Die Österreichischen Bundesbahnen versuchen, durch eine offensive Preis- und Angebotspolitik Marktanteile im Güterverkehr
zurückzugewinnen. Dabei könnten sich Probleme durch Quersubventionen aus Transportbereichen ergeben, in denen die ÖBB ein
Monopol haben oder die aus gesellschaftspolitischen Überlegungen staatlich gestützt werden. Führt man diese Bereiche in eigenständige
Unternehmensformen über, so unterbindet man nicht nur die Quersubventionen, man kann auch in den gestützten Leistungsbereichen
Wettbewerbselemente einführen.
Keywords:Wettbewerbsprobleme im Stückgutverkehr auf der Schiene; Competition Issues in Rail Parcel Service
Forschungsbereich:Regionalökonomie und räumliche Analyse
Sprache:Deutsch
Competition Issues in Rail Parcel Service
The Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB) now offers a complete door-to-door parcel service, combined with other logistical services
("ExpressCargo"). In doing so, they have intensified competition with private haulage contractors. By contrast, the Swiss
Federal Railways (SBB) and the German Railway (DB) abandoned this line of business at the end of 1996 and the end of 1997,
respectively, owing to insufficient earnings. DB and SBB now concentrate their activities on the core sectors of rail transport
and have withdrawn from services which are also offered on competitive markets. The ÖBB, on the other hand, pursue a strategy
of extending their operations with the goal of raising the utilization of existing capacities. With regard to the parcel service,
the government payments to the ÖBB might distort competition between the ÖBB's "ExpressCargo" and the general rail shipment
provided by private haulage contractors. In 1997, the federal government paid ATS 16.4 billion to the ÖBB to reimburse the
ÖBB for the costs of operating the railtrack and of expanding the railroad infrastructure as well as for the costs of providing
public services. These payments are covered by the general social consensus in Austria and are intended to help the "environmentally
friendly" railways compete with road transportation. The environment argument is, however, irrelevant for competition between
"ExpressCargo" and general rail shipment provided by haulage contractors because these services do not differ in their impact
on the environment. Market distortions my also result from the enterprise structure of the ÖBB. The ÖBB are a vertically integrated
firm, with activities ranging from the operation of the infrastructure to rail transport, to logistic services. The ÖBB, moreover,
have the monopoly of "environmentally friendly" rail transport. A vertically integrated firm is likely to support strategically
important lines of activity if this support is necessary for strengthening its overall market position or maximizing profits.
Such cross subsidies are, however, problematic for the entire economy, if such subsidies are drawn from monopoly rents and
from business activities subsidized by the government. In this particular case, the possibility should be ruled out that the
competitive position of "ExpressCargo" vis-à-vis the competing haulage contractors is strengthened by cross subsidies and
that the ÖBB render access to rail services more difficult to competing rail parcel services. Monitoring of the infrastructure
balance sheets and of the use of funds for public services by public accountants and the Ministry for Science and Transportation
may reveal undesirable cross subsidies and market distortions ex post. The establishment of independent enterprises for the
business segments of rail infrastructure, transportation, and logistic would, however, rule out market distortions ex ante.