- Condition ILA comprises all cases where $20 \%$ of all models have changed their positions from long to short and where at the same time still less than $50 \%$ of the models hold long positions. Hence, condition ILA covers the first phase of reversing technical positions after stock prices have started to rise (all cases under condition ILA lie below the zero level of the position index - see figure 14).
- Condition ILB comprises the second phase of position changes, e. g., when a stock price trends has gained momentum so that already more that $50 \%$ of the models are holding long positions.
- Condition 2LA covers the third phase in the trading behaviour of technical models during an upward trend, namely, the first 5 trading intervals (days or 30 -minutes-intervals, respectively) after more than $90 \%$ of all models have opened and are still holding long positions.
- Condition 2LB comprises the other trading intervals over which $90 \%$ of all models keep holding long positions, i.e., the fourth and last phase which endures until the models start to again reverse their position in reaction to a downward movement.
The size of the conditional ex-ante exchange rate changes differs strongly across the four phases of an appreciation trend (table 29). When $25 \%$ of the models have switched from short to long positions and more than $50 \%$ of the models are still short (condition ILA) the appreciation movements often do not persist. Hence, the means of the conditional exchange rate changes following the realization of conditions ILA differ only insignificantly from the unconditional means.
The ex-ante dollar/euro exchange rate changes get significantly positive after the exchange rate trend has gained momentum (condition 1LB) and during the first 5 days after $90 \%$ of all models have taken long positions (condition 2LA). Exchange rate changes subsequent to the realizations of condition 2LB are significantly positive over the subsequent 5 and 10 days, but much smaller or even negative over the subsequent 20 and 40 days. The main reason for this result is the fact that the longer a trend lasts, the higher becomes the probability of a reversal. Exchange rate changes subsequent to the four conditions of technical trading during depreciation trends differ from the average change over the entire sample period in only three cases, namely, following the conditions 2 SA and 2 SB over 20 days, and following the condition 2SB over 40 days.

Table 30: Aggregate trading signals of 2466 30-minutes models and subsequent exchange rate movements
Price series: Dollar/DM exchange rate at 30-minutes intervals

| Parameters of the conditions for | Time spanj <br> of CER | More than $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of all models change open positions in the same direction within 3 (5,. 10) 30-minutes-intervalls |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| k | j | From short to long positions (condition 1L) |  |  | From long to short position (condition 1S) |  |  |
|  |  | Number of cases | Mean of $\mathrm{CER}_{\text {+ }+\mathrm{j}}$ | t-statistic | Number of cases | Mean of $\mathrm{CER}_{\text {t }+\mathrm{j}}$ | t-statistic |
| 20 | -3 | 5236 | 0.1913 | 61.5604 | 5317 | -0.1839 | -63.5623 |
|  | 5 | 5236 | 0.0079 | 2.1862 | 5317 | 0.0007 | -0.0000 |
|  | 10 | 5236 | 0.0160 | 3.1641 | 5317 | -0.0033 | -1.0447 |
|  | 20 | 5236 | 0.0206 | 3.0167 | 5317 | -0.0175 | -3.4895 |
|  | 40 | 5236 | 0.0232 | 2.1020 | 5317 | -0.0187 | -3.1977 |
| 40 | -5 | 2353 | 0.2683 | 45.2376 | 2501 | -0.2639 | -47.1256 |
|  | 5 | 2353 | 0.0153 | 3.1569 | 2501 | -0.0005 | -0.2463 |
|  | 10 | 2353 | 0.0199 | 2.9164 | 2501 | -0.0014 | -0.4327 |
|  | 20 | 2353 | 0.0238 | 2.6336 | 2501 | -0.0131 | -1.9374 |
|  | 40 | 2353 | 0.0069 | 0.0679 | 2501 | -0.0078 | -1.2436 |
| 80 | -10 | 1152 | 0.5120 | 48.9642 | 1362 | -0.4543 | -51.4489 |
|  | 5 | 1152 | 0.0121 | 1.6441 | 1362 | -0.0008 | -0.2127 |
|  | 10 | 1152 | 0.0216 | 2.1641 | 1362 | -0.0014 | -0.3219 |
|  | 20 | 1152 | 0.0302 | 2.5754 | 1362 | -0.0057 | -0.7727 |
|  | 40 | 1152 | 0.0092 | 0.1804 | 1362 | 0.0216 | 1.0069 |
|  |  | More than $90 \%$ of all models hold the same type of open positions |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Long positions (condition 2L) |  |  | Short positions (condition 2S) |  |  |
|  | 5 | 8714 | 0.0003 | -0.1920 | 8096 | -0.0025 | -1.4235 |
|  | 10 | 8714 | 0.0038 | 0.7997 | 8096 | -0.0079 | -3.1052 |
|  | 20 | 8714 | 0.0104 | 1.7138 | 8096 | -0.0085 | -2.7134 |
|  | 40 | 8714 | -0.0204 | -3.9697 | 8096 | 0.0230 | 2.6022 |

The table presents the means of exchange rates changes over i business days ( $\mathrm{CER}_{\mathrm{tj}}$ ) under four different conditions. Condition IL (S) comprises all situations where more than $10 \%(20 \%, 40 \%)$ of all trading systems have been moving monotonically from short to long (long to short) positions over the past $3(5,10)$ business days. The moves are restricted to a range of the position index Plt between 80 and -80 .
Condition $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ comprises all situations beyond this range. i.e. where more than $90 \%$ of all trading systems hold long (short) positions.
More formally these conditions are defined as follows:
Condition IL (S): $\quad\left[\mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}}-\mathrm{Pl}_{\left.\mathrm{t}_{--}\right]}>\mathrm{k}(<-\mathrm{k}) \cap\left[\mathrm{PI}_{t_{-n}}-\mathrm{Pl}_{-n-n-1}\right] \geq 0(\leq=0) \cap\left[-80 \leq \mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}} \leq 80\right]\right.$

> k......20, 40, 80
> i.......3, 5, 10
> n....... $1, \ldots$ it-1

Condition 2L (S): PI > $80(<-80)$
CER $_{++j}=100^{*}\left[E R_{+j+j}-E R_{+}\right] / E R_{+} \quad$ for $j . . . . . . .5,10,20,40$
CER ${ }_{t+j}=100 *\left[E R_{t}-E R_{t+j}\right] / E R_{+} \quad$ for $j \ldots \ldots . . .-3,-5,-10$
The t-statistic tests for the significance of the difference between the mean of the conditional exchange rate changes and the unconditional mean over the entire sample, the latter being as follows:

For $\mathrm{j}=\quad$| 3 | 0.0004 |
| ---: | ---: |
| 5 | 0.0007 |
|  | 10 |
|  | 0.0015 |
|  | 40 |
|  | 0.0030 |
|  |  |

Table 31: Eight phases of technical trading of 2466 30-minutes models and subsequent exchange rate movements
Price series: Dollar/euro exchange rate at 30 -minutes intervalls

| Conditions for CER $_{t+j}$ | Time spanj of $C E R_{t+j}$ | (Increasing) Long positions (Conditions .L.) |  |  | (Increasing) Short position (Conditions .S.) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { I }=\text { Phases } \\ \text { of } \end{gathered}$ |  | Number of cases | Mean of $C E R_{+}+\mathrm{j}$ | t-statistic | Number of cases | Mean of $C E R_{+}+\mathrm{j}$ | t-statistic |
| Technical trading) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 A | 5 | 660 | -0.0059 | -0.7681 | 1773 | 0.0007 | 0.0000 |
| 1 B | 5 | 1693 | 0.0236 | 4.2063 | 728 | -0.0032 | -0.4606 |
| 2A | 5 | 4351 | -0.0081 | -2.9577 | 4043 | -0.0011 | -0.5625 |
| 2B | 5 | 4363 | 0.0086 | 2.8602 | 4053 | -0.0040 | -1.5550 |
| 1 A | 10 | 660 | 0.0009 | -0.0489 | 1773 | 0.0000 | -0.1935 |
| 1 B | 10 | 1693 | 0.0272 | 3.5204 | 728 | -0.0047 | -0.4757 |
| 2A | 10 | 4351 | -0.0104 | -3.0064 | 4043 | -0.0099 | -2.6783 |
| 2B | 10 | 4363 | 0.0179 | 4.1440 | 4053 | -0.0060 | -1.8260 |
| 1 A | 20 | 660 | 0.0259 | 1.3220 | 1773 | -0.0115 | -1.5577 |
| 1 B | 20 | 1693 | 0.0230 | 2.3307 | 728 | -0.0169 | -1.1614 |
| 2A | 20 | 4351 | -0.0008 | -0.6842 | 4043 | -0.0083 | -2.0299 |
| 2B | 20 | 4363 | 0.0216 | 2.9282 | 4053 | -0.0088 | -1.9254 |
| 1 A | 40 | 660 | 0.0461 | 1.6618 | 1773 | 0.0069 | 0.0619 |
| 1B | 40 | 1693 | -0.0083 | -1.0819 | 728 | -0.0436 | -2.3057 |
| 2 A | 40 | 4351 | -0.0185 | -2.6345 | 4043 | 0.0097 | 0.3959 |
| 2 B | 40 | 4363 | -0.0223 | -3.0902 | 4053 | 0.0364 | 3.4022 |

Each of the four phases of technical trading defined by the conditions $1 \mathrm{LL}(\mathrm{S})$ and the conditions $2 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ for $\mathrm{k}=40$ and $\mathrm{i}=5$ (see table 4) is divided into two subphases by the conditions A and B :
Condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ : More than $20 \%$ of all trading systems have been moving from short to long (long to short) positions over the past five 30 -minutes-intervals within the range $\left\{-80 \leq \mathrm{Pl}_{\ddagger} \leq 80\right\}$ and ....
Condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S})$ A: Less than $50 \%$ of the models hold long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{\mathrm{t}} \leq 0\left(\mathrm{Pl}_{+} \geq 0\right)$. Condition $1 \mathrm{~L}(\mathrm{~S}) \mathrm{B}:$ More than $50 \%$ of the models holg long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{+} \geq 0\left(\mathrm{Pl}_{+} \leq 0\right)$.
Condition 2L (S): More than $90 \%$ of all trading systems hold long (short) positions, i.e., $\mathrm{Pl}_{\uparrow}>80$ ( $\mathrm{Pl}_{\uparrow}<-80$ ).
Condition 2L (S) A: Comprises the first five 30-minutes-intervals for which condition 2L (S) holds true. Condition 2L (S) B: Comprises the other 30-minutes-intervals for which condition 2L (S) holds true.
The t-statistics tests for the significance of the difference between the mean of the conditional stock price changes and the unconditional mean over the entire sample, the latter being 0.0007 (for $\mathrm{j}=5$ ).

Tables 30 and 31 document the relationship between the trading behaviour of 2466 models based on 30 -minutes data and the simultaneous as well as the subsequent movements of the dollar/euro exchange rate at 30 -minutes intervals (the tables are analogous to the tables 28 and 29 for daily models and exchange rates). The main results can be summarized as follows:

- When the technical models change open positions at a certain speed (as defined by the conditions 1 L and 1 S ) then the simultaneous exchange rate changes are much
stronger than on average over the entire sample. The respective t-statistic exceeds 40 in any of the 6 cases.
- The means of exchange rate changes over the $5(10,20,40) 30$-minutes-intervals following the realization of condition 1 have in 22 out of 24 cases the same sign as the preceding change in the position index and are in most cases significantly different from the unconditional means (table 30). However, this relationship holds true to a greater extent for appreciation movements than for depreciation movements.
- After those 30 -minutes-intervals during which $90 \%$ of all models hold already a long position (condition 2L) exchange rates do often not continue to rise stronger than on average over the entire sample. Hence, the mean exchange rate change over the first 5 intervals following condition 2 L is slightly smaller than the unconditional mean (for the same reason, the means of the exchange rate changes following the conditions 2LA in table 31 are negative). However, over the 10 and 20 intervals of 30 minutes after the realization of condition 2 L (when a trend has gained some persistence), the exchange rate continues to rise stronger than on average over the entire period.
- Over a time span of 40 intervals (roughly one trading day), the average exchange rate change becomes significantly negative. This result reflects the fact that exchange rate trends based on 30-minutes intervals are less persistent than daily trends, often reverting into a counter-movement.
- This pattern is less pronounced after those 30-minutes-intervals during which $90 \%$ of all models hold already a short position (condition 2 S ). However, also in this case are is the mean of exchange rate changes over 40 intervals of 30 minutes following the realization of condition $2 S$ significantly positive, indicating the trend reverting behaviour of exchange rate movements.
The above analysis of the aggregate trading behaviour of technical models implies that the transactions of technical traders and of other "bandwagonists" interact with exchange rate dynamics in such a way as to bring about clusters of transactions. In turn, these clusters of either buy or sell transactions strengthen the trending behaviour of exchange rates.


## 6. Concluding remarks

The most important results of the present study are as follows:
First, the dollar/euro as well as the dollar/deutschmark exchange rate fluctuate most of the time around "underlying" short-term trends which occur on the basis of daily data as well as on the basis of intraday data. Over a extended period of time, these trends (e. g., monotonic movements when the original data are smoothed by moving averages) last longer in one direction than in the other. The accumulation of upward (downward) runs lasting longer than counter-movements brings about a "bull market" ("bear market") in a stepwise process.
Second, the phenomenon of trending of exchange rates (as well as of asset prices in
general) represents the sole source of profitability of technical trading systems. Since exchange rate trends are more persistent on the basis of daily data as compared to intraday data, the simple models tested in this study perfom better when daily data are user instead of 30 -minutes data. The fact that "whipsaws" (i. e., short "sideways" fluctuations) are more pronounced on the basis of intraday data as compared to daily data, also contributes to the worse performance of 30 -minutes models relative to daily models (the result might be different if more sophisticated models had been tested which also account for volatility - in practice, those types of models are actually applied).
Third, there operates a strong feed-back mechanism between the transactions of technical models and exchange rate movements. Rising (falling) exchange rates cause increasingly more technical models to produce buy (sell) signals. The execultion of these trading signals in turn strengthens and lengthens the upward (downward) trend.

An evaluation of these results with respect to the "fundamentalist hypothesis" on the one hand, and the "bull-bear-hypothesis" on the other hand as sketched in chapter 2 suggests the following. The empirical evidence as elaborated in this study seems to be more in line with the "bull-bear-hypothesis" as compared to the "fundamentalist hypothesis". However, much more research has still to be done on this controversal issue.

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## Annex

Table AI: Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Daily dollar/euro rates

|  | Runlength | Upward runs |  |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |  | Contribution to overall change in price |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Number |  | Average | Average slope 1) |  | Number |  | Average | Average slope 1) |  | Upward runs |  | Downward runs |  |
|  |  |  |  | Days |  |  |  |  | Days |  |  | In cents | In \% | In cents | In \% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Based on original data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $2000 / 10 / 25$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 57.0 \\ (59.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.560 \\ (0.502) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 42.0 \\ (59.3) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.536 \\ & -(0.504) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 31.9 \\ (29.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 33.3 \\ (25.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -22.5 \\ & -(29.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.3 \\ (25.3) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 36.0 \\ (29.6) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.436 \\ (0.499) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 27.0 \\ (29.5) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.499 \\ & -(0.498) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 31.4 \\ (29.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 32.8 \\ (25.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -26.9 \\ & -(29.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.7 \\ (24.8) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 12.0 \\ (14.8) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.329 \\ (0.497) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 24.0 \\ (14.8) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.527 \\ & -(0.504) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.8 \\ (22.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.3 \\ (18.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -37.9 \\ & -(22.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 29.1 \\ (18.9) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 5.0 \\ (7.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.681 \\ (0.505) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 8.0 \\ (7.3) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.456 \\ & -(0.502) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 13.6 \\ (15.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.2 \\ (12.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -14.6 \\ & -(14.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.2 \\ (12.4) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.380 \\ (0.506) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (3.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.500 \\ & -(0.506) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (9.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (7.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -15.0 \\ -(9.3) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.5 \\ & (7.8) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.429 \\ (0.497) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.336 \\ & -(0.496) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 5.2 \\ (5.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.4 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -8.1 \\ & -(5.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.2 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | * | (7.97) | (0.508) |  | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 7.50 \\ (8.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.343 \\ & -(0.505) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (7.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (6.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.1 \\ & -(7.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.9 \\ (6.2) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 113.0 \\ (118.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.79 \\ (1.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.474 \\ (0.501) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 113.0 \\ (118.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.38 \\ (1.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.484 \\ & -(0.502) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 95.8 \\ (118.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -130.2 \\ & -(118.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | 5-days moving average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $2000 / 10 / 25$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 17.0 \\ (13.5) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.060 \\ (0.071) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.0 \\ (13.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.066 \\ & -(0.072) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (1.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.6 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.7 \\ & -(1.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (6.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.125 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (6.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.091 \\ & -(0.105) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (1.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.9 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.1 \\ & -(1.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (4.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.164 \\ (0.135) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (4.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.210 \\ & -(0.133) \end{aligned}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 1.5 \\ (1.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.9 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.5 \\ & -(1.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.5 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (3.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.246 \\ (0.160) \end{gathered}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (3.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.192 \\ & -(0.157) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.1 \\ (3.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.5 \\ & -(1.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.1 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 7.0 \\ (5.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.225 \\ (0.198) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (5.3) \end{gathered}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.039 \\ & -(0.199) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 7.9 \\ (5.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20.6 \\ & (9.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2 \\ & -(5.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.3 \\ (10.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (3.5) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.231 \\ (0.231) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.204 \\ & -(0.231) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.8 \\ (4.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.2 \\ (9.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -3.7 \\ & -(4.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.1 \\ (9.4) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7.0 \\ (12.5) \end{array}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 10.57 \\ (10.88) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.292 \\ (0.268) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 18.0 \\ (12.4) \end{gathered}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 12.94 \\ (10.88) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.266 \\ & -(0.269) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 21.6 \\ (36.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 56.6 \\ (69.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -62.0 \\ & -(36.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86.4 \\ (69.5) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 44.0 \\ (48.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.80 \\ (4.83) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.229 \\ (0.224) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 45.0 \\ (48.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.64 \\ (4.82) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.240 \\ & -(0.224) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 38.3 \\ (52.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -71.7 \\ & -(52.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: Values in parentheses are expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *},{ }^{* * *}\right)$ indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%$ $(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

Table Al (cont.): Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Daily dollar/euro rates


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: Values in parentheses are expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *}\right.$, ${ }^{* * *}$ ) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%$ $(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

Table Al (cont.): Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Daily dollar/euro rates


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: Values in parentheses are expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *}\right.$, ${ }^{* * *}$ ) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%$ $(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

Table Al (cont.): Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Daily dollar/euro rates

|  | Run length | Upward runs |  |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |  | Contribution to overall change in price |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Number |  | Average | Average slope 1) |  | Number |  | Average | Average slope 1) |  | Upward runs |  | Downward runs |  |
|  |  |  |  | Days |  |  |  |  | Days |  |  | In cents | In \% | In cents | In \% |
|  |  | Based on original data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 2004/12/30 - } \\ & \text { 2006/12/30 } \end{aligned}$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 72.0 \\ (65.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.499 \\ (0.510) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 73.0 \\ (65.1) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.433 \\ & -(0.511) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 35.9 \\ (33.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 28.5 \\ (25.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -31.6 \\ & -(33.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24.4 \\ (25.2) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 41.0 \\ (32.6) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.491 \\ (0.507) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 32.0 \\ (32.5) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.439 \\ & -(0.507) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 40.3 \\ (33.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 31.9 \\ (25.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -28.1 \\ & -(33.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21.7 \\ (25.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 15.0 \\ (16.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.329 \\ (0.504) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 24.0 \\ (16.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.527 \\ & -(0.509) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.8 \\ (24.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.3 \\ (18.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -37.9 \\ & -(24.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29.1 \\ & (18.8) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (8.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.619 \\ (0.516) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{aligned} & 12.0 \\ & (8.1) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.537 \\ & -(0.508) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 14.9 \\ (16.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.8 \\ (12.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -25.8 \\ & -(16.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19.9 \\ (12.5) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (4.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.470 \\ (0.510) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (4.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.392 \\ -(0.512) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 7.1 \\ (10.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.6 \\ (7.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -5.9 \\ -(10.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.5 \\ (7.8) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.553 \\ (0.509) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (2.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.598 \\ & -(0.508) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.6 \\ (6.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.3 \\ (4.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -7.2 \\ -(6.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.5 \\ (4.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | * | (7.99) | (0.500) | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{aligned} & 8.00 \\ & (8.02) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.498 \\ & -(0.512) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (7.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0 \\ (5.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.0 \\ & -(7.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (6.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 139.0 \\ (129.9) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 1.80 \\ (1.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.505 \\ (0.508) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 139.0 \\ (129.9) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 1.93 \\ (1.99) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.484 \\ -(0.509) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 126.3 \\ (131.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -129.7 \\ & -(131.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | 5-days moving average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 2004 / 12 / 30- \\ & 2006 / 12 / 30 \end{aligned}$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 15.0 \\ (14.9) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.063 \\ (0.073) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.0 \\ (15.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.049 \\ & -(0.073) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 0.9 \\ (1.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.5 \\ & -(1.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.9 \\ (1.9) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & 11.0 \\ & (7.2) \end{aligned}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.089 \\ (0.107) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{aligned} & 10.0 \\ & (7.2) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.125 \\ & -(0.107) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (1.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.5 \\ (2.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -2.5 \\ & -(1.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.3 \\ (2.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (4.5) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.120 \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{aligned} & 10.0 \\ & (4.4) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.153 \\ & -(0.136) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.1 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.6 \\ & -(1.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.9 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (3.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.125 \\ (0.164) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.0 \\ (3.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.117 \\ & -(0.160) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (2.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.5 \\ (3.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.5 \\ & -(2.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 8.0 \\ (5.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.231 \\ (0.201) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \\ (5.8) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.183 \\ -(0.200) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 9.2 \\ (5.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 16.3 \\ & (9.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.5 \\ & -(5.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.5 \\ \text { (9.9) } \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 5.0 \\ (4.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.293 \\ (0.234) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (3.9) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.224 \\ & -(0.236) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 8.8 \\ (5.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 15.5 \\ & (9.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.0 \\ & -(5.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.9 \\ (9.4) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.0 \\ (13.6) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 11.20 \\ (10.91) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.291 \\ (0.271) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 15.0 \\ (13.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 10.47 \\ (10.92) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.259 \\ & -(0.273) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 32.6 \\ (40.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 57.6 \\ (69.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -40.6 \\ & -(40.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 69.7 \\ (69.5) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 56.0 \\ (53.3) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 4.36 \\ (4.83) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.232 \\ (0.226) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 56.0 \\ (53.2) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 4.82 \\ (4.83) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.216 \\ & -(0.227) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 56.6 \\ (58.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -58.2 \\ & -(58.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: Values in parentheses are expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *},{ }^{* * *}\right.$ ) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%$ $(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

Table A2: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs
Daily dollar/euro rates


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A2 (cont.): Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs
Daily dollar/euro


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A3: Classification of exchange rate runs by duration: Daily dollar/deutschmark rates Daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998

|  | Run length | Upward runs |  |  |  |  | Downward runs |  |  |  |  | Contribution to overall change in price |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Number |  | Average | Average |  | Number |  | Average | Average |  | Upwa | d runs | Down | ard runs |
|  |  |  |  | Days |  |  | Days |  |  |  |  | In cents | In \% | In cents | In \% |
|  |  | Based on original data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1987/01/01 - } \\ & \text { 1995/04/19 } \end{aligned}$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 256.0 \\ (265.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.567 \\ (0.665) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 250.0 \\ (265.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.637 \\ & -(0.665) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 145.2 \\ (176.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21.6 \\ (25.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -159.2 \\ & -(176.2) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25.3 \\ (24.9) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 122.0 \\ (132.3) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.658 \\ (0.664) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 146.0 \\ (133.0) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.540 \\ & -(0.664) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 160.6 \\ (175.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.9 \\ (24.9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -157.7 \\ & -(176.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 25.0 \\ (25.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 70.0 \\ (66.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.638 \\ (0.666) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 68.0 \\ (66.3) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.634 \\ & -(0.667) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 134.0 \\ (132.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19.9 \\ & (18.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -129.4 \\ & -(132.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.5 \\ (18.8) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 38.0 \\ (33.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.599 \\ (0.665) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 29.0 \\ (33.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.567 \\ & -(0.664) \end{aligned}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 91.0 \\ (88.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.5 \\ (12.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -65.8 \\ & -(87.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.4 \\ (12.4) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 18.0 \\ (16.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.692 \\ (0.665) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 22.0 \\ (16.6) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.670 \\ & -(0.669) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 62.3 \\ (55.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.3 \\ (7.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -73.7 \\ & -(55.4) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.7 \\ & (7.8) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 9.0 \\ (8.3) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.610 \\ (0.666) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (8.3) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.818 \\ & -(0.664) \end{aligned}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 32.9 \\ (33.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.9 \\ (4.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -19.6 \\ -(33.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.1 \\ (4.7) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.0 \\ & (8.5) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 7.55 \\ (7.98) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.565 \\ (0.662) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 5.0 \\ (8.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{aligned} & 8.00 \\ & (7.98) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.628 \\ & -(0.664) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 46.9 \\ (44.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.0 \\ (6.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -25.1 \\ & -(45.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \\ (6.4) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 524.0 \\ (530.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.08 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.618 \\ (0.665) \end{gathered}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 524.0 \\ (530.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.98 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.609 \\ & -(0.665) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 672.8 \\ (706.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -630.6 \\ & -(707.0) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | 5-days moving average |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1987/01/01 - } \\ & \text { 1995/04/19 } \end{aligned}$ | 1 | $\begin{gathered} 51.0 \\ (60.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.084 \\ (0.094) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 70.0 \\ (60.2) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 1.00 \\ (1.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.068 \\ & -(0.094) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 4.3 \\ (5.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.3 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -4.7 \\ & -(5.7) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.7 \\ (1.8) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{gathered} 22.0 \\ (28.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.138 \\ (0.137) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 21.0 \\ (28.9) \end{gathered}$ | * | $\begin{gathered} 2.00 \\ (2.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.133 \\ & -(0.137) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.1 \\ (7.8) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.6 \\ & -(7.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.9 \\ (2.5) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 3 | $\begin{gathered} 20.0 \\ (18.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.150 \\ (0.176) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 15.0 \\ (18.1) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ (3.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.130 \\ & -(0.175) \end{aligned}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 9.0 \\ (9.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.8 \\ (3.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -5.9 \\ & -(9.5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \\ (3.0) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 4 | $\begin{gathered} 13.0 \\ (13.3) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.186 \\ (0.209) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 10.0 \\ (13.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 4.00 \\ (4.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.185 \\ & -(0.209) \end{aligned}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 9.7 \\ (11.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.0 \\ (3.5) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -7.4 \\ -(11.2) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.6 \\ (3.6) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | 5 | $\begin{gathered} 19.0 \\ (23.4) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.273 \\ (0.262) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 24.0 \\ (23.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 5.00 \\ (5.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.288 \\ -(0.261) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{aligned} & 26.0 \\ & (30.6) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.9 \\ \text { (9.7) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -34.5 \\ & -(30.8) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12.1 \\ & (9.7) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 6 | $\begin{gathered} 21.0 \\ (16.0) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.274 \\ (0.305) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 15.0 \\ (15.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 6.00 \\ (6.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.385 \\ & -(0.308) \end{aligned}$ | *** | $\begin{gathered} 34.6 \\ (29.3) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10.6 \\ & (9.3) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -34.7 \\ & -(29.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12.1 \\ & (9.2) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $\geq 7$ | $\begin{gathered} 62.0 \\ (56.6) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.21 \\ (10.95) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.342 \\ (0.357) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 53.0 \\ (56.7) \end{gathered}$ | - | $\begin{gathered} 11.04 \\ (11.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.331 \\ & -(0.356) \end{aligned}$ | ** | $\begin{gathered} 237.4 \\ (221.4) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 72.6 \\ (70.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -193.3 \\ & -(221.9) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 67.6 \\ (70.2) \end{gathered}$ |
|  | All | $\begin{gathered} 208.0 \\ (216.7) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 5.40 \\ (4.89) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.291 \\ (0.298) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 208.0 \\ (216.7) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 4.77 \\ & (4.90) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.288 \\ & -(0.298) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 326.9 \\ (315.7) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -286.1 \\ & -(316.1) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100.0 \\ (100.0) \end{gathered}$ |

1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: See tables A1.

Table A3 (cont.): Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.

Notes: See tables A1.

Table A4: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs
Daily dollar/deutschmark rates 1987-1998


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

Table A5: Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30-minutes-interval in cents.

Notes: See tables A1.

Table A5 (cont.): Classification of exchange rate runs by duration
Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30 -minutes-interval in cents.

Notes: See tables A1.

Table A6: Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs
Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per30-minutes interval in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

Notes: The table compares the observed numbers and slopes of exchange rate runs by duration to their expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences (the observed difference in the case of random walks with drift) and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *},{ }^{* * *}\right)$ indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walkhypothesis at the $10 \%(5 \%, 1 \%)$ level.

Table A6 (cont.): Non-random components in duration and slope of exchange rate runs
Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per30-minutes interval in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.

The table compares the observed numbers and slopes of exchange rate runs by duration to their expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis. These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000 random walk series. The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first differences (the observed difference in the case of random walks with drift) and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate series over the respective-period. ${ }^{*}\left({ }^{* *}\right.$, ${ }^{* * *}$ ) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the $10 \%$ (5\%, 1\%) level.

Table A7: Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999/2000

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30-minutes interval in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective -period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A7 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999/2000

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30-minutes interval in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective -period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A7 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999/2000

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per 30-minutes interval in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective -period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A8: Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002/2004 Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A8 (cont.) : Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002/2004

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A8 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002/2004

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A8 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002/2004

Dollar/euro rates at 30-minutes intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A9: Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999
Dollar/euro rates at 1 -minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per per minute in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A9 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per per minute in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A9 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per per minute in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A9 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bear market" 1999

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per per minute in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective period moving average.

Notes: See tables A6.

Table A10: Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002
Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

Table Al0 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

Table Al0 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

Table Al0 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

Table Al0 (cont.): Non-random components of exchange rate runs during the "bull market" 2002

Dollar/euro rates at 1-minute intervals


1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents. - 2) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed by the respective moving average.
Notes: See tables A6.

[^0]:    1) For survey studies see Group of Thirty, 1985; Taylor-Allen, 1992; Menkhoff, 1997 and 1998; Lui-Mole, 1998; Cheung-Chinn-Marsh, 2004; Cheung-Wong, 2000; Cheung-Chinn, 2001; Oberlechner, 2001; Gehrig-Menkhoff; 2004, 2005A and 2005B.
[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ ) The first part of this chapter draws on chapter 2 in Schulmeister, 2009A.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ ) In a recent, pathbreaking book, Frydman - Goldberg (2007) demonstrate that recognizing the importance of imperfect knowledge is key to understanding outcomes in financial markets and that the difficulties encountered by neoclassical theory and behavioral finance models to explain financial market behaviour stem from their disregard of this insight.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ ) Similar results were already obtained in a study which elaborated the pattern of exchange rate dynamics by measuring the path of the daily deutschmark/dollar exchange rate during the "bull market" 1980/85 as well as during the "bear market" 1985/86 (Schulmeister 1987). The results are confirmed in a recent study on price dynamics in commodity futures markets (Schulmeister, 2009A).

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ ) Tables $A / 3$ and $A / 4$ in the annex document the distribution of runs of the dollar/DM exchange rate in an analogous manner as tables $A / 1$ and $A / 2$ for the dollar/euro rate. The main characteristics of the distribution of exchange rate runs are very similar. E. g., also in the case of the dollar/DM rate did relatively few but persistent runs based on 5 day moving averages account for most of the cumulative "gross" appreciation and depreciation (see table A/3).

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Recent contributions to the debate about the efficiency of asset markets are LeRoy (1989), Shiller (2003), and Lo (2004).

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ ) In the behavioral finance literature trend-following approaches are called "momentum strategies", however, in this study they are termed "trend-following" since in the terminology of technical analysis "momentum" refers to a specific type of model which can be trend-following as well as contrarian.

[^7]:    8) Similar sets of models were used when testing the profitability and price effects of technical trading based on daily data in the foreign exchange market (Schulmeister, 2006; 2008A; 2008B) and - based on daily as well as on 30minutes data - in the stock market (Schulmeister, 2009C).
[^8]:    10) The t-statistic of the means of the single returns measures their statistical significance and, hence, estimates the probability of making an overall loss when following a specific trading rule. The t-statistic is therefore conceptually
[^9]:    different from the Sharpe ratio which measures the univariate risk-return relation. As the number of observations goes to infinity, an estimated t-statistic will go to zero or to positive or negative infinity. By contrast, an estimated Sharpe ratio will converge to the true Sharpe ratio. However, in the context of the present study (with finite samples) the informational content of the $t$-statistic and the Sharpe ratio is equivalent. This is so because the $t$-statistic differs from the Sharpe ratio only by the factor $\sqrt{n-1}$ (where n is the sample size) and by the risk-free rate.

[^10]:    ${ }^{11}$ ) Such a shift to using data of higher frequencies than daily data when applying (automated) trading systems has most probably contributed to the tremendous increase in transaction volume in financial markets in general and in foreign exchange markets in particular (as documented in Schulmeister - Schratzenstaller - Picek, 2008). E.g., between 1986 and 2007 currency transactions in spot and derivatives markets rose by $15.0 \%$ per year.
    ${ }^{12}$ ) Studies on the profitability of technical currency trading based on intraday data arrive at mixed results. Osler (2000), Dempster-Jones (2002) and Gencay et al. (2003) find this type of trading to be profitable, Curcio et al. (1997) and Neely-Weller (2003) arrive at the opposite conclusion. As regards stock trading, Schulmeister (2008B) reports that the profitability of technical models in the stock index futures market has been declining over the 1990s when based on daily data but has remained roughly the same when based on 30-minute-data. However, since 2000 the profitability of technical stock trading based on 30-minute-data has been declining (it might have shifted to even higher data frequencies and/or the use of more complex rules).

[^11]:    ${ }^{13}$ ) This analysis is done only for the dollar/euro exchange rates. There are two reasons for this restriction. First, the analogous investigation concerning the daily dollar/deutschmark market has already been carried out (Schulmeister, 2006; for a similar study on the interaction between technical trading and the dynamics of the daily dollar/yen exchange rate see Schulmeister, 2009B). Second, the respective analysis based on 30-minutes data involves an extremely great amount of calculations.

[^12]:    ${ }^{14}$ ) In order to avoid double-counting only the cases of conditions $1 L(S)[20 / 3]$ are considered as regards condition 1 most cases satisfying condition 1 with $\mathrm{k}=40$ or $\mathrm{k}=80$ are a subset of the cases satisfying condition 1 with $\mathrm{k}=20$.

