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WIFO publications and research project papers(4 hits)
Helmut Elsinger, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Christine Zulehner, Competition in Treasury Auctions
WIFO Working Papers, 2016, (512), 33 pages
Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. As the results show, increased competition reduces bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
Online since: 08.03.2016 0:00
Dieter Pennerstorfer, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Nicolas Schutz, Christoph R. Weiss, Biliana Yontcheva, Information and Price Dispersion. Theory and Evidence
WIFO Working Papers, 2015, (502), 63 pages
We examine the relationship between information and price dispersion in the retail gasoline market. We first show that the clearinghouse models in the spirit of Stahl (1989) generate an inverted-U relationship between information and price dispersion. We construct a new measure of information based on precise commuter data from Austria. Regular commuters can freely sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. We use detailed information on gas station level price to construct various measures of price dispersion. Our empirical estimates of the relationship are in line with the theoretical predictions.
Online since: 10.08.2015 0:00
Nikolaus Fink, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Konrad Stahl, Christine Zulehner, Registered Cartels in Austria. An Overview
WIFO Working Papers, 2015, (501), 47 pages
Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country's EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialisation cartels divide markets and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylised facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustaining collusion.
Online since: 27.07.2015 0:00
Gabriel S. Lee, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Bernhard Felderer, Christian Helmenstein, Austrian Demography and Housing Demand: Is There a Connection?
Empirica, 2001, 28(3), pp.259-276